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With the massive growth in the formation of international joint ventures (IJVs) 
over the past three decades, research on firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle 
stages has become an important issue in international business study. 
Although the significance of institutions as a set of constraints on firm 
behaviours has been recognised, our knowledge of the mechanisms through 
which host-country institutions constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-
cycle stages have been limited. This thesis contributes to this research field 
by revealing several new mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages.  
At the stage of IJV formation, we have collected data from 431 outward FDI 
projects conducted by Chinese manufacturing firms between 2006 and 2008 
and examined whether host-country institutions constrain the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) ownership mode choice (OMC) of an IJV through the 
national cultural dimension of IR. We have found that host-country 
indulgence enhances the relationships between transaction-cost attributes of 
an FDI project (a parent firm’s R&D intensity, a parent firm’s host-country 
experience, and host-country political risk) and the FDI OMC of an IJV and 
that the direct relationship between host-country indulgence and the FDI 
OMC of an IJV is insignificant.  
At the stage of IJV operation, we have collected data from 256396 domestic 
firms and 68381 foreign-invested firms in Chinese manufacturing industry 
between 1998 and 2007 and investigated whether host-country institutions 
constrain intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms 
through state ownership of the host-country IJV partner. We have found that 
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state ownership of the host-country IJV partner enhances intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms, especially to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  
At the stage of IJV termination, we have collected data from 16583 
manufacturing IJVs in China between 2005 and 2006 and explored whether 
through two informal mechanisms - rates of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises (WFOEs)/successful WFOEs in a host industry and host-regional 
SOE dominance - and two formal mechanisms - host-regional centrally-
planned allocation of economic resources and FDI-restricted industry - host-
country institutions constrain the conversion of an IJV into a WFOE (CIW). 
We have found (1) positive effects of rates of WFOEs/highly profitable 
WFOEs/high market-share WFOEs in a host industry and (2) a negative effect 
of host-regional SOE dominance, on the CIW. We have also found no 
significant impact of host-country institutions on the CIW through the two 
formal mechanisms. Theoretical, managerial, and policy implications of our 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1  Introduction 
Because of the massive growth in the formation of international joint ventures 
(IJVs) over the past three decades, research on firm behaviours across IJV 
life-cycle stages becomes an important issue in international business study 
(Steensma, Barden, Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Tihanyi, 2008). An IJV life-cycle 
refers to the formation, operation and termination of an IJV. A multinational 
enterprise’s (MNE) decision of forming an IJV and a host-country firm’s 
decision of joint venturing with an MNE are the two principal firm behaviours 
at the stage of IJV formation. Important firm behaviours at this stage also 
include the search and selections of IJV partners and the negotiations and 
contracting between IJV partners (Luo, 1997; Roy & Oliver, 2009). We 
define the stage of IJV operation as the general stage between the IJV 
formation and the IJV termination (Arino & De La Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; 
Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). At this stage, firm behaviours are featured by (1) 
interactions between IJV partners such as inter-partner collaborations (Li, 
Zhou, & Zajac, 2009; Loess & Yavas, 2003) and conflicts (Blodgett, 1992; 
Yan & Zeng, 1999) and (2) interactions between the IJV and other firms such 
as inter-firm cooperations (Lee, 2001; Lihong & Goffin, 2001) and spillovers 
(Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2008), during the 
actual operation of the IJV. Firm behaviours at the stages of IJV formation 
and IJV operation are widely considered to influence IJV performance 
(Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003; Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Luo, 1997). 
The IJV termination marks the last stage of an IJV life-cycle. An IJV can be 
terminated by liquidating the IJV or converting the IJV into a wholly foreign-
owned enterprise (WFOE) or into a wholly local-owned enterprise (Reuer, 
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2000). The IJV termination is often considered as a measure of IJV 
performance, especially poor IJV performance (Yan & Zeng, 1999). However, 
some IJV terminations represent the fulfilment of the purposes of forming the 
IJV (Reuer, 1998), such as the foreign IJV partner’s acquisition of host-
country knowledge or networks or the host-country IJV partner’s acquisition 
of foreign knowledge or technologies. Hence, the IJV termination is not 
necessarily a negative outcome. Instead of IJV performance, determinants of 
the IJV termination become the most concerned issue at this stage (Gaur & 
Lu, 2007; Lu & Xu, 2006; Meschi, Phan, & Wassmer, 2016).  
From an institutional perspective, host-country institutions constrain firm 
behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages, because legitimate firm behaviours 
are more likely to improve firm performance (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). 
Institutional theory suggests that institutions define legitimacy and sanctions, 
through formal and informal mechanisms (North, 1990). Formal institutions 
define legitimate firm behaviours by establishing written rules or constraints 
such as laws and regulations (Scott, 1995b). The purpose of using host-
country formal institutions to constrain inward FDI is to maximise local 
interests from inward FDI or to protect national interests (Cui & Jiang, 2012). 
The mechanisms through which host-country formal institutions constrain 
firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages include FDI restrictions, 
constraints on access to local resources, mandatory exporting, and 
interference with other operational matters (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 
2009). Informal institutions define legitimate firm behaviours by establishing 
unwritten rules and norms such as socially-shared norms and understandings 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Host-country informal institutions constrain 
inward FDI by defining the social acceptability of firm behaviours or by 
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shaping a firm’s internal representation of the external environment (Lu & 
Xu, 2006; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). The mechanisms through which host-
country informal institutions constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-
cycle stages include culture (Brouthers, 2002), managerial norms (Meyer, 
2001), acceptability of bribery (Peng, 2003), antiforeigner attitudes (Cui, 
Jiang, & Stening, 2011), network-based business norms (Peng & Heath, 1996) 
or inter-organisational imitation (Lu, 2002). Conformity to institutions is 
considered legitimate, while defiance of institutions is considered illegitimate 
and will be sanctioned (Scott, 1995a). Illegitimate firm behaviours at different 
IJV life-cycle stages often have been found to negatively affect IJV 
performance (Lu & Xu, 2006; Meschi et al., 2016). 
Although the significance of institutions as a set of constraints on firm 
behaviours has been recognised, our understanding of the mechanisms 
through which host-country institutions constrain firm behaviours across IJV 
life-cycle stages have been limited. Given the importance of institutional 
mechanisms in determining legitimate firm behaviours and thus IJV 
performance, this thesis focuses on revealing new mechanisms through which 
host-country institutions constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle 
stages. 
1.2 Research background and potential contributions 
This thesis is inspired by and built on existing research on institutional 
constraints on firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages. 
Culture is considered as an important institutional constraint across IJV life-
cycle stages. Culture is often defined as “the collective programming of the 
human mind that distinguishes the members of one human group from those 
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of another. Culture in this sense is a system of collectively held values” 
(Hofstede, 1984). It shapes the norms and values of a firm in business. At the 
stage of IJV formation, Shane (1993) suggests that MNEs are more likely to 
choose the IJV mode of entry in low power distance host-countries, because 
low power distance is associated with high interpersonal trust which may 
reduce the difficulties in managing an IJV. Kaufmann and O’Neil (2007) 
suggest that culturally distant IJV partners are more likely to form an IJV with 
a marketing/supplier focus because marketing and supplying practices differ 
between cultures, while culturally similar IJV partners are more likely to form 
an IJV with an innovation focus since innovation requires extensive and 
effective interactions between IJV partners. At the stage of IJV operation, 
Iriyama, Shi, and Prescott (2014) suggest that an IJV is more likely to 
experience frequent and directional reversal of ownership changes in 
collectivism host countries than in individualism host countries, since 
collectivist host-country IJV partners tend to exhibit a within-group view and 
therefore find it difficult to develop a favourable exchange cycle between IJV 
partners while individualist host-country IJV partners are not constrained by 
the within-group view. At the stage of IJV termination, Makino, Chan, Isobe, 
and Beamish (2007) suggest that IJVs formed between culturally distant 
partners are more likely to terminate since cultural distance between IJV 
partners is a major source of misunderstanding and miscommunication. Other 
culture-related studies have also examined whether (1) cultural contexts such 
as the investment risk and market potential (Brouthers, 2002) or (2) national 
cultural dimensions such as uncertainty avoidance (Brouthers & Brouthers, 
2003; Erramilli, 1996; Makino & Neupert, 2000) and long-term orientation 
(Peng & Beamish, 2014), constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle 
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stages. However, whether the national cultural dimension of indulgence-
restraint (IR) constrains firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages 
remains unanswered. IR is defined as the extent to which people in a society 
try to control their “gratification (s) of basic and natural human desires related 
to enjoying life and having fun” (Hofstede, 1991). It reflects a society’s belief 
that the gratification of human desires has to be restrained and ruled by 
stringent social norms and values such as moral disciplines, thrift and 
maintaining order in the nation (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). We 
argue that the host-country national cultural dimension of IR will shape the 
norms and understandings of both host-country IJV partners and host-country 
employees and therefore this institutional factor will constrain an MNE’s 
decision of whether to choose the IJV mode of entry. We will fill this research 
gap by exploring Research question 1 in 1.3 Research questions and 
objectives.  
State ownership is another institutional constraint on firm behaviours across 
IJV life-cycle stages. State ownership refers to the holding of firm shares by 
governments. It shapes the motivations, capabilities (Buckley, Clegg, & 
Wang, 2002) and legitimate status (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & 
Ramaswamy, 2014) of a firm in business activities. At the stage of IJV 
formation, Cui and Jiang (2012) suggest that state-owned MNEs are more 
likely to enter via an IJV under host-country institutional pressures than 
privately-owned MNEs, because state-owned MNEs are often perceived as 
foreign political forces and in need of legitimacy spillovers from host-country 
IJV partners. At the stage of IJV operation, Liu, Vredenburg, and Steel (2014) 
suggest that state-owned host-country IJV partners and non-state-owned ones 
may bring distinct management challenges to an IJV’s responses to activist 
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organisations. Chen, Paik, and Park (2010) suggest that MNEs tend to exert 
less social control in IJVs with state-owned host-country partners (SIJVs) 
than non-SIJVs, due to state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) inherent resistance 
to their foreign IJV partners’ social influences. At the stage of IJV termination, 
Mohr, Wang, and Fastoso (2016) suggest that the probability of IJV 
dissolution declines as the equity share held by host-country state-controlled 
actors increases, because host-country state-controlled actors tend to 
contribute more in an IJV’s absorbing external resource constraints than 
privately-owned actors. Other state ownership-related research has also 
explored whether host-regional SOE dominance (Liao, 2015) or the 
privitisation of SOEs (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006) constrain firm 
behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages. However, little is known about 
whether state ownership of the host-country IJV partner constrains 
productivity spillovers from IJVs. We argue that since an SOE’s political 
objectives and technological capabilities differ from a POE, SIJVs’ 
motivations and abilities to help improve domestic firms’ productivity differ 
from IJVs with privately-owned host-country partners (PIJVs). As a result, 
productivity spillovers from SIJVs to domestic firms should differ from those 
from PIJVs. We will fill this research gap by answering Research question 2 
in 1.3 Research questions and objectives. In addition, whether host-regional 
SOE dominance constrains the IJV termination also remains unanswered. We 
argue that since host-regional SOE dominance may create a business 
environment unfriendly to MNEs (Liao, 2015), MNEs are more in need of the 
host-country IJV partner who has a better understanding of surviving this 
environment. Hence, the conversion of an IJV into a WFOE (CIW) is less 
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likely to happen in such a host region. We will fill this research gap by 
exploring Research question 3 in 1.3 Research questions and objectives. 
Inter-organisational imitation has also been found to constrain firm 
behaviours at the stage of IJV formation. Inter-organisation imitation refers 
to the imitation of organisational practices and structures adopted by others 
in the same organisational field under isomorphic pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Inter-organisational imitation is commonly divided into three types: 
frequency-based, trait-based and outcome-based (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 
Frequency-based imitation relies on a firm’s belief that structures and 
practices adopted by a large number of organisations gain strong legitimacy. 
Trait-based imitation refers to a firm’s following behaviours or strategies of 
other successful firms. Outcome-based imitation suggests that a firm imitates 
practices that generate positive outcomes to other firms and avoid those that 
generate negative outcomes. At the stage of IJV formation, Lu (2002) has 
found inter-organisational imitations among MNEs on whether to choose the 
IJV mode of entry. Xia, Tan, and Tan (2008) have also found similar firm 
behaviours at the stage of IJV formation. However, little is known about 
whether inter-organisational imitation constrains firm behaviours at the stage 
of IJV termination. We argue that legitimate status of the IJV mode relative 
to the WFOE mode may change at the post-formation stages and therefore 
inter-organisational imitation may lead to the CIW when the WFOE mode 
becomes more legitimate in the host-country context. We will fill this 




Host-country resource allocation institutions have been found to constrain 
firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages. We define resource 
allocation institutions as institutions which establish rules of the distribution 
of resources among firms. At the stage of IJV formation, Meyer and Nguyen 
(2005) suggest that MNEs are more likely to choose the IJV mode of entry 
where host-country institutions cannot facilitate MNEs’ access to land, since 
MNEs can ally with host-country IJV partners who have the access. At the 
stage of IJV operation, Wang, Sheng, Wu, and Zhou (2017) suggest that 
foreign partner opportunism is more likely to happen in an IJV which is 
constrained by host-government resource dependence, because the host-
country IJV partner’s familiarity with host governments may increase its 
power in the IJV and the foreign partner may manage this power imbalance 
through opportunistic behaviours such as controlling the process of sharing 
foreign information. Other studies have also explored the mechanisms such 
as the development of local equity market through which host-country 
resource allocation institutions constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-
cycle stages (Driffield, Mickiewicz, & Temouri, 2016). However, little is 
known about whether host-country resource allocation institutions constrain 
the IJV termination. We argue that host-regional centrally-planned allocation 
of economic resources (CAER) will prevent the CIW, because MNEs need 
the host-country IJV partner in accessing local economic resources where the 
allocation of economic resources is controlled by the local government. We 
will fill this research gap by exploring Research question 3 in 1.3 Research 
questions and objectives. 
FDI regulations also have been considered to constrain firm behaviours across 
IJV life-cycle stages. FDI regulations refer to rules or laws which are made 
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and maintained by the host-country government to protect domestic industries 
or national interests (Cui & Jiang, 2012). At the stage of IJV formation, 
Brouthers (2002) suggests that many legal restrictions on entry mode will lead 
to the FDI OMC of an IJV, because in this host context managers consider an 
IJV as a more legitimate mode of entry than a WFOE. Nguyen and Meyer 
(2004) suggest that FDI regulations can inhibit the formation of SIJVs 
through partial acquisitions in some host countries. At the stage of IJV 
operation, Blodgett (1991) suggests that a host-country government’s 
ownership control may give the host-country IJV partner an advantage, which 
is termed “government suasion”, in expanding its ownership position in an 
IJV. At the stage of IJV termination, Puck, Holtbrügge, and Mohr (2009) 
suggest that the complexity of host-country FDI regulations will prevent the 
CIW, because MNEs may find it difficult to manage the complex FDI 
regulations on their own. Other FDI regulation-related studies have also 
investigated whether FDI regulations constrain firm behaviours at different 
IJV life-cycle stages (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Cui et al., 2011; 
Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2007; Kim & Gray, 2008). However, whether 
the FDI-restricted industry constrains the IJV termination remains unknown. 
We argue that the host-country IJV partner is necessary for an MNE to 
leverage legitimacy in an FDI-restricted industry, because host industries in 
which FDI is restricted are strategically important or politically sensitive or 
characterised by overcapacity or overinvestment (Reuters, 2017). Therefore, 
the CIW is less likely to happen in an FDI-restricted industry. We will fill this 




Host-country institutions have also been found to constrain firm behaviours 
at different IJV life-cycle stages through other mechanisms such as control of 
corruption (Meschi, 2009; Sartor & Beamish, 2018; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, 
Doh, & Eden, 2006), country risks or uncertainties (Ahmed, Mohamad, Tan, 
& Johnson, 2002; Brouthers, 1995; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2000; 
Delios & Beamish, 1999; Okoroafo, 1990), institutional barriers (Chang, 
2019; Cui et al., 2011), institutional development or advancement (Dikova & 
Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Giachetti, Manzi, & Colapinto, 2019), regional 
marketization (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2003; Shi, Sun, & Peng, 2012; Xie, 
2017), rule of law (Hearn, 2015; Ramachandran, Clark, McIver, & Miller, 
2011; Roy & Oliver, 2009), or shareholder protections (Devarakonda, Klijn, 
Reuer, & Duplat, 2020; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014; Talamo, 2009). We 
review those findings briefly in this section, because the exploration of those 
mechanisms are beyond the scope of this thesis and we will control those 
effects in our empirical tests when necessary. 
This thesis will contribute to IJV literature in the following ways. In general, 
it will extend our knowledge of the mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages. In 
particular, at the stage of IJV formation, this thesis explores whether host-
country institutions constrain the FDI OMC of an IJV through the national 
cultural dimension of IR. At the stage of IJV operation, this thesis investigates 
whether host-country institutions constrain intra-industry productivity 
spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms through state ownership of the host-
country IJV partner. At the stage of IJV termination, this thesis examines 
whether host-country institutions constrain the CIW through two informal 
mechanisms - rate of WFOEs/successful WFOEs in a host industry and host-
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regional SOE dominance - and two formal mechanisms - host-regional CAER 
and FDI-restricted industry.  
1.3 Research questions and objectives 
This thesis is inspired and transpired by identifying and addressing the 
following research questions. 
Research question 1: At the stage of IJV formation, is an MNE’s propensity 
to choose the IJV mode of entry (compared with the WFOE mode of entry) 
in indulgent host countries different from that in restraint host countries? 
This research question contains two parts. The first part is the direct effects 
of (1) the host-country cultural dimension of IR and (2) transaction-cost 
attributes of an FDI project, on the FDI OMC of an IJV. It represents the 
baseline relationships for us to investigate the moderating effects of the host-
country national cultural dimension of IR. Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra, and 
Nielsen (2014) suggest that the theoretical framework explaining the baseline 
arguments needs to be specified to explain any moderating effect. We use 
institutional theory to explain the relationship between the host-country 
cultural dimension of IR and the FDI OMC of an IJV, and we use transaction-
cost economics (TCE) to explain the relationships between transaction-cost 
attributes of an FDI project and the FDI OMC of an IJV. The second part is 
about the moderating effects of the host-country cultural dimension of IR on 
the relationships between transaction-cost attributes of an FDI project and the 
FDI OMC of an IJV. We integrate institutional theory with TCE in explaining 
the moderating effects, because existing research suggests that institutions 
arrange the structure in which transactions happen (Roberts & Greenwood, 
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1997). We theorise that the host-country cultural dimension of IR arranges 
the institutional structure in which the FDI OMC of an IJV happen. 
Theoretically, this research question aims to address the research gap 
concerning the institutional role that the host-country national cultural 
dimension of IR plays in the FDI OMC of an IJV. Practically, this research 
question aims to address MNE managers’ concerns over transaction costs 
associated with their FDI OMC in indulgent host countries and restraint host 
countries. This research question also aims to address host-country 
policymakers’ concerns over the national cultural dimension of IR’s impact 
on inward FDI and thus the efforts that they can spend on reducing the 
negative impact. 
Research question 2: At the stage of IJV operation, will state ownership of 
the host-country IJV partner influence the magnitude of intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms? 
The magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic 
firms refers to the extent to which domestic firms experience changes in 
productivity from the presence of IJVs within the same industry (Javorcik & 
Spatareanu, 2008). Research question 2 comprises two parts. The first part is 
the direct effects of (1) state ownership of the host-country IJV partner and 
(2) state ownership of a domestic firm, on the spillovers. It illustrates the 
baseline relationships for us to investigate the moderating effects of state 
ownership of a domestic firm. We incorporate technology gap and absorptive 
capacity into an institutional framework to explain the baseline relationships, 
because (1) technology gap determines the potential for domestic firms to 
learn from IJVs, (2) absorptive capacity determines domestic firms’ ability to 
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take advantage of the technology gap in improving their productivity and (3) 
institutions arrange the structure in which the spillovers happen (Meyer, 
2004). We theorise that state ownership of the host-country IJV partner 
affects the technology gap between IJVs and domestic firms and the 
absorptive capacity of domestic firms to learn from IJVs. The second part is 
about the moderating effects of state ownership of a domestic firm on the 
relationship between state ownership of the host-country IJV partner and the 
magnitude of intra-industry spillovers from IJVs. Here, we also adopt the 
previous institutional framework to explain the moderating effects. We 
theorise that state ownership of a domestic firm affects the technology gap 
between SIJVs (PIJVs) and domestic firms and the absorptive capacity of 
domestic firms to learn from SIJVs (PIJVs). 
Theoretically, this research question aims to address the research gap 
concerning the institutional role that state ownership of the host-country IJV 
partner plays in intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic 
firms. Practically, this research question aims to address MNE managers’ 
concerns over IJV partner selection-related productivity spillovers from their 
IJVs to their local competitors. This research question also aims to address 
host-country policymakers’ concerns over the effective utilisation of IJVs in 
improving domestic firms’ productivity. 
Research question 3: At the stage of IJV termination, is there any new 
mechanism through which host-country institutions constrain the conversion 
of an IJV into a WFOE? 
This research question also consists of two parts. The first part is the direct 
effects of rates of WFOEs/successful WFOEs in a host industry and host-
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regional SOE dominance on the CIW. It explores two informal mechanisms 
through which host-country institutions may constrain the CIW. The second 
part is the direct effects of host-regional CAER and FDI-restricted industry 
on the CIW. It explores two formal mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions may constrain the CIW. We use institutional theory to explain the 
above relationships, because institutions define whether firm behaviours such 
as the CIW are legitimate (Scott, 1995a). 
Theoretically, this research question aims to address the research gap 
concerning new mechanisms through which host-country institutions 
constrain the CIW. Practically, this research question aims to address MNE 
managers’ concerns over the legitimate status of their IJVs and thus the need 
to convert their IJVs into WFOEs. This research question also aims to address 
host-country policymakers’ concerns over their local institutions’ influence 
on IJVs and thus the efforts that they can spend on reducing the negative 
influences. 
1.4 Structure of this thesis 
This section outlines this thesis and explains the content of each chapter. 
Chapter 1-Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research background and motivations, key 
research questions, and potential contributions.  
Chapter 2-Entering Indulgent Countries via An International Joint Venture or 
a Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise?  
Theoretically, this chapter integrates TCE and institutional theories, treats the 
host-county national cultural dimension of IR as an institutional constraint 
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and hypothesises whether an MNE’s propensity to choose the IJV mode of 
entry differs between indulgent host countries and restraint host countries. 
Empirically, this chapter uses cross-sectional data from 431 outward FDI 
projects conducted by Chinese manufacturing firms between 2006 and 2008 
for empirical tests. Using Logit regressions, this chapter tests (1) the direct 
effect of the host-country cultural dimension of IR on the FDI OMC of an IJV 
and (2) the moderating effects of the host-country cultural dimension of IR 
on the relationships between transaction-cost attributes of an FDI project (a 
parent firm’s R&D intensity, a parent firm’s international experience, and 
host-country political risk) and the FDI OMC of an IJV. 
Chapter 3-Impact of state ownership of the host-country IJV partner on Intra-
industry Productivity Spillovers from International Joint Ventures 
Theoretically, this chapter incorporates technology gap and absorptive 
capacity into an institutional framework, treats state ownership of the host-
country IJV partner as an institutional constraint and hypothesises whether 
the magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from SIJVs to 
domestic firms differs from that of intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
PIJVs. Empirically, this chapter uses panel data from 256396 domestic firms 
and 68381 foreign-invested firms in Chinese manufacturing industry between 
1998 and 2007 for empirical tests. Using panel OLS regressions, this chapter 
compares (1) the magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
SIJVs to domestic firms and that of intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
PIJVs and (2) the magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
SIJVs (PIJVs) to SOEs and that of intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
SIJVs (PIJVs) to POEs. 
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Chapter 4-Conversion of an International Joint Venture into a Wholly 
Foreign-owned Enterprise under Host-Country Institutional constraints 
Theoretically, this chapter adopts institutional theory and hypothesises that 
host-country institutions constrain the CIW through two informal 
mechanisms - rates of WFOEs/successful WFOEs in a host industry and host-
regional SOE dominance - and two formal mechanisms - host-regional CAER 
and FDI-restricted industry (excluding WFOE-only industries). Empirically, 
this chapter adopts panel data from 16583 manufacturing IJVs in China 
between 2005 and 2006 for empirical analyses. Using panel Logit regressions, 
this chapter tests the effects of rates of WFOEs/highly profitable WFOEs/high 
market-share WFOEs in a host industry, host-regional SOE dominance, host-
regional CAER, and FDI-restricted industry (excluding WFOE-only 
industries), on likelihood of the CIW. 
Chapter 5-Conclusions 
This chapter concludes the whole thesis by summarising its key findings and 
contributions, listing practical implications for managers and policymakers, 
acknowledging research limitations, and pointing out future research 
questions.  
This thesis has three separate essays (Chapters 2-4), but they are closely 
connected. On one hand, three essays are separate from a perspective of the 
institutional mechanisms that they focus on and respectively extend our 
knowledge of host-country institutional constraints - culture (Chapter 2), state 
ownership (Chapters 3 and 4), inter-organisational imitation, resource 
allocation institutions and FDI regulations (Chapter 4) - on firm behaviours 
across IJV life-cycle stages. This research design is driven by matching 
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research gaps in this field and data available for us to collect to address those 
research gaps. On the other hand, three essays are closely connected from a 
perspective of IJV life-cycle stages and respectively extend our knowledge of 
host-country institutional constraints on firm behaviours at the stages of IJV 
formation (Chapter 2), IJV operation (Chapter 3) and IJV termination 
(Chapter 4). All three essays are based on institutional theory and therefore 

















Chapter 2. Entering indulgent countries via an International Joint 
Venture or a Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise?  
2.1 Abstract 
This chapter intends to explore new mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours at the stage of IJV formation. 
Specifically, we examine whether host-country institutions constrain the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) ownership mode choice (OMC) of an 
international joint venture (IJV) through the host-country national cultural 
dimension of indulgence-restraint (IR). By integrating the transaction cost 
economics (TCE) and institutional theories, we propose that the effects of 
opportunism and bounded rationality on TCE’s predictions of FDI OMC are 
stronger in indulgent host countries than in restraint host countries, and thus 
the relationships between transaction-cost attributes of an FDI project and the 
FDI OMC of an IJV are enhanced in a high indulgence host-country context. 
Using cross-sectional data from 431 outward FDI projects conducted by 
Chinese manufacturing firms between 2006 and 2008, our empirical results 
strongly support our theoretical arguments. We find that (1) the negative 
relationships between a parent firm’s R&D intensity/host-country experience 
and the FDI OMC of an IJV and (2) the positive relationship between host-
country political risk and the FDI OMC of an IJV, are stronger in indulgent 
host countries than in restraint host countries. We also find insignificant direct 
effect of the host-country national cultural dimension of IR on the FDI OMC 
of an IJV.  
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2.2 Introduction  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) ownership mode choice (OMC) between an 
international joint venture (IJV) and a wholly foreign-owned enterprise 
(WFOE) is an important issue in international business (Shaver, 2013), and 
national culture is widely considered to have an important influence on it 
(Brouthers, 2002). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from a low power 
distance culture show a higher trust propensity and more willingness to 
cooperate in IJVs, while MNEs from a high power distance culture often 
prefer the WFOE mode or other high control modes to centralise decision-
making authority (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Makino & Neupert, 2000; 
Morschett, Schramm-Klein, & Swoboda, 2010; Shane, 1993). MNE 
managers from an individualism culture show a stronger desire for a clear 
boundary of accountability in managing subsidiaries than those from a 
collectivism culture, and therefore they are reluctant to work in IJVs where 
roles and responsibilities of partnering firms sometimes overlap (Jung & Suh, 
2013). MNE managers from a high uncertainty avoidance culture also prefer 
a majority ownership mode for foreign subsidiaries so that they can control 
more effectively, because coping with foreign partners is often fraught with 
uncertainty (Erramilli, 1996; Makino & Neupert, 2000). MNEs are also more 
likely to maintain a high resource commitment in a long-term oriented market, 
since investment risk is relatively low in such a cultural context (Peng & 
Beamish, 2014). Apart from the impact of those single national cultural 
dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980), the cultural distance between the 
host country and the home country may also affect the uncertainty associated 
with the IJV mode and the WFOE mode, respectively. In a cultural distant 
market, internal uncertainty associated with the IJV mode is comparatively 
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high because of MNEs’ difficulties in monitoring local employees, while 
external uncertainty associated with the WFOE mode is comparatively high 
due to MNEs’ difficulties in understanding the local environment (Slangen & 
Van Tulder, 2009). A few studies also explore the impact of other national 
cultural components such as integration (Shane, 1994), investment risk and 
market potential (Brouthers, 2002) on international entry mode choice 
(include but not limited to FDI OMC). Among the six cultural dimensions 
identified by Hofstede (2011) - power distance, individualism-collectivism, 
masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and 
indulgence-restraint (IR) - the impact of IR on FDI OMC of an IJV has rarely 
been examined, which is the research gap that we intend to fill in this paper.   
From an institutional view, the host-country national cultural dimension of IR 
may shape local stakeholders’ behavioural patterns and MNEs’ cognitions, in 
terms of opportunism and/or bounded rationality. Opportunism refers to 
“self-interest seeking with guile… [which] includes but is scarcely limited to 
more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating… [Opportunism] 
involves subtle forms of deceit” (Williamson, 1985). Bounded rationality 
refers to economic actors’ behaviours that are “intended rational, but only 
limitedly so” (Simon, 1961), due to their limited capability of acquiring and 
processing information (Williamson, 1975). IR is defined as the extent to 
which people in a society try to control their “gratification (s) of basic and 
natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun” (Hofstede, 
1991). It reflects a society’s belief that the gratification of human desires has 
to be restrained and ruled by stringent social norms and values such as moral 
disciplines, thrift and maintaining order in the nation (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Opportunism is widely treated as an immoral or guileful behaviour (Matthews, 
31 
 
1990). In a restraint culture, social sanctions for enforcing moral disciplines 
can drive up the costs of opportunistic behaviours. Therefore, we propose that 
the effect of opportunism on TCE’s predictions of FDI OMC is weaker in a 
restraint culture than in an indulgent culture. Thrift is often considered a 
valuable trait in a restraint culture (Akdeniz & Talay, 2013). This social value 
may mitigate local employees’ latitudes in relishing leisure. 
Local employees’ propensity to deviate from their contractual obligations to 
an MNE is affected by their latitudes in leisure or money spending at work, 
and hence social appraisals for thrift can reduce such latitudes and thus their 
propensity to deviate from contractual obligations. Thus, we propose that the 
effect of bounded rationality on MNEs’ difficulties in monitoring local 
employees is mitigated in a highly restraint culture. Maintaining order in the 
nation is also given a much higher priority in a restraint culture than in an 
indulgent culture. This social norm reduces the frequency that MNEs have to 
adjust their contracts in response to environmental volatility. Hence, we 
propose that the effect of bounded rationality on MNEs’ difficulties in 
responding to environmental shifts is also weaker in a highly restraint culture.  
Opportunism and bounded rationality are the two main behavioural 
assumptions of transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985), which 
is one of the fundamental theories in explaining FDI OMC (Brouthers, 2002). 
TCE explain how firms choose an efficient governance mode (e.g., ownership 
mode) to minimise transaction costs arising from the interactions between the 
behavioural assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality, and the 
transaction-cost attributes of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
(Williamson, 1991). TCE suggest that all contracts are considered to be 
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incomplete due to bounded rationality and need to be monitored and enforced 
due to opportunism (Henisz & Williamson, 1999). With the effect of 
opportunism and bounded rationality being held constant, conventional 
transaction cost-based FDI OMC studies suggest that factors that cause high 
(internal or external) uncertainty will lead to an MNE’s OMC of the IJV mode 
since a low control mode is more efficient in MNEs’ monitoring local 
employees and responding to environmental volatility with the help of local 
partners, while factors that cause high asset specificity will lead to an MNE’s 
OMC of the WFOE mode because a high control mode is more efficient in 
reducing opportunism induced by transaction-specific assets (Zhao, Luo, & 
Suh, 2004). The frequency of transactions is widely considered unrelated to 
FDI OMC (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). That is to say, the effects of 
opportunism and/or bounded rationality can enhance (1) the negative 
relationship between asset specificity of an FDI project and the FDI OMC of 
an IJV and (2) the positive relationship between uncertainty of an FDI project 
and the FDI OMC of an IJV. Therefore, as we discussed in the previous 
paragraph, since the effects of opportunism and bounded rationality on TCE’s 
predictions of FDI OMC are stronger in an indulgent culture than in a restraint 
culture, we propose that (1) the negative relationship between asset specificity 
of an FDI project and the FDI OMC of an IJV and (2) the positive relationship 
between uncertainty and the FDI OMC of an IJV, are stronger in an indulgent 
culture than in a restraint culture.  
This study contributes to two strands of literature. First, from a perspective of 
host-country institutions, we contribute to the literature on the FDI OMC of 
an IJV (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). We expand the existing literature by 
exploring the institutional impact of the host-country national cultural 
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dimension of IR on the FDI OMC of an IJV. Second, we contribute to the 
TCE literature (Williamson, 1985). Our theoretical extensions explain why 
and how the host-country national cultural dimension of IR may constrain the 
effects of opportunism and bounded rationality on TCE-based predictions. 
This study may also provide new managerial and policy implications. For 
MNE managers, this research may indicate that transaction costs associated 
with FDI OMC are different between indulgent- and restraint host-country 
cultures and therefore in which host-country culture should MNE managers 
pay more attention to transaction costs induced by asset specificity, internal 
uncertainty or external uncertainty of an FDI project in their FDI ownership 
decision making, because FDI OMC with lower transaction costs often result 
in better performance of the FDI project (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al., 
2003). For policymakers, this research may also suggest in which host-
country culture should the local government spends more efforts on 
protecting transaction-specific FDI projects from local firms’ exploitations. 
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
summarise the existing literature on the FDI OMC and address the research 
gap that we intend to fill in this study. This is followed by the development 
of hypotheses. Then we report our research methods and empirical results. 
Finally, we discuss the main contributions, future research directions and 
implications of our study for both research and practice.  
2.3 Literature review  
FDI OMC is part of a firm’s FDI ownership mode strategy (Hennart & 
Slangen, 2014). FDI OMC is among the most important topics in international 
business study (Shaver, 2013). FDI ownership mode strategy decides whether 
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a firm’s foreign subsidiaries adopt the IJV mode or the WFOE mode. A firm 
can implement this strategy at the time of its foreign entry or in its post-entry 
periods. FDI OMC refers to a firm’s ownership mode strategy at the time of 
its foreign entry. Existing research suggests that two principal factors may 
influence a firm’s FDI OMC: transaction-cost factors and institutional factors. 
On one hand, transaction-cost analyses propose that an MNE’s FDI OMC 
depends on the costs and benefits of the IJV mode relative to those of the 
WFOE mode (Hennart, 1991b). MNEs choose the ownership mode, which 
minimises their FDI costs (Taylor, Zou, & Osland, 1998). By building on and 
modifying Williamson’s transaction cost paradigm, most transaction cost-
based FDI OMC studies suggests that factors which cause high (internal or 
external) uncertainty will lead to the FDI OMC of an IJV while factors which 
cause high asset specificity will lead to the FDI OMC of a WFOE (Zhao et 
al., 2004). Also, by using Hennart’s (2009) transaction cost approach, 
transaction cost-based FDI OMC literature also indicates that factors 
enhancing an MNE’s access to local complementary inputs or assets may 
discourage the FDI OMC of an IJV (Hennart, Sheng, & Pimenta, 2015). On 
the other hand, institutional analyses suggest that the FDI OMC of an IJV 
relies on the institutional pressures imposed on the IJV mode relative to the 
WFOE mode (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Institution-based FDI OMC research is 
often based on Scott’s (1995b) or North’s (1990) institutional frameworks 
and proposes that MNEs should enter a foreign market via the ownership 
mode which faces weaker institutional pressures (Lu, 2002). Those 
institutional pressures can be formal or informal, and they can come from the 
host country or the home country (Puck et al., 2009). In addition, existing 
studies also tries to explain a firm’s international entry mode choice (include 
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but not limited to FDI OMC) based on resource-based view, OLI paradigm 
or internationalisation theory. Resource-based view’s main argument is that 
a firm’s sustainable competitive advantages are determined by its firm-
specific resources and capabilities, which are valuable, rare, difficult to copy 
and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Resource-based 
entry mode studies suggest that a firm’s possession of greater resource-based 
advantages should enter a foreign market with a higher level of internalisation, 
which can protect and maximise its resource-based advantages (Dev, 
Erramilli, & Agarwal, 2002; Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004; Erramilli, Agarwal, 
& Dev, 2002; Tan, Erramilli, & Liang, 2001). OLI paradigm mainly argues 
that a firm’s international business strategy is determined by its ownership 
advantages, location advantages and/or internalisation advantages (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008). OLI-based entry mode research often consider OLI 
paradigm as an effective way to combine insights from resource-based view 
(ownership advantages), institutional theory (location advantages), and 
transaction cost theory (internalisation advantages) (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 
1992; Anand & Delios, 1997; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Erramilli, Agarwal, 
& Kim, 1997). Internationalisation theory’s basic argument is that a firm’s 
internationalisation is a slow and progressive process, and its commitments 
to foreign markets increase with its knowledge about foreign markets and 
operations, which it learns in its internationalisation process (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). Internationalisation theory-based entry mode literature mainly 
focuses on a firm’s accumulation of international experience and suggests a 
general U-shaped relationship between a firm’s international experience and 
its level of integration in an foreign entry (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997; Cho & 
Padmanabhan, 2001; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Erramilli, 1991). Important 
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theoretical frameworks related to the FDI OMC of an IJV are listed below in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Important theoretical frameworks related to the FDI OMC of an IJV 






A firm’s sustainable competitive advantages are determined by 
its firm-specific resources and capabilities, which are valuable, 
rare, difficult to copy and non-substitutable.  
(Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008) 
OLI paradigm A firm’s international business strategy is determined by its 
ownership advantages, location advantages and/or internalisation 





A firm’s internationalisation is a slow and progressive process, 
and its commitments to foreign markets increase with its 
knowledge about foreign markets and operations, which it 
learnings in its internationalisation process.  
(North, 1990; 
Scott, 1995a) 
Institution theory Institutions (1) establish incentives and business practices that 
influence an organisation’s strategy making and (2) shape an 





The costs of searching for, negotiating, and securing an 
agreement determines the governance structure of the agreement. 
In particular, national culture is often considered as an important transaction-
cost or institutional determinant of international entry mode choice 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are often used 
to examine how national culture influences an MNE’s FDI ownership strategy. 
Erramilli (1996), Makino and Neupert (2000) and Morschett (2010) suggest 
that, power distance acceptance in the home country is positively associated 
with an MNE’s propensity to enter via the WFOE mode or other high control 
modes, because MNEs from a high power distance culture prefer high control 
modes to centralise decision-making authority while MNEs from a low power 
distance culture show higher trust propensity and more willingness to 
cooperate. However, Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) suggest that this 
relationship is significant for service firms but insignificant for manufacturing 
firms, while Hennart and Larimo (1998) suggest that this relationship is 
insignificant. Instead, Shane (1993) focuses on the impact of host-country 
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power distance and find that host-country power distance positively affects 
an MNE’s propensity to enter through the WFOE mode or other high control 
modes, because such a culture is characterised by low interpersonal trust and 
MNE managers perceive high transaction costs in managing IJVs. Erramilli 
(1996) and Makino and Neupert (2000) also find that MNE managers from a 
high uncertainty avoidance culture prefer majority ownership or sole 
ownership for their foreign subsidiaries so that they can control more 
effectively. Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) suggest that this relationship is 
significant for manufacturing firms but insignificant for service firms, while 
Hennart and Larimo (1998) suggest that this relationship is insignificant. Jung 
and Suh (2013) propose that, individualism in the home country is negatively 
associated with the FDI OMC of an IJV, since the roles and responsibilities 
of partnering firms sometimes overlap in IJVs and managers from an 
individualism culture often show a stronger desire for a clear boundary of 
accountability in managing subsidiaries than those from a collectivism culture. 
Peng and Beamish (2014) advocate that MNEs’ ownership levels are 
positively associated with host-country long-term orientation, because 
uncertainty becomes comparatively low in long-term oriented societies and 
hence MNEs are more willing to maintain a high resource commitment. The 
masculinity-femininity dimension is often used in calculating the cultural 
distance between host and home countries in FDI OMC literature (Kogut & 
Singh, 1988). The cultural distance between the host and home country is 
often considered to reflect internal uncertainty associated with the IJV mode 
and external uncertainty associated with the WFOE mode (Slangen & Van 
Tulder, 2009). Therefore, some studies suggest that cultural distance 
positively affects an MNE’s propensity to enter through the IJV mode or other 
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low control modes (Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Yiu & Makino, 2002; Zhao et 
al., 2004), some studies suggest that cultural distance negatively affects an 
MNE’s propensity to enter through the IJV mode or other low control modes 
(Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997) and others suggest that the impact of cultural 
distance is insignificant (Erramilli & Rao, 1993). Apart from exploring the 
impact of Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions on a firm’s international 
entry mode, a few other studies also explore the impact of other national 
cultural components such as integration (Shane, 1994), investment risk and 
market potential (Brouthers, 2002). Important empirical findings of national 
culture-related international entry mode research are listed below in Table 2. 
Specifically, Hofstede’s (2011) sixth cultural dimension of IR draws little 
attention from national culture-related international entry mode literature. 
















Cultural distance - Firm  Nerthlands 
and U.K.  
Multiple  Differences between host and home 
countries in power distance, 
individualism-collectivism and 
masculinity positively affects an 
MNE’s propensity to choose the IJV 
mode of entry (compared to the 
WFOE mode of entry), while 
differences in uncertainty avoidance 
and long-term orientation negatively 
affects the likelihood of the IJV mode 










Firm  Europe  Multiple  Host-country investment risk 
negatively affect an MNE’s 
propensity to enter via the WFOE 
mode (compared with the IJV mode), 
while the impact of host-country 
















Home-country power distance only 
negatively affects the likelihood of 
service MNEs’ OMC of a WFOE 
(compared with an IJV), while home-
country uncertainty avoidance only 
positively affects the likelihood of 
manufacturing MNEs’ OMC of a 











Firm  Japan and 
Finland   
U.S.  Cultural distance positively affects an 
MNE’s propensity to enter via the 
IJV mode (compared with the WFOE 
mode), while the impact of home-
country power distance or uncertainty 
avoidance is insignificant.  
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Individualism in the home country is 
negatively associated with OMC of 
the IJV mode, since the roles and 
responsibilities of partnering firms 
sometimes overlap in IJVs and 
managers from an individualism 
culture often show a stronger desire 
for a clear boundary of accountability 
in managing subsidiaries than those 










Firm  Japan and 
U.S.  
Japan 
and U.S.  
Home-country power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance positively 
affect an MNE’s propensity to 
choose the WFOE mode of entry 
(compared with the IJV mode).  




Firm  U.S. Multiple  Host-country power distance 
negatively affects the likelihood of 
the establishment of IJVs (compared 
with WFOEs), because high power 
distance is associated with low 
interpersonal trust which may cause 
difficulties in managing an IJV and a 




Cultural distance Transaction 
cost and 
institution 
Firm  Japan  Multiple  Cultural distance positive affects an 
MNE’s propensity to choose the IJV 
mode of entry (compared with 
WFOE).  
National culture and other FDI entry mode choice 
(Erramilli & 
Rao, 1993) 
Cultural distance  Transaction 
cost 
Firm  U.S. Multiple  The moderating effect of cultural 
distance on the relationship between 
asset specificity and an MNE’s OMC 







- Firm Europe and 
U.S. 
Europe  Home-country power distance 
positively affects an MNE’s 
propensity to choose majority 
ownership in FDI. MNEs from a high 
uncertainty avoidance culture also 
prefer majority ownership for their 
foreign subsidiaries where they can 







- Firm  Multiple  U.S. Home-country uncertainty avoidance 
and the cultural distance between the 
host and home country positively 
affects an MNE’s propensity to enter 
via greenfield investment (compared 










Firm  Multiple  Multiple  Power distance acceptance in the 
home country is positively associated 
with an MNE’s WFOE mode of 
foreign entry, because MNEs from a 
high power distance culture prefer 
the WFOE mode to centralise 
authority and decision-making 
authority while MNEs from a low 
power distance culture show higher 












Firm  Japan  Multiple  MNEs’ ownership levels are 
positively associated with host 
countries’ long-term orientation, 
because uncertainty becomes 
comparatively low in long-term 
oriented societies and hence MNEs 
are more willing to maintain a high 
resource commitment. 





Industry   U.S.  Multiple  High host-country power distance 
and low host-country integration 
positively affects the likelihood of 
entry via FDI over licensing, because 
such a culture is characterised by low 
interpersonal trust and MNE 
managers perceive high transaction 
costs in business.  
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(Zhao et al., 
2004) 
Cultural distance Transaction 
cost 
Firm Multiple  Multiple  Cultural distance negatively affects 
the likelihood of ownership-based 
entry mode.  
Prior cultural studies indicate that the systems of collected values and norms 
are different between indulgent and restraint cultures (Minkov, 2007). First, 
an indulgent culture considers moral disciplines less important in constraining 
human behaviours than a restraint culture (Hofstede et al., 2010). Moral 
disciplines can drive up the costs of opportunistic behaviours because 
opportunism is often considered immoral or guileful (Matthews, 1990). 
Therefore, the costs of opportunistic behaviours are lower in an indulgent 
culture than in a restraint culture. Second, an indulgent culture gives more 
weight to leisure and spending money, while a restraint culture regards it to 
be a waste of time to pursuit happiness and this culture praises thrift (Akdeniz 
& Talay, 2013). Employees from an indulgent culture may become less 
comfortable with intensive work and hence may shirk, while employees from 
a restraint culture are more comfortable with tough jobs because working hard 
is highly praised in their societies. Hence, employees from an indulgent 
culture are less likely to adhere to their contractual obligations to MNEs than 
those from a restraint culture. For instance, managerial apprentices from an 
indulgent culture such as the United States show a higher propensity of free 
ride than those from a restraint culture such as China (Earley, 1989). Third, 
the indulgent culture considers it less important to maintain order in the nation 
than the restraint culture (Hofstede et al., 2010). Governments of indulgent 
cultures, such as Columbia (Hiatt & Sine, 2014), tend to put less time and 
efforts in controlling political and criminal risks than those of restraint 
cultures. As a result, political or criminal risks are more likely to run out of 
control in an indulgent culture.  
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Those beliefs, which may or may not be evidenced by empirical results, shape 
the behavioural patterns of local stakeholders and MNEs’ cognitions, and 
hence the FDI OMC of an IJV. We therefore argue that these beliefs, and 
hence local firms’ opportunistic propensity in indulgent and restraint cultures, 
apply to their joint venturing with MNEs. Host-country IJV partners from an 
indulgent culture are more likely to take advantage of MNEs’ dependency on 
them and exploit those MNEs, compared with those from a restraint culture. 
When starting a new foreign subsidiary, MNEs may also find local employees 
more likely to deviate from their contractual obligations in an indulgent 
culture than in a restraint culture. In addition, environmental uncertainty is 
probably more salient in indulgent societies and hence the role of local 
partners in MNEs’ risk management. Existing literature connects national 
culture with entry mode strategy and contributes to our understanding of how 
national cultural dimensions in terms of power distance, individualism-
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance or long-term orientation influence a 
firm’s entry mode choice, but not of how national culture in terms of IR 
affects a firm’s entry mode choice, which is the research gap we intend to fill 
in this study.  
In the following, we develop the rationale for the influence of the host-
country cultural dimension of IR on a firm’s FDI OMC, as illustrated on the 
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Figure 1 Research model of chapter 2 
2.4 Hypothesis development  
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desires related to enjoying life and having fun” (Hofstede, 1991). Restraint 
reflects a society’s belief that the gratification of human desires has to be 
restrained and ruled by stringent social norms such as moral disciplines. As a 
result, a restraint culture relies heavily on moral disciplines to constrain 
human behaviours (Chakkarath, 2005). Since opportunism is widely 
considered immoral or guileful (Matthews, 1990), social sanctions for 
enforcing moral disciplines may drive up the costs of opportunistic 
behaviours. Reputation is an important way through which moral disciplines 
constrain human behaviours (Hau-siu Chow & Ding, 2002). Individuals 
whose reputation expects to be tarnished for acting opportunistically are 
likely to assign high costs to opportunism. Therefore, moral disciplines can 
mitigate opportunism and foster trust in transactions (Akrout, 2015). 
However, an indulgent culture allows a reasonably free gratification of human 
desires (Hofstede, 2010). Fewer moral disciplines are imposed on individuals 
in an indulgent culture (Hofstede et al., 2010) and hence fewer social 
sanctions for enforcing moral disciplines. Individuals may perceive low costs 
for acting opportunistically in an indulgent culture. For instance, managerial 
trainees from an indulgent culture such as the United States shows a higher 
propensity to free ride at work compared to those from a restraint culture such 
as China (Earley, 1989). Therefore, we propose that a restraint culture 
discourages opportunism in cooperative relations, while an indulgent culture 
encourages opportunism. 
TCE suggest that the effect of opportunism becomes critical when there are 
transaction-specific assets (Williamson, 1996). Transaction-specific assets 
refer to investments that are dedicated to a specific partner and redeployment 
of the investments can cause substantial switching costs (Williamson, 1985), 
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such as investments in R&D and marketing (Shelanski & Klein, 1995). Due 
to such switching costs, an MNE will find it difficult to punish the partner 
when it acts opportunistically (Williamson, 1998). As a result, the partner can 
exploit an MNE by shirking, free-riding or technology dissemination 
(Brouthers, 2002). In this situation, the FDI OMC of an IJV may expose an 
MNE to the local partner’s opportunistic behaviours, while the FDI OMC of 
a WFOE can efficiently mitigate potential behavioural hazards by substituting 
joint control with full control (Henisz, 2000). Therefore, partial 
internalisation by using the IJV mode is considered less efficient than full 
internalisation by using the WFOE mode. Williamson (1991) uses the concept 
asset specificity to describe the extent to which an investment is dedicated to 
a particular partner. The higher the asset specificity of an investment is, the 
higher the switching costs are expected to be. Therefore, TCE-based FDI 
OMC studies suggest a negative relationship between the asset specificity of 
an FDI project and the likelihood of the FDI OMC of an IJV (Zhao et al., 
2004). However, TCE propose on FDI OMC that “a low level of ownership 
is preferable until proven otherwise” (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986), due to 
the higher resource commitment and hence the exit costs with the WFOE 
mode than with the IJV mode. When risk of the host-country IJV partner’s 
opportunism is reduced, its propensity to exploit its foreign IJV partners is 
expected to be reduced. As a result, the need for an MNE to fully internalize 
a foreign subsidiary is reduced. With the reduced effect of opportunism, the 
impact of asset specificity of an FDI project on a firm’s FDI OMC is expected 
to be weakened, and vice versa. As we discussed in the previous paragraph, 
economic actors from an indulgent culture are more likely to act 
opportunistically than those from a restraint culture. Thus, we propose 
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Hypothesis 1. The negative effect of asset specificity of an FDI project on 
the probability of choosing an IJV (as opposed to a WFOE) foreign market 
entry mode is strengthened in the presence of a high indulgence (as opposed 
to restraint) host-country culture.  
TCE also suggest that uncertainty is another important factor that determines 
a firm’s FDI OMC (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). In this theoretical 
paradigm, uncertainty can be internal or external. Internal uncertainty refers 
to the degree of difficulty faced by one party, due to bounded rationality or 
opportunism, in ascertaining the extent to which its agents have carried out 
contractual obligations, or performed under a pre-specified agreement (Dutta, 
Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995). When internal uncertainty is high, an MNE 
often has to impose subjective assessment and monitor its employees’ inputs 
rather than judging their outputs (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). An MNE 
also has to provide various incentives to achieve goal congruence and foster 
loyalty to encourage its employees to fulfil their obligations according to the 
pre-specified agreement. However, firms new to FDI often find high 
uncertainty internal to its foreign affiliates because they lack experience in 
monitoring their local employees’ performance in a foreign context. Also, 
due to a lack of experience in managing in a foreign market, they are unlikely 
to overcome such internal uncertainty on their own. Therefore, new MNEs 
tend to share control of their foreign affiliates with local partners and 
delegate management of their foreign affiliates to the local partner 
(Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996), because the local partner has the better 
knowledge in managing local employees. Although joint venturing with 
local firms may also subject an MNE to difficulties in monitoring its local 
partner’s performance (Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009), inexperienced MNEs 
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often have few alternative choices. Previously, some firms tried to exert 
control without sufficient knowledge of how to control, and they made fatal 
mistakes and impaired their operation efficiency (Teece, 1976). To share 
control with experienced local partners is a more efficient choice than to 
maintain high control for inexperienced firms, especially in an international 
setting (Chang, 1995).  
However, MNEs can learn to manage in a foreign market from their past 
international investments (Contractor & Kundu, 1998). We define general 
international experience as an MNE’s experiential knowledge gained from 
past investments in foreign markets. Those experiences can enhance an 
MNE’s understanding and perception of how to manage their foreign 
subsidiaries and hence their abilities to cope with uncertainty internal to their 
foreign subsidiaries (Dow & Larimo, 2009). An MNE may also learn how to 
assess whether its employees in the foreign affiliate are working responsibly 
and coherently from its general international experience, and therefore 
uncertainty internal to an MNE’s foreign affiliates is also reduced. With 
reduced internal uncertainty and stronger abilities to overcome potential 
uncertainty internal to foreign subsidiaries, experienced MNEs become more 
confident of taking control and risk of their foreign subsidiaries on their own 
(Root, 1982). By using the WFOE mode instead of the IJV mode for a foreign 
subsidiary, an MNE can also avoid problems associated with monitoring 
host-country IJV partners (Reuer, Klijn, & Lioukas, 2014).   
As we discussed in developing Hypothesis 1, in an indulgent culture people 
are more likely to act opportunistically in business relations. People in 
indulgent cultures also have strong desires to enjoy leisurely activities and 
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spend money (Costa, Crawford, & Jakob, 2013), while people in restraint 
cultures disdain entertainment and regard thrift as a valuable characteristic 
(Akdeniz & Talay, 2013). We expect that employees from an indulgent 
culture have a considerable latitude to follow their preferences at work, such 
as budget-breaking. When conflicts occur between contractual obligations 
and local employees’ personal preferences, such as an assignment to local 
employees is highly demanding, employees from an indulgent culture may 
act opportunistically by shirking or free-riding. Hence, employees from an 
indulgent culture tend to deviate from their agreement with MNEs. In 
contrast, since in a restraint culture people may scorn leisure and consider 
thrift as a precious trait, they adhere to their obligations to the MNE and put 
work efficiency in the first place. As a result, for inexperienced MNEs, the 
local partner’s knowledge and abilities in monitoring local employees are 
more in need in an indulgent culture than in a restraint culture. Thus, we 
propose  
Hypothesis 2a. The negative effect of general international experience on the 
probability of choosing the IJV (as opposed to the WFOE) foreign market 
entry mode is strengthened in the presence of a high indulgence (as opposed 
to restraint) host-country culture.  
However, some country-specific experience that an MNE gains from one 
market may apply in the next market, such as language, culture or politics. 
Host-country experience not only enhances an MNE’s general ability to 
monitor market transactions in foreign countries, but also sharpens its 
understanding of business rules and norms in a specific host country context. 
As a result, some studies suggest that host-country experience is more 
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helpful than general international experience for an MNE to reduce and 
overcome uncertainty internal to its foreign affiliates (Dow & Larimo, 2009). 
Thus, we define host-country experience as an MNE’s experiential 
knowledge acquired from past investment in one specific host country and 
propose 
Hypothesis 2b. The negative effect of host-country experience on the 
probability of choosing the IJV (as opposed to the WFOE) foreign market 
entry mode is strengthened in the presence of a high indulgence (as opposed 
to restraint) host-country culture.  
Apart from internal uncertainty, MNEs also faces uncertainty external to 
their foreign subsidiaries (Palenzuela & Bobillo, 1999). External uncertainty 
refers to the unpredictability of a firm’s environment (Milliken, 1987), 
including fast changing political, macroeconomic, social, demographic, 
regulatory and technological factors. Since a firm’s rationality is bounded, it 
cannot predict all environmental shifts and secure its benefits by contracts. 
Host-country political risk is often considered an important uncertainty 
external to a foreign affiliate in FDI OMC studies (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 
1992). We define political risk as the “risk or probability of occurrence of 
some political events that will change the prospects” of an investment, 
following Haendel, West and Meadow (Haendel, West, & Meadow, 1975). 
Operating in a volatile political environment, MNEs have to make quick and 
accurate responses (Miller, 1992), because any firm strategy incompatible 
with the shifts in a political environment may reduce their operating 
efficiency or even result in investment failure. Therefore, MNEs may share 
investment risks with local partners in politically unstable countries (Delios 
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& Henisz, 2000). In their adaptation to local political turmoil, MNEs often 
have to suffer considerable sunk costs, because their resource commitment 
to one operation may turn out incompatible to the next political shifts (Hill, 
Hwang, & Kim, 1990). As a result, MNEs also tend to maintain a low 
resource commitment and hence flexibility in divestment. Local partners are 
also more familiar with the local political environment and have political 
connections to help MNEs deal with political uncertainty (Puck et al., 2009).  
Indulgent and restraint societies give different priorities to maintain order in 
the nation. Restraint societies often give higher priority to maintaining order 
in the country than restraint societies (Hofstede et al., 2010). Therefore, we 
expect governments of restraint societies will commit more time and effort 
to control political risk. In contrast, governments of indulgent cultures may 
fail to maintain order and control domestic political risk, such as Columbia, 
which would create high uncertainty for local business (Hiatt & Sine, 2014). 
Political risk is more likely to run out of control in indulgent cultures than in 
restraint cultures. As a result, in their response to host-country political risk, 
there is an increasing need for MNEs to keep a low resource commitment 
and share the risk with outsiders in an indulgent culture than in a restraint 
culture. Thus, we propose 
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of host-country political risk on the 
probability of choosing an IJV (as opposed to WFOE) foreign market entry 
mode is strengthened in the presence of a high indulgence (as opposed to 
restraint) host-country culture.  
At last, we will discuss the potential direct effect of the national cultural 
dimension of IR on the FDI OMC of an IJV. As we discussed before, 
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economic actors from an indulgent culture are more likely to act 
opportunistically than those from a restraint culture. Such behavioural 
uncertainties drive manufacturing firms to seek control in FDI (Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2003). However, we also mentioned before that employees from 
indulgent cultures may have a greater latitude to follow their preferences at 
work than those from restraint cultures. “Different types of human resources 
require a variety of structures to achieve their full potential” (Estrin, 
Baghdasaryan, & Meyer, 2009), and such managing difficulties may 
encourage firms to delegate control to local partners in FDI, since local 
partners are more familiar with managing local employees. Given the 
opposing effects discussed above, we control for the direct effect of the host-
country national cultural dimension of IR in our analyses. 
2.5 Data and Methodology  
Data and sample 
In this study, the hypotheses are tested in FDI conducted by Chinese 
manufacturing firms. Data for foreign affiliates is collected from a firm-level 
dataset from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, including basic information 
on Chinese firms’ 5819 FDI activities up to 2012 (FDI DATA). This dataset 
contains information such as the parent firm’s name, four-digit industry code, 
locations, and legal person code, and the foreign affiliate’s name, location, 
and the year for the FDI project approval. Additional data for parent firms is 
collected from the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics (ARIES) 
1998-2007, compiled by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. It covers 
around 90% of gross output in most industries with firms with annual sales of 
at least five million RMB. This dataset contains information of the parent firm 
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such as the register code, the controlling shareholder, ownership structure, 
total assets, annual sales, R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure, 
intangible assets, report year, and legal person code. According to their 
ownership structure, we separate firms from mainland China and those from 
outside mainland China. According to the industry codes of parent firms, we 
separate manufacturing firms from other firms. With a unique combination of 
the foreign affiliate’s year of establishment and the parent firm’s legal person 
code, we merge the two datasets. ARIES only includes firms with annual sales 
of at least five million RMB in our sample. Therefore, our empirical tests may 
only explain the FDI OMC of relatively large Chinese firms. Despite this 
limitation, these two datasets have been previously used to study Chinese 
firms’ FDI behaviours such as Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Wright (2012) and 
provide reliable empirical insights.  
As the information about a foreign affiliate’s ownership mode and 
establishment mode is not available in the data collected from the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce, we have completed the dataset by hand-collecting 
such information from parent firms’ annual reports (Meyer et al., 2014), and 
online business news of parent firms or foreign subsidiaries (Wei, Zheng, Liu, 
& Lu, 2014). For those observations where the foreign affiliate’s year of 
establishment is missing, we use the year in which the FDI project is approved 
by the Chinese government instead. As for the ownership mode, following 
earlier studies such as Slangen and Van Tulder (2009), if the information 
source states there is at least one host-country firms with equity investment 
in the foreign affiliate, this subsidiary is coded as an IJV. If the information 
source states the foreign subsidiary is fully owned by the parent firm, this 
subsidiary is coded as a WFOE. As for the establishment mode, following 
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earlier studies such as Meyer et al. (2014), a foreign affiliate is coded as an 
acquisition if it is acquired from a host-country firm, and as a greenfield if it 
is newly established. As for hand-collected information, there is the 
possibility of coding mistakes such as coding an IJV as a WFOE. Hence, to 
reduce the impact of coding mistakes on our empirical tests, we have double 
checked the information source for coding mistakes.  
Table 3 List of host countries and the number of FDI projects  
Host country  Number of FDI Host country  Number of FDI 
Algeria  1 Madagascar  1 
Argentina  3 Malaysia 5 
Australia 18 Mauritius 1 
Bangladesh 4 Mexico 3 
Belgium 1 Mongolia  1 
Brazil 7 Morocco  1 
Cambodia 4 Myanmar 1 
Cameron  1 Namibia  1 
Canada 11 Netherlands 8 
Chile 3 Niger 2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 Nigeria 5 
Cuba 1 Pakistan 5 
Denmark 1 Panama 1 
Egypt 3 Peru  1 
Ethiopia 10 Philippines 1 
France 6 Poland  1 
Gabon 1 Romania  2 
Germany 25 Russia 31 
Ghana  2 Singapore 7 
Greece 1 South Africa 7 
Guatemala 2 Spain 4 
Hungary 2 Sri Lanka  1 
India 17 Sweden 1 
Indonesia 9 Switzerland  1 
Iran  2 Syria  2 
Ireland  1 Tajikistan  1 
Italy 7 Thailand 6 
Japan 12 Turkey 4 
Jordan 1 Uganda 1 
Kazakhstan 2 Ukraine 3 
Kenya  1 United Kingdom 10 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 6 United States 69 
Korea, Rep. 25 Uzbekistan 1 
Kuwait  2 Venezuela 1 
Kyrgyzstan 2 Vietnam 35 
Lao  8 Zimbabwe 3 
  Total  431 
Following Elango and Pattnaik (2007), we set a one-year lag for data to 
measure independent variables to control for the potential endogeneity 
problem. Then we exclude entities which invested in Hong Kong, Macao, 
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British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, following Meyer et al. (2014), 
because entities which invested in the above areas often operate as holding 
corporations or financing companies for their businesses in other countries. 
Parent firms with equity held by foreign investors are also excluded. Since 
ARIES and FDI DATA are archival datasets, there may be unusable or 
unreliable observations such as observations with negative R&D 
expenditures. Therefore, we have checked for and removed unusable or 
unreliable observations. Then we have a sample of 431 observations for 
statistical analysis between 2006 and 2008. Due to missing values on 
independent variables, our final sample for regression analysis ranged from 
372 to 392 observations. The list of host countries and the number of foreign 
affiliates in our sample are provided in Table 3. Measurements for variables 
are listed in Table 4.  
When Hofstede’s (2010) country-level scores is used for firm-level analysis, 
it is important to check whether between-country variations are large enough 
to justify further research or they may be artefacts due to between-firm 
variations (Rieger, Wang, & Hens, 2014). In this context, an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) is commonly used to compare between-group- and 
within-group variations (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006). One-way 
parametric- and non-parametric ANOVA tests reveal significant between-
country variations for the FDI OMC between an IJV and a WFOE (F (71,430) 
=1.37, p=0.0362; Chi2 (71) =91.47, p=0.0515). Therefore, there is a 




Table 4 Variables and measurements of Chapter 2 
Variables Definition  Source  
FDI ownership mode A dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 if the foreign 
subsidiary is an IJV and 0 if it is a WFOE. 
e.g. (Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009) 
source: FDI DATA 
Asset specificity The parent firm’s R&D expenditures divided by total sales in 
year t-1. 
e.g. (Brouthers, 2002; Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Yiu & Makino, 
2002) source: ARIES 
General international 
experience  
The difference between year t-1 and the year of the parent 
firm’s first OFDI. 
e.g. (Contractor & Kundu, 1998) 
Source: FDI DATA 
Host-country 
experience 
The difference between year t-1 and the year of the parent 
firm’s first FDI in the same host country. 




1- an index assessing a host country’s political stability and 
lack of violence in year t-1. 
e.g. (Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009) 
Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators from the World Bank  
Host-country 
indulgence 
Logarithm of an index assessing the extent to which people in 
a host country try to control their gratifications of basic and 
natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun in 
year t-1. 
e.g. (Akdeniz & Talay, 2013) 
Source: (Hofstede et al., 2010) 
Firm age Logarithm of the difference between year t-1 and the parent 
firm’s year of establishment. 
e.g. (Xie, 2017). Source: ARIES 
and FDI DATA 
Firm size Logarithm of the parent firm’s number of employees in year t-
1 
e.g. (Meyer, 2001). Source: 
ARIES 
Profitability  The parent firm’s net profits divided by total assets in year t-1. e.g. (Meyer et al., 2014). Source: 
ARIES 




A dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 if the FDI project is 
an acquisition and 0 if it is a greenfield investment.  
e.g. (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). 




The aggregated marketisation index of the province where the 
parent firm is located in year t-1.  
e.g. (Shi et al., 2012). Source: 




The standard deviation of the Home-country regional 
institutional development during 1997 and 2007.  
e.g. (Wu & Chen, 2014). Source: 
Chinese NERI marketisation Index 
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Cultural distance  A Euclidean distance index based on the scores of the China 
and each host country on Hofstede (1980)’s four dimensions of 
national culture (power distance, individualism, masculinity 
and uncertainty avoidance).  
e.g. (Kogut & Singh, 1988) 
Source: (Hofstede, 1980) 
2.6 Empirical results  
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample and the correlation 
matrix for the variables. We observe that the correlation between Host-
country political risk and Cultural distance is relatively high at 0.45 and enter 
them separately in different models to avoid the potential multicollinearity 
problem.   
Table 5 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of Chapter 2 
Variables  N Mean  s. d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.Asset specificity 431 0.01 0.02 1 
            
2.General international experience 431 0.30 0.84 0.20* 1 
           
3.Host-country experience 431 0.04 0.27 0.04 0.21* 1 
          
4.Host-country  
political risk 431 0.00 0.86 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 1 
         
5.Host-country indulgence 372 3.77 0.49 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.38* 1 
        
6.Firm age 431 2.19 0.66 0.04 0.17* -0.06 0.01 0.02 1 
       
7.Firm size 431 5.92 1.47 0.17* 0.25* -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.45* 1 
      
8.Profitability  431 0.07 0.12 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 1 
     
9.Export orientation 431 0.38 0.38 -0.13* -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.10* 1 
    
10.Establishment mode 431 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.04 0.13* 0.10* 0.00 0.02 1 
   
11.Home country regional 
institutional development 431 7.25 1.26 0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13* 0.42* 0.04 1 
  
12.Home country regional 
institutional instability 431 0.77 0.13 -0.09 -0.15* 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.12* -0.04 0.23* -0.01 0.36* 1 
 




We employed Logit regression to estimate the model because the data is 
cross-sectional and the dependent variable is dichotomous. Table 6 reports 
the results with positive coefficients indicating a preference for the IJV mode 
and negative coefficients for the WFOE mode. To illustrate the patterns of 
the moderating effects that support the hypotheses, we also plotted the 
moderating effects using different levels of the moderating variable. Model 1 
is the base model, which includes the control variables only. Model 2 reports 
the direct effects of transaction cost factors on the FDI OMC. The interaction 
effects of the transaction cost factors and host-country indulgence on FDI 
OMC are introduced in Models 3 to 6. The average VIF value of the variables 
included is 1.22, well below the threshold value of 10 for concerns of 
multicollinearity (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2015). Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level to correct for potential heteroscedasticity. All the continuous 
independent variables are mean-centered before calculating the interaction 
terms, to minimise the potential for multicollinearity and make it easier to 
interpret the interaction effects (Yu, Jiang, & Land, 2015). 
Dawson (2014) suggests that whether a moderating effect exists depends on 
the significance of the interaction term. The high and low levels of the 
moderating variable are calculated as the mean + standard deviation and mean 
– standard deviation respectively. The coefficient of asset specificity is 
negative and that of asset specificity × host-country indulgence is negative 
and significant (p<0.05) in Model 3 in Table 6. Following the method in 
Norton et al. (2004), we have also calculated the “correct interaction effect” 
and find that the values of the correct interaction effect range from -10.81 to 
3.76, with a mean value of −3.82, and that the z-statistic values range from -
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2.19 to 1.77, with only positive values of the correct interaction effect being 
significant (z<-1.96).  
Table 6 Results of Logit models predicting the FDI OMC of IJV 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Explanatory variables       
Asset specificity 
 
-14.69 -21.37 -15.65 -13.78 -13.72 
  
(10.68) (14.10) (11.82) (11.06) (11.17) 
General international experience 
 
-0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.44 -0.38 
  
(0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.33) 
Host-country experience 
 
-0.11 0.23 -0.09 -0.08 -0.16 
  
(0.90) (0.76) (0.90) (0.70) (0.85) 
Host-country political risk 
 
0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 
  
(0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.22) 
Moderator variables       
Indulgence  -0.06 -0.25 -0.06 -0.12 -0.43 
  (0.36) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) (0.36) 
Interaction terms       
Asset specificity × Host-country indulgence   -42.37*    
 
  (20.46)    
General international experience × Host-country indulgence    0.06   
 
   (0.54)   
Host-country experience × Host-country indulgence     -2.50*  
 
    (1.23)  
Host-country political risk × Host-country indulgence      1.08* 
 
     (0.53) 
Control variables       
Firm age 0.54+ 0.65+ 0.65+ 0.67* 0.70* 0.71* 
 
(0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) 
Firm size -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 
 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Profitability -0.02 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.17 -0.15 
 
(1.40) (1.56) (1.61) (1.58) (1.64) (1.50) 
Export orientation -0.42 -0.81 -0.68 -0.69 -0.70 -0.77 
 
(0.53) (0.57) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.58) 
Establishment mode 1.73* 1.70* 1.90* 1.82* 1.93* 1.93* 
 
(0.81) (0.84) (0.86) (0.86) (0.83) (0.81) 
Home country regional institutional development -0.49** -0.38* -0.41* -0.40* -0.40* -0.42* 
 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Home country regional institutional instability -2.29 -2.28 -2.09 -2.20 -2.22 -2.22 
 
(1.44) (1.54) (1.63) (1.58) (1.57) (1.50) 
Cultural distance -0.35+  -0.25 -0.27 -0.26  
 
(0.20)  (0.25) (0.24) (0.24)  
Constant -2.11*** -2.03*** -2.08*** -2.07*** -2.08*** -1.95*** 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) 
Number of observations 392 367 367 367 367 367 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 
Nagelkerke R2 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 
Correctly classified (%) 85.46 87.74 88.01 88.01 88.01 88.28 
Chi2 48.36*** 55.56*** 60.71*** 58.75*** 60.75*** 58.04*** 
Log likelihood -132.90 -116.50 -114.70 -115.80 -115.20 -114.10 






Figure 2a Differences between correct- and incorrect interaction effect of asset specificity and host-country 
indulgence 
 
Figure 2b Predicted probabilities for asset specificity at different levels of host-country indulgence 
Figure 2a illustrates that (1) the average marginal effects of asset specificity 
is negative and significant (the confidence intervals does not include zero) 
and (2) the positive effects are enhanced, at a relatively high level of host-
country indulgence. This result thus supports Hypothesis 1, in which we 
suggest that the negative effect of asset specificity on a firm’s propensity to 




Surprisingly, we also find that the average marginal effects of asset specificity 
(1) are positive and significant and (2) the positive effects are weakened, at a 
relatively low level of host-country indulgence, which contradicts with 
conventional transaction cost-based predictions. One possible explanation is 
that we use a firm’s R&D intensity to measure the asset specificity of its OFDI 
projects. A firm’s R&D intensity may also reflect the stock of knowledge that 
the firm is exploiting abroad (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). An IJV’s R&D 
activities can improve the IJV’s performance when the appropriability 
hazards related to its R&D activities are mitigated (Teece, 1986; Zhang, Li, 
Hitt, & Cui, 2007). Our findings suggest that their understanding applies in a 
low indulgence host-country culture, where moral disciplines discourage 
opportunism (Hofstede et al., 2010; Matthews, 1990). In a high indulgence 
culture where moral disciplines are less used in social control, Chinese firms’ 
attitude to transaction-specific assets is consistent with transaction cost-based 
predictions.   
 






Figure 3b Predicted probabilities for general international experience at different levels of host-country indulgence 
In Model 4 in Table 6, the coefficient of general international experience is 
negative but the coefficient of general international experience × host-
country indulgence is positive and insignificant (p>0.10). The values of the 
correct interaction effect range from -0.00 to 0.02, with a mean value of 0.01, 
and that the z-statistic values range from -0.07 to 0.23, with no value of the 
correct interaction effect significant (-1.645<z<1.645). Figure 3b shows that 
the average marginal effects of general international experience are negative 
but insignificant (the confidence intervals include zero) at all levels of host-
country indulgence. Therefore, we find no support for Hypothesis 2a, in 
which we suggest that the negative relationship between general 
international experience and a firm’s propensity to choose an IJV mode of 
entry is strengthened in a high indulgence host-country culture.  
The coefficient of host-country experience is negative and the coefficient of 
host-country experience × host-country indulgence is negative and 
significant (p<0.05) in Model 5 in Table 6. The values of the correct 
interaction effect range from -0.91 to 0.14, with a mean value of −0.23, and 
that the z-statistic values range from -2.10 to 0.92, with only some negative 
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values of the correct interaction effect being significant (z<-1.96). Figure 4b 
shows that the average marginal effects of host-country experience (1) are 
negative and significant (confidence intervals does not include zero) and (2) 
the negative effects are enhanced, at a high level of host-country indulgence. 
Therefore, this result supports Hypothesis 2b, in which we suggest that the 
negative effect of host-country experience on a firm’s propensity to choose 
an IJV mode of entry is enhanced in a high indulgence host-country culture.  
In Model 6 in Table 6, (1) the positive coefficient of host-country political 
risk and (2) the positive and significant interaction term host-country political 
risk × host-country indulgence suggests that host-country indulgence is a 
significant (p<0.05) and positive moderator of the relationship between host-
country political risk and the likelihood of choosing an IJV mode of entry. 
The values of the correct interaction effect range from -0.00 to 0.34, with a 
mean value of 0.09, and that the z-statistic values range from -0.21 to 2.48, 
with only some positive values of the correct interaction effect being 
significant (p<0.05). Figure 5b illustrates that the average marginal effects of 
host-country political risk (1) are positive and significant (p<0.10) and (2) the 
positive effects are enhanced, at a high level of host-country indulgence. Thus, 
we find support for Hypothesis 3, in which we suggest that the positive 
relationship between host-country political risk and the FDI OMC of an IJV 
is strengthened in a high indulgence host-country culture. Interestingly, we 
also find that the average marginal effects of host-country political risk (1) 
are negative and significant and (2) the negative effects are weakened, at a 
low level of host-country indulgence, which contradicts with conventional 




Figure 4a Differences between correct- and incorrect interaction effect of host-country experience and host-
country indulgence 
 
Figure 4b Predicted probabilities for host-country experience at different levels of host-country indulgence 
Several existing studies suggest that this is probably due to the capital market 
imperfections and institutional factors in China, which may have induced a 
perverse attitude to risk among Chinese firms (Buckley et al., 2007a). Host-
country political risk does not always impede investment from China (Cui & 
Jiang, 2009; Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2012). Our findings suggest that their 
understanding applies only in a low indulgence host-country culture, where 
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maintaining order in the nation is given a high priority (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
In a high indulgence culture where maintaining order in the nation is not given 
a high priority, Chinese firms’ attitude to risk is consistent with transaction 
cost-based predictions.   
 
Figure 5a Interaction effects of host-country political risk and host-country indulgence 
 







First, we used alternative measures for our explanatory variables. we used a 
parent firm’s marketing intensity instead of its R&D intensity to measure 
asset specificity of an FDI project in Model 1 in Table 7, because marketing 
intensity is another common measure of asset specificity in the existing 
literature (Zhao et al., 2004). Marketing intensity is calculated as a parent 
firm’s advertising expenditures divided by its total sales in year t-1. We also 
used general international experience dummy instead of general international 
experience (continuous) in Model 2 in Table 7 and host-country experience 
dummy instead of host-country experience (continuous) in Model 7 in Table 
7. Using a dichotomous rather than a continuous measure of experience is in 
line with prior international business studies such as Filatotchev, Liu, Buck 
and Wright (2009). The general international experience dummy is coded 1 
if the firm has other overseas investment before this OFDI project, and 0 if 
otherwise. The coding of the host-country experience dummy is similar. At 
last, we used the Military in Politics index from the International Country 
Risk Guide published by the PRS Group (Howell, 2011), instead of the 
Political Stability and Lack of Violence index from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators published by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2011), to measure host-country political risk in Model 4 in Table 
7. The International Country Risk Guide suggests that military participation 
in politics is often associated with political risk. We find those results similar 
to our main results, except that the coefficient of host-country experience 
(dummy) is positive while the coefficient of host-country experience (dummy) 
× host-country indulgence is negative and significant (p<0.05). Then, we 
have calculated and found that the values of the correct interaction effect 
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range from -1.28 to 0.00, with a mean value of −0.51, and that the z-statistic 
values range from -3.82 to 0.01, with only some negative values of the correct 
interaction effect being significant (z<-1.96). Figure 6b shows that the 
average marginal effects of host-country experience (dummy) (1) are 
negative and significant (confidence intervals does not include zero) and (2) 
the negative effects are enhanced, at a high level of host-country indulgence. 
At a relatively low level of host-country indulgence, this relationship 
becomes positive but the moderating effect also becomes insignificant, which 
is illustrated by the left part of the fitted line almost horizontal to the X axis. 
That is to say, the estimation result of our robustness tests is consistent with 
our main result.  
Second, we use an alternative model for our main regression. Apart from 
Logit regression, Probit regression is commonly used in management 
research to estimate the model when the data is cross-sectional data and the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. The main difference between Logit and 
Probit regression is the distribution function. We rerun our tests using Probit 







Figure 6a Differences between correct- and incorrect interaction effect of host-country experience (dummy) and 
host-country indulgence 
 








Table 7 Robustness tests of Chapter 2 















8                Explanatory variables         
Asset specificity -44.84 -14.53 -13.96 -15.74 -11.29 -8.70 -7.84 -7.98 
 
(60.00) (11.53) (11.15) (11.90) (6.88) (5.61) (5.34) (5.41) 
General international experience -0.38 -0.75 -0.49 -0.43 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 
 
(0.35) (0.74) (0.38) (0.38) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
Host-country experience 0.36 -0.01 0.65 0.13 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 
 
(0.74) (0.85) (1.25) (0.90) (0.39) (0.45) (0.36) (0.44) 
Host-country political risk -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.30 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) 
Moderator variables         
Host-country indulgence -0.14 -0.03 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.04 -0.07 -0.19 
 
(0.42) (0.38) (0.36) (0.31) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Interaction terms         
Asset specificity × Host-country indulgence -181.7+    -21.82*    
 
(107.0)    (10.04)    
International experience × Host-country 
indulgence 
 -0.57    -0.01   
 
 (0.85)    (0.25)   
Host-country experience × Host-country 
indulgence 
  -5.13*    -1.50*  
 
  (2.59)    (0.75)  
Host-country political risk × Host-country 
indulgence 
   0.61+    0.51+ 
 
   (0.34)    (0.28) 
Control variables         
Firm age 0.77* 0.63+ 0.72* 0.84* 0.36* 0.37* 0.38* 0.38*   
 
(0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.37) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Firm size -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Profitability -0.27 -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.19 
 
(1.75) (1.51) (1.65) (1.79) (0.80) (0.79) (0.80) (0.77) 
Export orientation -0.57 -0.72 -0.72 -0.77 -0.39 -0.39 -0.40 -0.45 
 
(0.56) (0.54) (0.54) (0.62) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) 
Establishment mode 1.84+ 1.83* 1.92* 2.09** 1.09* 1.06* 1.12* 1.09*   
 
(0.95) (0.82) (0.84) (0.78) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) 
Home country regional institutional 
development 
-0.47** -0.41* -0.39* -0.37* -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.25**  
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Home country regional institutional instability  -2.59 -2.15 -2.35 -2.54+ -1.10 -1.14 -1.16 -1.12 
 
(1.75) (1.60) (1.57) (1.53) (0.83) (0.81) (0.81) (0.80) 
Cultural distance -0.24 -0.27 -0.25  -0.15 -0.16 -0.15                 
 


















(0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Number of observations 367 367 367 355 367 367 367 367 
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 
Nagelkerke R2 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 
















* Log likelihood -114.40 -115.90 -114.60 -105.50 -114.20 -115.20 -114.60 -114.10 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Year dummies included.  
2.7 Discussions and conclusions  
Our study is motivated by the desire to better understand how national culture 
influences the FDI OMC of an IJV. It contributes to the literature by 
comparing MNEs’ FDI OMC of an IJV in an indulgent culture with that in a 
restraint culture. As noted earlier, prior research has primarily examined how 
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national cultural dimensions-such as power distance, individualism-
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation-affect 
international entry mode choice, by comparing international entry mode 
choice in different cultural contexts. While several studies have 
acknowledged that the national cultural dimension of IR is a relevant 
dimension in cross-culture management (Akdeniz & Talay, 2013; Aramo-
Immonen, Jaakkola, & Linna, 2011), ours is the first to examine the role of 
this national cultural dimension in FDI OMC.  
We drew upon transaction cost and institutional theories (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002; Roberts & Greenwood, 1997) 
to examine how the national cultural dimension of IR may determine (1) local 
firms’ opportunistic propensity, (2) local employees’ propensity to deviate 
from their contractual obligations, and (3) local governments’ propensity to 
maintain order in the nation, and hence this national cultural dimension may 
moderate the relationship between transaction cost factors and the FDI OMC 
of an IJV. Using a cross-sectional outward FDI dataset of manufacturing 
firms from China during 2005 and 2007, we find that Chinese firms are less 
likely to enter through the IJV mode for highly asset-specific FDI projects in 
an indulgent culture than in a restraint culture. Compared with the restraint 
culture, the indulgent culture often shows greater tolerance for opportunistic 
behaviours and hence adopting the IJV mode for a highly asset-specific FDI 
project may subject an MNE to the local partner’s exploitation. We also find 
that inexperienced Chinese firms are more likely to enter through the IJV 
mode in an indulgent culture than in a restraint culture, and that this effect is 
statistically insignificant in terms of general international experience but 
significant with respect to host-country experience. These results suggest that 
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internal uncertainty becomes a more severe management problem in an 
indulgent culture-where local employees have a greater latitude to have fun 
and spend money (Costa et al., 2013)-than in a restraint culture. In the highly 
indulgent culture, joint venturing with local firms is more in need for firms 
new to the host market, which lack sufficient knowledge and ability to 
manage their local employees. These findings also suggest that there may be 
a limit for general international experience to help an MNE overcome 
uncertainty internal to its future FDI projects, because experience from one 
host country may not apply in the next host country (Dow & Larimo, 2009). 
We also find that Chinese firms are more likely to enter high political risk 
countries through the IJV mode, where the host-country culture is more 
indulgent. Political risk is more likely to run out of control in an indulgent 
culture, because maintaining order in the nation is not given a high priority in 
an indulgent culture (Hofstede et al., 2010). These findings are consistent with 
our arguments that the culture dimension of IR has a significant impact on an 
MNE’s FDI OMC from transaction cost and/or institutional perspectives.  
Our focus on the role of the cultural dimension of IR in FDI OMC differs 
from yet complements some existing understanding in this field. Morschett et 
al. (2010) focus on the culture dimension of power distance and find that 
MNEs from high power distance countries tend to choose the WFOE mode 
for their foreign subsidiaries. Jung and Suh (2013) concentrate on the culture 
dimension of individualism-collectivism and find that MNEs from high 
collectivism countries are likely to enter a foreign market through the WFOE 
mode. Erramilli (1996) is interested in the culture dimension of uncertainty 
avoidance and finds that MNE managers from a high uncertainty avoidance 
culture prefer a highly integrated ownership mode such as WFOE to organize 
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the foreign subsidiary. Peng and Beamish (2014) discuss the culture 
dimension of long-term orientation and find that MNEs tend to maintain high 
ownership levels in long-term oriented host countries. These studies advanced 
the international entry mode literature by examining the impact of different 
dimensions of national culture. Our findings suggest that, by introducing the 
national culture dimension of IR, new insight has been provided on the 
determinants of FDI OMC and may stimulate future research in this direction.  
Our findings on the contingent effect of the IR culture dimension also partly 
differ from and complement prior research in this area. Aware of the lack of 
contextualisation in the conventional transaction cost approach (Granovetter, 
1985), most studies have examined how national culture distance influences 
the transaction cost-based predictions of FDI OMC via its impact on asset 
specificity (Agarwal, 1994; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Morschett, Schramm-
Klein, & Swoboda, 2008), internal uncertainty (Cho & Padmanabhan, 2005), 
and external uncertainty (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001). A few of them, such 
as Peng & Beamish (2014), have examined how a single cultural dimension, 
in terms of long-term orientation, changes an MNEs’ propensity to adopt 
transaction cost-based, regarding cross-national distance, predictions of FDI 
OMC. Our findings suggest that the likelihood of an MNE to use the 
transaction cost-predicted FDI OMC, regarding asset specificity, internal 
uncertainty and external uncertainty, is conditioned on the host-country 
cultural dimension of IR. Our research, together with other research in this 
field, illustrates that the development and testing of the moderating influences 
of cultural factors on transaction-cost attributes is in need to expand our 
understanding of the determinants of FDI OMC.  
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Our study has limitations that may have implications for future research. First, 
we take into account an MNE’s foreign entry strategy between the WFOE 
and IJV modes only. Since transaction costs may also influence an MNE’s 
foreign entry mode choice between (1) an equity-based mode and a non-
equity-based mode and (2) a greenfield mode and an acquisition mode (Pan 
& David, 2000), future research may examine our research question in those 
contexts. Second, our use of archival data is incapable of capturing the 
perceptions of MNE managers of the pivotal variables such as asset 
specificity and uncertainty (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007), and hence future 
research can use survey instruments to complement our documentary data. 
Third, this study is limited to explaining how the host-country cultural 
dimension of IR affects FDI OMC. Future research may explore how the 
home-country cultural dimension of IR influences FDI OMC. Fourth, we find 
that, rather than the interaction between general international experience and 
host-country cultural dimension of IR, but the interaction between country-
specific experience and host-country cultural dimension of IR, is an important 
determinant of FDI OMC. Future research could further observe how 
different cultural dimensions interact with a firm’s FDI experience of 
different attributes to influence its FDI OMC. Finally, this study has its 
limitations with respect to sampling. MNEs in our sample are relatively large 
firms. Due to data availability in ARIES, we include only MNEs with annual 
sales of at least five million RMB in our sample. Since small and medium-
sized firms may be subject to liability of smallness such as highly sensitive to 
uncertainty (Maekelburger, Schwens, & Kabst, 2012), their responses to 
cultural influences and thus their FDI OMC, may differ from those of larger 
firms. Future research may examine whether our findings are consistent with 
72 
 
smaller MNEs. We also focus on FDI firms from China only. Although we 
believe that our theoretical arguments apply to a wider scope of transition or 
emerging countries, a single home-country sample may not fully reveal that 
potential. Compared to other transition or emerging economies, such as India 
which is focused on FDI in manufacturing and IT services, China has some 
unique attributes, including huge FDI in resource extraction activities 
dominated by state-owned enterprises (Gammeltoft). Future research may 
examine whether our findings are consistent with other emerging economies. 
We also consider only FDI firms from the manufacturing industry. Some 
existing studies suggest that transaction cost-based predictions of FDI OMC 
differ between manufacturing firms and service firms (Brouthers & Brouthers, 
2003). Therefore, future research may also test whether our arguments are 
supported by the FDI OMC of service firms. Such research efforts may not 
only advance our knowledge about FDI OMC but also offer practical 
implications with respect to how firms from emerging economies can 
internationalize more efficiently.  
This study also provides valuable managerial and policy implications. For 
MNE managers, we would advise them to pay more attention to transaction 
costs induced by asset specificity, country-specific experience or host-
country political risk in their FDI ownership decision making, because FDI 
OMC with lower transaction costs often result in better performance of an 
FDI project (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al., 2003). Our findings confirm 
that MNEs are more likely to stick to a low transaction-cost FDI OMC in an 
indulgent host-country culture than in a restraint host-country culture. 
Transaction costs associated with FDI OMC become a bigger concern of 
MNEs in an indulgent host-country culture than in a restraint host-country 
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culture, because opportunism and disorder in the nation are more likely to 
happen in an indulgent culture. Employees from an indulgent culture also 
have a greater latitude for spending money and having fun (Hofstede, 2011), 
and they may bring this social norm to work and reduce their work efficiency. 
For policymakers from an indulgent culture, we advise them to enhance local 
rules and law against business opportunism, so that transaction-specific FDI 
projects can be properly protected from local firms’ exploitation. Maintaining 
order in the nation should be given a high priority in policy making, thus 
providing MNEs with a relatively stable business environment in an indulgent 
culture. In contrast, those are far less of a concern for host-country 
policymakers from a restraint culture, because such societies’ dependence on 
moral disciplines can mitigate opportunism, and maintaining order in the 
nation is an established social norm (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
In conclusion, to the limit of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study 
that explicitly examines how the national cultural dimension of IR affects an 
MNE’s FDI OMC. Our findings broaden our knowledge of culture as a set of 
institutional constraints on firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages and 







Chapter 3. Impact of state ownership of the host-country IJV partner 
on Intra-industry Productivity Spillovers from International Joint 
Ventures 
3.1 Abstract  
This chapter intends to explore new mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours at the stage of international joint 
venture (IJV) operation. Specifically, in a transition economy context, we 
examine whether host-country institutions constrain intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms through state ownership 
of the host-country IJV partner. Taking an institutional perspective, we 
propose that, compared with IJVs with privately-owned host-country partners 
(PIJVs), IJVs with state-owned host-country partners (SIJVs) (1) are more 
technologically advanced and (2) have a stronger incentive, to facilitate the 
improvement of domestic firms’ productivity, especially the improvement of 
SOEs’ productivity. Using comprehensive panel data from 256396 domestic 
firms and 68381 foreign-invested firms in Chinese manufacturing industry 
between 1998 and 2007, our empirical results strongly support our theoretical 
arguments. We find that SIJVs generate a greater magnitude of intra-industry 
productivity spillovers to domestic firms than PIJVs. We also find that (1) 
SIJVs generate a greater magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers 
to SOEs than to POEs and that (2) PIJVs generates very limited intra-industry 
productivity spillovers to both SOEs and POEs. 
3.2 Introduction  
Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is widely considered to have a salient 
impact on China’s economic success (Yao & Wei, 2007). Apart from creating 
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the export surplus and domestic employment, in China FDI also generates 
productivity spillovers to domestic firms (Liu, Parker, Vaidya, & Wei, 2001). 
Because governments in transition or developing economies such as China, 
Romania and Vietnam play a salient role in shaping firm behaviours, 
researchers have studied the impact of state ownership on FDI productivity 
spillovers, focusing on whether state ownership of domestic firms may 
influence their absorptive capacity (Li, Liu, & Parker, 2001; Liu, Wang, & 
Wei, 2009). 
According to the institutional view, state ownership and private ownership 
affect domestic firms’ responses to FDI productivity spillovers via different 
mechanisms. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have access to the government 
supportive policy and scarce resources, and they are subject to government 
policy burdens and soft budget constraints (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998). 
Government supportive policy grants SOEs prioritized access to technology 
advancement (Child, 1996), and SOEs’ absorptive capacity to capture FDI 
productivity spillovers is hence enhanced. However, soft budget constraints 
result in SOEs’ lack of incentives to improve their productivity by learning 
from foreign-invested firms (Buckley et al., 2002). In contrast, privately-
owned enterprises (POEs) have to survive with market competition and hard 
budget constraints (Nee, 1992). Both market competition and hard budget 
constraints may drive POEs to seek productivity improvement by learning 
foreign knowledge (Xiao & Park, 2017). According to this view, compared 
with POEs, SOEs are more technologically advanced but have a weaker 
incentive to capture FDI spillovers.  
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When studying the impact of state ownership on FDI spillovers, existing 
research focuses only on state ownership of domestic firms as spillover 
receivers, but not that of the host-country IJV partner as spillover sources. 
Apart from the literature which explores the relationship between state 
ownership and FDI spillovers, the literature pertaining to productivity 
spillovers from IJVs also ignores this research question. From the perspective 
of IJVs, our understanding of the determinants of productivity spillovers from 
IJVs is limited to the level of foreign ownership (Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; 
Fatima, 2016; Konwar, McDonald, Wang, & Wei, 2015; Takii, 2005), 
country of origin of the foreign partner (Ito, Yashiro, Xu, Chen, & Wakasugi, 
2012), firm age, size and location (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, & Terrell, 2014), 
and industry types (manufacturing or service) (Tang, 2008). In reality, 
however, state ownership exists not only in domestic firms but also in 
international joint ventures (IJVs). State-owned host-country partners are 
often preferred by foreign investors, when foreign investors are faced with 
difficulties in accessing government-controlled- resources or markets on their 
own (Gueorguiev & Malesky, 2012). Otherwise, foreign investors are more 
likely to cooperate with privately-owned host-country partners, because state-
owned host-country partners may also induce government interventions and 
operational inefficiency (Luo, 1997).  
To fill this research gap between state ownership of the host-country IJV 
partner and productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms, we theorize 
in this paper that state ownership of the host-country IJV partner pertains to 
two principal spillover drivers: technology gap and absorptive capacity 
(Meyer, 2004). State-owned host-country partners’ advantages in technology 
could make them capable of cooperating with technologically-advanced 
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foreign investors, while privately-owned host-country partners’ 
disadvantages in technology may limit them to technologically-backward 
foreign investors. Thus, we propose that there may be greater potential for 
domestic firms to learn from IJVs with state-owned host-country partners 
(SIJVs) than from IJVs with privately-owned host-country partners (PIJVs). 
Ownership-induced government interventions could also drive SIJVs to help 
improve domestic firms’ productivity, especially SOEs’ productivity, while 
PIJVs are not directly subject to such interventions. PIJVs are also unlikely 
to help improve domestic firms’ productivity because they are rivals in the 
host market. In addition, SOEs’ advantages in technology will also contribute 
to their absorptive capacity. Therefore, we propose that domestic firms’ 
absorptive capacity to capture productivity spillovers from SIJVs should be 
stronger than their absorptive capacity to capture productivity spillovers from 
PIJVs, and that SOEs’ absorptive capacity to capture productivity spillovers 
from SIJVs should be stronger than POEs’ absorptive capacity to capture 
productivity spillovers from SIJVs. In addition, because of difficulties in 
learning from PIJVs through certain channels, we propose that SOEs’ 
absorptive capacity to capture productivity spillovers from PIJVs should be 
no weaker than POEs’ absorptive capacity to capture productivity spillovers 
from PIJVs. Empirically, we compare (1) the magnitude of intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from SIJVs to domestic firms and that of intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from PIJVs to domestic firms and (2) the magnitude 
of intra-industry productivity spillovers from SIJVs (PIJVs) to SOEs and that 
of intra-industry productivity spillovers from SIJVs (PIJVs) to POEs. The 
magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs refers to the 
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extent to which domestic firms experience changes in productivity from the 
presence of IJVs within an industry (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2008). 
We contribute to the FDI spillover literature in two important ways. First, we 
contribute to the literature on spillovers from IJVs (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 
2008; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). Our theoretical extension explains why 
and how state ownership of the host-country IJV partner may affect intra-
industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms. Second, we 
contribute the literature on state ownership-related FDI spillovers (Buckley, 
Wang, & Clegg, 2007b; Lu, Tao, & Zhu, 2017). We expand existing FDI 
spillover study, from concerning only the impact of state ownership on the 
spillover receiver, to taking into account the influence of state ownership on 
the spillover source.  
This study may also provide useful managerial and policy implications. For 
IJV managers, this work may indicate that the magnitude of intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from SIJVs to domestic firms is different from that of 
intra-industry productivity spillovers from PIJVs to domestic firms. Their 
partner selections between state-owned host-country firms and privately-
owned ones can affect the extent to which their local competitors may benefit 
from their productivity spillovers. For host-country policymakers, this work 
may suggest whether SIJVs or PIJVs may generate a greater magnitude of 
intra-industry productivity spillovers to domestic firms. Hence, the host 
government should encourage foreign investors to establish the type of joint 
venture that can generate a greater magnitude of intra-industry productivity 
spillovers to domestic firms. 
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The rest of this essay is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
summarise the existing literature on FDI productivity spillovers and address 
the research gaps that we intend to fill in this study. This is followed by the 
development of hypotheses. Then we report our research methods and 
empirical results. Finally, we discuss the main contributions, future research 
directions and implications of our study for both research and practice.  
3.3 Literature review  
Intra-industry FDI productivity spillovers are part of foreign-invested firms’ 
impacts on the host country, reflected by changes in domestic firms’ 
productivity (Blomström & Kokko, 1998). In international business study, the 
productivity spillover effect is a frequently discussed topic from the economic 
perspective and an emerging topic from the management perspective (Eden, 
2009). Productivity spillovers may occur in four directions: from foreign-
invested firms to domestic firms (Liu et al., 2001), from domestic firms to 
foreign-invested firms (Driffield & Love, 2003), from foreign-invested firms 
to foreign-invested firms (Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016), and from domestic 
firms to domestic firms (Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, 2008). FDI 
productivity spillovers occur in the first direction. It is generally accepted that 
FDI productivity spillovers are generated by non-market transactions 
between foreign-invested firms and domestic firms (Meyer, 2004), especially 
informal (not formally contracted) flows of knowledge from foreign-invested 
firms to domestic firms (Eapen, 2012). Kinoshita (1998) considers 
demonstration-imitation, competition and labour training as the main 
channels via which domestic firms may attain intra-industry productivity 
gains from inward FDI. While not a concern of this study, domestic firms 
may also attain inter-industry productivity gains from inward FDI via 
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transactional linkages (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2011; Liu, 2008). Existing 
research is mainly focused on analysing three main attributes of FDI 
productivity spillovers: magnitude, scope and speed. Research on the 
magnitude of FDI productivity spillovers explores whether and to what extent 
domestic firms benefit from FDI presence (Aitken & Harrison, 1999). 
Research on the scope of FDI productivity spillovers is concerned with 
whether the spillover effect is limited by sectoral, geographical and/or 
technological scope of FDI  (Driffield, Munday, & Roberts, 2004). Research 
on the speed of FDI productivity spillovers investigates the acceleration of 
domestic firms’ innovation and the erosion of foreign-invested firms’ 
technological advantages associated with the spillover effect (Perri & Peruffo, 
2016). Existing research either focuses on one attribute of FDI productivity 
spillovers or includes several attributes of FDI productivity spillovers in one 
study (Barrell & Pain, 1997). This study is focused on one attribute of FDI 
productivity spillovers, namely the magnitude. 
Intra-industry FDI productivity spillovers in transition or emerging 
economies comprise a process in which domestic firms learn from foreign-
invested firms (Meyer & Sinani, 2009; Zhang, Li, & Li, 2014). The 
precondition for such learning is the technology gap between foreign-invested 
firms and domestic firms (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998). 
Technology gap refers to the degree to which foreign-invested firms are 
technologically advanced relative to domestic firms (Gerschenkron, 1962). 
The larger the technology gap between foreign-invested firms and domestic 
firms, the greater the potential for domestic firms to learn from foreign-
invested firms (Caves, 1974). However, FDI productivity spillovers are 
difficult to materialize without domestic firms’ sufficient absorptive capacity 
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(Zhang, Li, Li, & Zhou, 2010). Absorptive capacity refers to a firm’s “ability 
to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity 
determines the extent to which domestic firms can take advantage of the 
technology gap to improve their own productivity. A firm’s absorptive 
capacity is determined by and positively associated with its technology 
advancement (Murovec & Prodan, 2009), its incentives to learn from the 
source (Buckley et al., 2002) and the effectiveness of information exchange 
between the firm and the source (Borgatti & Cross, 2003). Although not a 
concern of this study, existing literature also tries to explain FDI productivity 
spillovers from the competition perspective (Chen, 1996) and the network 
perspective (Burt, 1992). Competition-based research suggests that market 
commonality and resource similarity are likely to intensify the industry 
rivalry between foreign-invested firms and domestic firms and subsequently 
impede FDI spillovers (Chang & Xu, 2008). Network-based literature 
suggests that network tie is crucial to FDI spillovers because it serves 
as  platforms for interactions between foreign-invested firms and domestic 
firms (Eapen, 2012). Important theories/paradigms adopted in FDI spillover 







Table 8 Important theories adopted in FDI spillover research 
Author (s)  Focus  Theory/paradigm Main arguments 
(Abramovitz, 1986; 
Gerschenkron, 1962) 
Antecedents  Technology gap The existence of technology gaps between two countries offers the 
potential for the backward one to catch up with the advanced one.  
(Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1977) 
Antecedents  Network tie A relationship, whether it is strong or weak, generates information 
benefits when it is a bridge over a structural hole. 
(Chen, 1996) Antecedents  Competition  Market commonality and resource similarity affect the drivers of 
competitive behaviour, awareness, motivation, and capability, which 
affect the chance of competitive attack and response between two 
rivals.  
(Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990) 
Antecedents  Absorptive 
capacity  
A certain level of absorptive capacity is necessary for a firm to benefit 
from technologies developed by other firms.  
(North, 1990; Scott, 
1995a) 
Antecedents  Institutions  Institutions (1) establish incentives and business practices that 
influence an organisation’s strategy making and (2) shape an 
organisation’s abilities to implement strategies.  
The institutional view stresses the interaction between institutions and 
organisations and that a firm’s behaviour is shaped by institutions, through 
formal constraints like law and rules and informal mechanisms such as social 
norms and cultural orthodoxy (Scott, 1995a). Institutional constraints 
compromise incentives and sanctions (North, 1990). Those incentives and 
sanctions impose strong pressure on firms; those that conform to the 
institutional constraints are more likely to survive and succeed (Dacin et al., 
2007). Specifically, in intra-industry FDI spillover studies, institutional 
factors are often considered influencing the spillover effect through three 
major mechanisms. First, domestic firms’ learning ability is constrained by 
institutions. The local education system may affect the quality of labours in 
local firms and therefore those firms’ ability to learn (Blomström & Kokko, 
2002; Farole & Winkler, 2012). Second, institutions establish incentives and 
business practices that influence the knowledge acquisition processes. FDI 
regulations may affect the ease of FDI in a host country and tariff policy may 
influence its attractiveness to FDI (Chang, Chung, & Xu, 2007), thus the 
potential of FDI spillovers. Local labour market institutions may influence 
the mobility of employees between local and foreign-invested firms and thus 
the diffusion of knowledge (Hale & Long, 2006). Local governments grant 
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special economic zones more autonomy over their economic policies and 
institutional development than the rest of the country, where the collaboration 
between local- and foreign-invested firms are more likely to benefit local 
firms (Abraham, Konings, & Slootmaekers, 2010). Government support may 
also help domestic firms to benefit from the presence of FDI (Gorodnichenko 
et al., 2014). Third, although not a concern of this study, institutional 
frameworks offer motivations and organisational practices that affect the 
nature of competition. The institutional development of the host country may 
enhance local firms’ competitive positions in the home markets and thus those 
firms’ motivations and capabilities in upgrading their competences against 
foreign-invested firms (Meyer et al., 2009). An important aspect is trade 
openness, which may create a more competitive market environment and a 
higher level of technology exchange (Yi, Chen, Wang, & Kafouros, 2015). 
Important empirical findings of institution-related FDI spillover research are 
listed below in Table 9.  
Table 9 Important empirical findings of institution-related FDI spillover research 






Host country Main findings 
State ownership and intra-industry FDI productivity spillovers 








firm Multiple China  State ownership of the domestic 
firms impacts intra-industry FDI 
productivity spillovers. SOEs 
are less likely to improve 
productivity through intra-
industry FDI spillovers than 
COEs. 










Firm  Multiple  China  Industrial characteristics and 
country of origin affects the 
impact of state ownership of the 
domestic firms on intra-industry 
FDI productivity spillovers.  






Institutions  Firm  Multiple  China  SOEs are less likely to improve 
productivity through intra-
industry FDI spillovers than 
non-SOEs. 








Industry Multiple  China  Spillover mechanisms affect the 
impact of state ownership of 
domestic firms on intra-industry 
FDI productivity spillovers.  
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Firm  Multiple  China  Neither SOEs nor non-SOEs 
benefit from intra-industry FDI 
productivity spillovers.  






Institutions Firm  Multiple China  SOEs are less likely to improve 
productivity through intra-
industry FDI spillovers than 
non-SOEs. 
Other institutions and intra-industry productivity FDI spillovers 






Institutions Firm  Multiple  China  The special economic zone 
impacts intra-industry FDI 
productivity spillovers. Firms in 
special economic zones are less 
likely to improve productivity 
through intra-industry FDI 
spillovers than others. 





Institutions  Firm  Multiple  China  A host country’s FDI restriction 
on foreign ownership impedes 
intra-industry productivity 
spillovers from wholly foreign-
owned enterprises. 
(Du et al., 2011) Host-country 
tariff policy 
Institutions Firm  Multiple  China  Higher tariffs are associated 
with lower intra-industry FDI 






Institutions  Firm  Multiple  Low- and middle-
income countries 
A host country’s spending on 
education, trade openness, and 
sector concentration positively 
affect intra-industry FDI 
spillovers to domestic low 
productivity firms. A host 
country’s financial market 
openness, spending on 
education and investment 
openness positively affects 
intra-industry productivity 
spillovers from IJVs.   
(Gorodnichenko 




Institutions  Firm  Multiple  Central and Eastern 




A domestic firm manager’s 
interaction with government 
officials enhances intra-industry 
FDI productivity spillovers. 





Institutions  Firm  Multiple  China  The development of labour 
market institutions positively 
affects intra-industry FDI 
productivity spillovers.  





Institutions  Firm  Multiple  China  A host country’s regional 
institutional development 
negatively affects intra-industry 
FDI productivity spillovers 
(Yi et al., 2015) Host-country 
institutional 
development  
Institutions  Firm  Multiple  China  A host country’s regional 
intellectual property right 
protection, market development, 
and international openness 
positively affect intra-industry 
FDI productivity spillovers. 
Institutions and other FDI spillovers 
(Alfaro, 
Kalemli‐Ozcan, 




Institutions  Country  Multiple  Multiple  A host country’s financial 
market development positively 
affects FDI productivity 
spillovers. 
(Alguacil, 





Institutions  Country  Multiple  Multiple  The relationship between a host 
country’s institutional quality 
and the FDI effect on growth is 
insignificant.  
(Barry, 2007) Host-country 
education 
system 
- Country  Multiple  Ireland Ireland’s vocational/technical 
oriented education system is the 
key to the success of the 
country’s technology upgrade 









Institutions  Multiple  Multiple  Multiple  The relationship between 
bribery and FDI productivity 







Institutions  Country  Multiple  Multiple  A host country’s labour 
flexibility positively affects the 
FDI effect on growth. A highly 
complex local financial 
environment hinders the FDI 
effect on growth.  





Institutions  Multiple  Multiple  Multiple  A host country’s trade openness 
positively affects FDI 
productivity spillovers. A host 
country’s transparency and 
economic freedom affects FDI 
productivity spillovers in a 
curvilinear (U-shaped) way. 
(Wang, Gu, 





Institutions  Region  Multiple  China  A host city’s institutional 
development enhances the 
positive impacts of FDI on local 
labour productivity. 
Existing literature, implicitly or explicitly based on the institutional view, 
suggests that state ownership of domestic firms is a key determinant of 
domestic firms’ technology or incentives pertaining to FDI spillover effects 
(Li et al., 2001; Xiao & Park, 2017). State ownership of domestic firms may 
affect their technological capabilities of learning from foreign-invested firms 
(Buckley et al., 2007b). SOEs have access to the government supportive 
policy and prioritized access to production and innovation facilities (Child, 
1996; Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006). Therefore, China’s SOEs are better positioned 
for technology advancement and thus more technologically advanced than 
POEs (Liu et al., 2009). Apart from domestic firms’ technological capabilities, 
state ownership of domestic firms may also influence their incentives to learn 
from foreign-invested firms. SOEs are subject to soft budget constraints, 
which provide SOEs with constant financial support from the government 
regardless of performance (Lin et al., 1998). POEs are constrained by hard 
budget constraints, which drive underperformed POEs out of the market 
(Frydman, Gray, Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 2000). As a result, performance 
becomes less important for SOEs and so do their incentives to learn, 
compared with POEs.  
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Prior studies also indicate that the state ownership of domestic firms may 
affect their interaction with other organisations in the relevant organisation 
field (Liao, 2015). First, state ownership of domestic firms will affect foreign 
investors’ partnering strategies. In China, foreign investors are 
conventionally divided into two groups: Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan (HMT) 
firms and non-HMT firms (Wang, Wei, Liu, Wang, & Lin, 2014b). Non-
HMT firms’ ownership advantages often lie in state-of-the-art technology 
(Shi, 1998), and HMT firms’ ownership advantages often result from 
standardised and mature technology (Wang, Clegg, & Kafouros, 2009). 
Hence, non-HMT firms are generally considered to be more technologically 
advanced than HMT firms. In cooperative operations, non-HMT firms prefer 
state-owned host-country partners while HMT firms prefer non-state-owned 
host-country partners (Huang Jr, 2004), possibly due to state-owned host-
country partners’ stronger technological capabilities. Second, state ownership 
of domestic firms may influence their obligations to other domestic firms. 
SOEs operate as agencies of the government that implement government 
policies and regulations (Shleifer, 1998). In transition or developing 
economies, government policies on FDI are focused on the use of inward FDI 
in enhancing domestic firms’ competitiveness (Lall, 2000), and hence this 
focus becomes one of SOEs’ policy burdens. For example, in building South 
Korean’s industrialisation process, state-owned chemical and machinery 
firms trained domestic engineers via their turnkey plants or foreign engineers, 
and some of those engineers joined other domestic firms to provide the key 
knowledge base there (Kim, 2001). Third, state ownership of domestic firms 
may impact the domestic government’s support for them. SOEs often 
underperform and ascribe their losses to the domestic government (Lin & Tan, 
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1999). To ease its pressure on financing SOEs, the domestic government is 
eager to improve SOEs’ performance and hence implement SOE-favourable 
policies (Ma et al., 2006; Park, Li, & David, 2006). For the second and the 
third arguments, unlike SOEs that work as agencies of the government, POEs 
may neither bear similar policy burdens nor receive supportive policies alike.  
These beliefs, which may or may not be supported by empirical evidence, 
shape reactions by IJVs and domestic firms, and hence the productivity 
spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms. We therefore argue that these beliefs, 
and hence foreign investors’ partnering strategies in China, apply to their 
establishments of IJVs. SIJVs should be more technologically advanced than 
PIJVs, and therefore domestic firms learn more from SIJVs than from PIJVs. 
When joint-venturing with foreign firms, domestic firms may also bring in 
both their obligations to other domestic firms and the domestic government’s 
support. Policy burdens and supportive policy on SIJVs are probably more 
salient and hence their roles in productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic 
firms. Existing literature connects state ownership with FDI productivity 
spillovers and contributes to our understandings of how state ownership 
influences the spillover receiver, but not of how state ownership affects the 
spillover source, which is the research gap that we fill in this study. The 
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Figure 7 Research model of Chapter 3  
3.4 Hypothesis development 
Since the 1970s, investment in a domestic firm’s technology advancement 
has been strongly supported by the Chinese government (Song, Nason, & Di 
Benedetto, 2008), and most domestic firms remain state-owned when this 
supportive policy is initially implemented (Schermerhorn Jr & Nyaw, 1990). 
Therefore, Chinese SOEs generally started advancing their technology earlier 
than their local private counterparts. Although POEs also receive government 
support, government policy favours SOEs (Liao, 2015). SOEs also have 
prioritized access to production and innovation facilities compared with POEs 
(Child, 1996). Therefore, SOEs are better positioned for technology 
development and thus more technologically advanced than POEs. The impact 
of these institutional arrangements enables SOEs to capture a greater 
magnitude of FDI productivity spillovers than POEs and COEs in technology-
intensive industries (Buckley et al., 2007b), where the absorption of foreign 
technology requires relatively strong technological capabilities. When 















firms tend to cooperate with POEs or COEs (Huang Jr, 2004). Non-HMT 
firms’ ownership advantages often lie in using state-of-the-art technology 
(Shi, 1998), while HMT firms’ ownership advantages are often reflected by 
their ability to use the standardised and mature technology (Wang et al., 2009). 
That is to say, non-HMT firms are more technologically advanced than HMT 
firms (Wei & Liu, 2006). SIJVs which are often established by relatively 
more technologically-advanced non-HMT firms and more technologically-
advanced SOEs, is expected to be more technologically advanced than PIJVs, 
which are commonly established by relatively less technologically-advanced 
HMT firms and less technologically-advanced POEs. IJVs are also generally 
more technologically advanced than domestic firms in a transition or 
developing economy context, as evidenced by empirical studies based in 
transition or developing economies such as China, Romania and Vietnam 
(Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2008; Newman, Rand, Talbot, & Tarp, 2014; Tian, 
2010). Therefore, the technology gap between SIJVs and domestic firms is 
expected to be larger than that between PIJVs and domestic firms. There is a 
greater potential for domestic firms to benefit from intra-industry productivity 
spillovers from SIJVs than from PIJVs.   
Ownership and regulation are the two common types of government 
involvement in business to achieve political goals (Peng, 2000). An important 
political goal of developing country governments is to improve domestic 
firms’ productivity via FDI productivity spillovers (Lall, 2000). By investing 
in a firm, host-country government can impose policy burdens on the firm 
(Shleifer, 1998). Therefore, SIJVs will be motivated to facilitate the 
improvement of domestic firms’ productivity, thus fulfilling host-country 
governments’ political goal pertaining to inward FDI and domestic 
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development. For instance, engineers equipped with foreign knowledge from 
those state invested firms move to domestic firms (Kim, 2001). However, the 
improvement of domestic firms’ productivity often accelerate the innovation 
of domestic firms and the erosion of the technological advantages of foreign-
invested firms, threatening foreign-invested firms’ competitiveness in the 
host market (Perri & Peruffo, 2016). Privately-owned host-country partners 
in PIJVs are often profit seekers and competitiveness is essential for them to 
profit in market competition (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). Therefore, 
privately-owned host-country partners in PIJVs may discourage PIJVs from 
assisting domestic firms’ productivity improvement. Although the foreign 
partner in an IJV always minimises the IJV’s productivity spillovers to 
domestic firms (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2004), SIJVs may still commit some 
time and efforts to help domestic firms improve their productivity due to their 
policy burdens while PIJVs may not. Although absorptive capacity has been 
largely interpreted as a function of domestic firms’ internal technological 
capabilities (McDermott & Corredoira, 2010), Eapen (2012) suggests that the 
spillover source’s willingness to facilitate recipient firms’ productivity 
improvement may also affect the recipient firms’ absorptive capacity, because 
it affects the effectiveness of information exchange between the spillover 
source and receiver. Broader and deeper information exchange between the 
source and the recipient is essential to materialize FDI productivity spillovers. 
The absorptive capacity of domestic firms to capture intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from SIJVs is expected to be stronger than domestic 
firms to capture intra-industry productivity spillovers from PIJVs. In 
summary, there is more potential and support for domestic firms to learn from 
SIJVs than from PIJVs. Thus, we propose 
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Hypothesis 1. IJVs with state-owned host-country partners generate a greater 
magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers to domestic firms than 
IJVs with privately-owned host-country partners.  
Then we will discuss whether intra-industry productivity spillovers generated 
by SIJVs or PIJVs are distributed differently between SOEs and POEs. As  
Chinese SOEs are more technologically-advanced than POEs (Li et al., 2001) 
and SIJVs are commonly superior to PIJVs in technology, we expect the 
smaller technology gap (1) between foreign-invested firms and SOEs than 
between foreign-invested firms and POEs in general and (2) between SIJVs 
(PIJVs) and SOEs than between SIJVs (PIJVs) and POEs in particular. 
Compared with POEs, there may be less potential for SOEs to learn from 
SIJVs or PIJVs.  
A firm’s technology advancement also contributes to its absorptive capacity, 
because it determines whether a firm’s prior knowledge can facilitate the 
learning of new related knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, 
technology advancement may contribute to SOEs’ advantages over POEs in 
absorbing intra-industry productivity spillovers from foreign-invested firms, 
including SIJVs and PIJVs.  
SOEs also bear policy burdens such as control of strategically important 
industries, price distortion, job creation, retirement pensions and other social-
welfare costs (Lin et al., 1998). Such policy burdens make it difficult to 
distinguish between the policy-induced losses and SOEs’ own operational 
losses. A general solution is to impose soft budget constraints on SOEs, 
sustaining their underperformance by financial support from the government 
(Lin & Tan, 1999). Soft budget constraints may cause SOE managers’ 
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shirking and SOEs’ reluctance to pursue technology advancement by learning 
from foreign-invested firms (Buckley et al., 2002), including SIJVs and PIJVs. 
In contrast, the operational goal of POEs is profit seeking, and 
competitiveness is essential for their profitability in market competition 
(Boycko et al., 1996). Existing research suggests that advanced technology 
will contribute to a firm’s competitiveness and thus profitability (Zahra, 
1996). Firms can use advanced technologies to enhance competitiveness by 
providing new products or processes, changing the rules of competition or 
resetting industrial boundaries (Utterback, 1994). The operational goal of 
profit seeking also suggests that POEs have to meet hard budget constraints, 
running at least break even to survive (Shleifer, 1998). The pressure to survive 
and profit is expected to drive POEs to learn from foreign-invested firms, 
including SIJVs and PIJVs. That is to say, SOEs have a weaker incentive than 
POEs to absorb intra-industry productivity spillovers from SIJVs or PIJVs. 
In particular, SOEs’ productivity matters to host-country governments, 
because SOEs’ revenues will go to local governments as fiscal income (Chai, 
1996), and host-country governments are responsible for SOEs’ financial loss 
(Qian & Roland, 1998). However, SOEs are often found to underperform, 
partly due to the policy burdens imposed by host-country governments. 
Policy burdens such as job creation often conflict with SOEs’ profitability 
(Wang, Wang, & Bramley, 2005). By improving SOEs’ productivity, SOEs 
are more likely to contribute to governments’ fiscal income rather than asking 
them for financing after suffering operational losses. Therefore, transition or 
developing country governments are often keen to improve SOEs’ 
productivity (Park et al., 2006). POEs themselves not host-country 
governments, are responsible for their own financial losses. Although taxes 
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from POEs also contribute to host-country governments’ fiscal income, POEs 
are more likely to avoid taxes than SOEs (Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007). This 
may undermine POEs’ contribution to host-country governments’ fiscal 
income. Therefore, we expect that host-country governments will prioritize 
the improvement of SOEs’ productivity. As a result, we argue that, compared 
with POEs, SOEs’ disadvantages in potential and incentives to learn may be 
more than offset by their advantages in technology advancement and 
information exchange with the spillover source, in absorbing intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from SIJVs. Thus, we propose 
Hypothesis 2a. IJVs with state-owned host-country partners generate a greater 
magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers to SOEs than to POEs.  
However, unlike SIJVs which may facilitate the improvement of domestic 
firms’ productivity because of their policy burdens, PIJVs are reluctant to 
generate productivity spillovers to both SOEs and POEs, as we discussed in 
our first hypothesis development. This is due to the threat that productivity 
spillovers from PIJVs to domestic firms may pose to a PIJV’s technological 
advantages and thus profitability in the host market (Perri & Peruffo, 2016; 
Zahra, 1996). Since PIJVs have no special reason to assist the improvement 
of SOEs’ or POEs’ productivity without further specifications such as an 
affiliation to the same business group (Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010), both 
SOEs and POEs may lack effective information exchange with PIJVs. Since 
effective information exchange between the source and recipient is crucial to 
effective spillovers (Eapen, 2012), intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
PIJVs to both SOEs and POEs may be difficult to materialize. Existing studies 
also show that effective inter-firm knowledge sharing is difficult, even when 
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source firms are obligated to commit time and effort for it (Bechky, 2003; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986). Therefore, it could be even more 
difficult for domestic firms to capture productivity externalities from 
spillover sources such as PIJVs, which are unwilling to share knowledge with 
spillover receivers. In this scenario, we expect no significant difference 
between the magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from PIJVs 
to SOEs and that of intra-industry productivity spillovers from the same 
source to POEs. 
Nevertheless, through certain channels, intra-industry productivity spillovers 
from IJVs still happen (Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; Tian, 2010). PIJVs may 
protect their internal technologies from domestic firms, but they are incapable 
of preventing domestic firms from learning from their products sold in the 
market. Helpman (1997) suggests that domestic firms may attain productivity 
gains by imitating products. Specifically, firms often imitate products that are 
closely related to their existing products (Jirjahn & Kraft, 2011). Buckley et 
al. (2007b) also suggest that domestic firms’ technology advancement may 
help overcome their difficulties in materializing FDI productivity spillovers, 
because technology advancement determines their prior knowledge to 
facilitate the learning of new related knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
As we discussed before, China’s SOEs are likely to be better equipped with 
prior knowledge to facilitate the learning of new foreign knowledge than 
POEs. In this scenario, despite SOEs’ disadvantages in potential and 
incentives to learn, we expect that PIJVs will still generate a greater 
magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers to SOEs than to POEs. 
Taking both scenarios into consideration, we propose 
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Hypothesis 2b. The magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
IJVs with privately-owned host-country partners to SOEs is not significantly 
smaller than that of intra-industry productivity spillovers from the same 
source to POEs.     
3.5 Data and Methodology 
The data used in this study is collected from the Annual Report of Industrial 
Enterprise Statistics (ARIES) compiled by the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), which contains comprehensive information on industrial 
firms in mainland China with annual sales of at least five million RMB. 
Therefore, our empirical tests may only explain intra-industry productivity 
spillovers from relatively large IJVs to relatively large domestic firms. 
Despite this limitation, this dataset has been previously used to study 
productivity spillovers from IJVs in China such as (Tian, 2010) and provide 
reliable empirical insights. A data set including only manufacturing firms is 
built, consistent with previous FDI spillover studies (Smarzynska Javorcik, 
2004; Tian, 2007; Zhang et al., 2010). A manufacturing firm is defined as the 
one operating in a 2-digit industry where the Chinese Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code varies between 13 and 43 in ARIES (GB/T 4754-
2002). An IJV is defined as the foreign-invested firm with less than 95% 
equity share held by the foreign investor, and accordingly a wholly foreign-
owned enterprise (WFOE) is defined as the one with at least 95% equity share 
held by the foreign investor (Cui & Jiang, 2012). A SIJV is defined as the IJV 
whose host-country share-holder is state-owned. A PIJV is defined as the IJV 
whose host-country share-holder is privately-owned. We limit our 
observations to the period between 1998 and 2007 to ensure consistency in 
the coverage of state-owned- and non-state-owned firms (Zhang et al., 2014). 
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We only include firms that have data for at least two consecutive years, 
because we use independent variables with a lag of one year in our estimations. 
Due to the change of Chinese SIC code in 2002 and the application of new 
SIC code in 2003 (Holz, 2013), we match the new 4-digit SIC code with the 
old one for observations before 2003. Then we use the new SIC code for all 
observations.  
We exclude firms with collective ownership, due to difficulties in 
distinguishing whether a collectively-owned firm is actually controlled by the 
local government rather than its employees and managers (Jefferson, Rawski, 
Li, & Yuxin, 2000). We also exclude observations with the annual average 
employment of less than 6 workers (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2008). We 
exclude observations whose (1) 3-digit SIC code or (2) location (province) or 
(3) ownership mode (SIJV, PIJV, WFOE, SOE or POE) varies from the 
succeeding year, so we can include variables with a lag of one year in our 
estimations. Observations with missing data or unrealistic values such as 
negative values of firm capital are excluded. The final usable sample includes 
an unbalanced panel of 256396 domestic firms with 685162 firm-year 
observations and 68381 foreign-invested firms with 195149 firm-year 
observations, including 3985 SIJVs with 10259 firm-year observations and 
23336 PIJVs with 60891 firm-year observations. Operationalisation of 
variables is listed in Table 10, and all deflators are collected from the China 







Table 10. Variable measurements of Chapter 3 
Variable  Description  Example  
Log Y Annual sales of each domestic firm deflated by the aggregate producer price index and 
take the logarithm value in year t 
e.g. (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 
2008); Source: ARIES  
Log K Fixed assets of each domestic firm deflated by the aggregate fixed assets index and take 
the logarithm value in year t 
e.g. (Smarzynska Javorcik, 
2004); Source: ARIES 
Log L   Logarithm value of the annual average employment of each domestic firm in year t e.g. (Wei & Liu, 2006); Source: 
ARIES 
Log M  Intermediate inputs of each domestic firm deflated by the aggregate producer price index 
for intermediate inputs and take the logarithm value in year t 
e.g. (Du, Harrison, & Jefferson, 
2012); Source: ARIES 
SIJV presence The overall capital/labour/fixed assets/sales share of SIJVs in a 3-digit host-country 
industry in year t-1 
- 
PIJV presence The overall capital/labour/fixed assets/sales share of PIJVs in a 3-digit host-country 
industry in year t-1 
- 
WFOE presence The overall capital/labour/fixed assets/sales share of WFOEs in a 3-digit host-country 
industry in year t-1 
e.g. (Tian, 2010); Source: 
ARIES 
SOE A dummy  variable assigned a value of 1 if over 0% of the equity share of a domestic 
firm is held by domestic state investors and 0 if 100% of the equity share of a domestic 








3-digit host-country Herfindahl-hirschman index calculated by annual sales in year t-1  e.g. (Sinani & Meyer, 2004); 
Source: ARIES 




An index assessing the year on year growth of gross domestic product in year t-1.  e.g. (Li, Li, Lyles, & Liu, 





An aggregated index assessing the market-based institutional development of each 
province in year t-1.  
e.g. (Wang et al., 2013); 
Source: NERI index 
 
Consistent with previous FDI spillover research (Aitken & Harrison, 1999), 
this study adopts an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function. Log 
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output Yijt for a domestic firm i in industry j at time t is regressed on the 
firm’s inputs (log capital input Kijt , log labour input Lijt  and log 
intermediate input Mijt ), the presence of SIJVs, PIJVs and WFOEs in 
industry j at time t-1, state ownership of a domestic firm i in industry j at time 
t-1, interactions between the presence of SIJVs, PIJVs and WFOEs in 
industry j at time t-1 and state ownership of a domestic firm i in industry j at 
time t-1, and other regressors as controls. All independent variables (except 
for log K, log L and log M) are included in the regressions with a lag of one 
year (Wei & Liu, 2006), to minimise the potential endogeneity problem.  
The coefficient estimates of regressors containing SIJV (PIJV) presence are 
interpreted as evidence to support intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
SIJVs (PIJVs) to domestic firms’ output. The magnitude of the coefficient for 
SIJV (PIJV) presence reflects the magnitude of productivity spillovers from 
SIJVs (PIJVs) to domestic firms. A larger and positive coefficient suggests a 
greater magnitude of productivity spillovers.  
To improve the robustness of our estimation results, we use four alternative 
measures of foreign presence rather than one measure when assessing the 
spillover effects: the capital/labour/fixed assets/sales share accounted for by 
all SIJVs/PIJVs/WFOEs in each industry (Gorg & Strobl, 2001). αij denotes 
the unobserved effects for a domestic firm i in industry j, and ɛijt is the error 
term. The vector of controls includes intangible assets, industry concentration, 
export orientation, provincial GDP index, provincial marketisation index, 2-
digit industry dummies, and year dummies. Equation (1) corresponds to the 
null Model 1 in Table 22, Equation (2) corresponds to Models 2-5 in Table 
22 to test our Hypothesis 1, and Equation (3) corresponds to Models 6-9 in 
Table 22 to test our Hypothesis 2a-2b.  
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log Yijt = β1 log Kijt + β2 log Lijt + β3log Mijt +  β4Controlst−1 + αij + εijt 
(1)                                                                                                                             
log Yijt = β1 log Kijt + β2 log Lijt + β3log Mijt + β4SIJV presencejt−1 +
β5PIJV presencejt−1 +
β6WFOE presencejt−1 + β7SOEjt−1 +  β8Controlst−1 + αij + εijt                                                                                                                
(2) 
log Yijt = β1 log Kijt + β2 log Lijt + β3log Mijt + β4SIJV presencejt−1 +
β5PIJV presencejt−1 + β6SIJV presencejt−1 × SOEijt−1 +
β7PIJV presencejt−1 × SOEijt−1 + β8WFOE presencejt−1 +
β9WFOE presencejt−1 × SOEijt−1 + β10 SOEjt−1 +  β11Controlst−1 + αij +
εijt                                                                         
(3) 
3.6 Empirical results  
Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables, 
except for year dummies and industry dummies for space reasons. Table 12 
reports firm-fixed effect models of individual domestic firms’ production 
function. We used panel OLS regression (xtreg in STATA) to estimate the 
models because the data is longitudinal panel data and the dependent variable 
is continuous (Harbord & Higgins, 2008). Pooled OLS regression is not 
adopted because the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test shows the 
existence of unobserved individual effects (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Random-
effects OLS regression is not adopted because the Hausman test shows the 
existence of a correlation between unobserved individual effects and 
independent variables (Wooldridge, 2010). Standard errors are clustered at 
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the firm level to correct for potential heteroscedasticity. All continuous 
independent variables are mean-centered before calculating the interaction 
terms, to minimise the potential for multicollinearity and make it easier to 
interpret interaction effects (Yu et al., 2015). 
102 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12. Fixed-effects panel OLS regressions of Chapter 3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Null  Capital  Labour  Fixed assets Sales Capital  Labour  Fixed assets Sales 
Log K 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log L 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log M 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Predictors           
SIJV presence  
 0.09*** 0.10* 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.07*   
   (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
PIJV presence 
 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.04** 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03*   
   (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.014) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
SIJV presence × SOE  
     0.31*** 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.32*** 
       (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) 
PIJV presence × SOE 
     0.00 0.11 -0.02 0.07 
       (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) 
Moderator           
SOE  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Controls           
WFOE presence 
 -0.02* -0.03** -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03* -0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
WFOE presence × SOE 
     -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 
      (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Intangible asset intensity  
-0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.045*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industrial concentration 
-0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Export orientation 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Provincial GDP index 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Provincial marketisation index 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 9.90*** 9.89*** 9.89*** 9.89*** 9.89*** 9.88*** 9.89*** 9.89*** 9.89*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Test: SIJV presence = PIJV presence - F=11.00*** F=5.42* F=6.31* F=9.94** - - - - 
N 664622 664622 664622 664622 664622 664622 664622 664622 664622 
F value 7458*** 6868*** 6485*** 6879*** 6488*** 6876*** 6491*** 6880*** 6498*** 
Within R2 0.7653 0.7654 0.7654 0.7653 0.7654 0.7653 0.7654 0.7654 0.7654 
Total R2 0.9282 0.9284 0.9285 0.9284 0.9285 0.9283 0.9284 0.9283 0.9283 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
In Models 2-5 in Table 12, we used the Wald test to examine whether the 
coefficient of SIJV presence is statistically different from that of PIJV 
presence. The null hypothesis of this Wald test is that the coefficient of SIJV 
presence equals that of PIJV presence. In our results, the coefficients of SIJV 
presence are positive and significant (p<0.001 in Models 2, 4 and 5, and 
p<0.05 in Model 3) in Models 2-5 in Table 12, and the values of the 
coefficients of SIJV presence are consistently greater than those of PIJV 
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presence and the differences are statistically significant (p<0.001 in Model 2, 
p<0.01 in model 5, and p<0.05 Models 3 and 4), meaning that the null 
hypothesis is rejected or the magnitude of intra-industry productivity 
spillovers from SIJVs to domestic firms is greater than that of intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from PIJVs to domestic firms, through all the four 
spillover channels. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported.  
Dawson (2014) suggests that whether a moderating effect exists depends on 
the significance of the interaction term. In models 6-9 in Table 12, the 
coefficients of SIJV presence are positive, and the coefficients of the 
interaction term SIJV presence × SOE are positive and significant (p<0.001). 
These results depict that the positive relationship between the intra-industry 
presence of SIJVs and the productivity of a domestic firm in the industry is 
stronger when the domestic firm is state-owned (or weaker when the domestic 
firm is privately-owned), regarding all the four spillover channels. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2a is supported. 
In Models 6-8 in Table 12, the coefficients of PIJV presence are insignificant, 
and the coefficients of the interaction term PIJV presence × SOE are 
insignificant (p>0.05). These findings demonstrate that (1) the intra-industry 
presence of PIJVs has no significant impact on the productivity of SOEs or 
POEs through channels such as capital, labour or fixed assets and (2) state 
ownership of domestic firms has no significant influence on the distribution 
of productivity spillovers from PIJVs. In Model 9 in Table 12, the coefficient 
of PIJV presence is positive and significant and the coefficient of the 
interaction term PIJV presence × SOE is insignificant (p>0.05). This finding 
illustrates that (1) the intra-industry presence of PIJVs significantly affects 
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the productivity of SOEs or POEs through channels such as sales but (2) the 
state ownership of domestic firms has no significant impact on the 
distribution of productivity spillovers from PIJVs. In summary, our results 
suggest that there is no difference between SOEs and POEs in absorbing intra-
industry productivity spillovers from PIJVs. Since we hypothesized that 
(compared with POEs) SOEs are not disadvantaged in capturing intra-
industry productivity spillovers from PIJVs, Hypothesize 2b is partly 
supported. We find no channel via which a greater magnitude of productivity 
spillovers occur from PIJVs to SOEs than to POEs.  
3.7 Discussions and conclusions 
Our study was motivated by the desire to better understand how productivity 
spillovers from IJVs may occur in a transition market. It contributes to the 
literature by exploring the relationship between state ownership of the host-
country IJV partner and the magnitude of intra-industry productivity 
spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms. As noted earlier, prior research has 
primarily examined how state ownership affects FDI productivity spillovers 
by investigating the distribution of FDI spillovers between SOEs and POEs. 
While several studies have acknowledged that state ownership of the host-
country IJV partner is a relevant dimension in assessing IJVs’ strategies and 
performance (Luo, 1997; Nguyen & Meyer, 2004), ours is the first one that 
examines the role of state ownership of the host-country IJV partner in 
productivity spillovers from IJVs.  
We drew upon the institutional perspective (Du et al., 2011; Peng, Wang, & 
Jiang, 2008) to examine how state ownership of the host-country IJV partner 
may determine (1) the technology gap between IJVs and domestic firms and 
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(2) the absorptive capacity of domestic firms to capture productivity 
spillovers from IJVs, and hence productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic 
firms. Using a comprehensive panel dataset of manufacturing firms in China 
during 1998-2007, we have found that the magnitude of intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms is greater when those 
host-country IJV partner are state-owned rather than privately-owned, the 
attribute that is associated with IJVs’ technology advancement and 
obligations to domestic firms. Compared with PIJVs, SIJVs are generally 
more technologically advanced for domestic firms to learn and have a 
stronger incentive to facilitate the learning process. We also find a greater 
magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers from SIJVs to SOEs than 
to POEs, but we find no significant difference between SOEs and POEs in 
absorbing productivity spillovers from PIJVs. This result suggests that 
productivity spillovers from IJVs depend on not only state ownership of the 
host-country IJV partner but also on state ownership of domestic firms. In 
absorbing productivity spillovers from SIJVs, SOEs have advantages in 
technology and government support, compared with POEs. This finding also 
suggests that there may be a limit on the extent to which state ownership of 
domestic firms affects productivity spillovers from IJVs because of limited 
opportunities-such as imitating PIJVs’ products-for both SOEs and POEs to 
learn from PIJVs. These findings are consistent with our argument that state 
ownership of the host-country IJV partner determines the potential for 
domestic firms to learn from IJVs and domestic firms’ capabilities of learning 
from IJVs.  
Our focus on the role of state ownership of the host-country partner in 
productivity spillovers from IJVs differs from yet complements some existing 
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understanding in this field. Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) are focused on 
the level of foreign ownership in IJVs and find that both the presence of 
foreign majority-owned IJVs and that of foreign minority-owned IJVs 
generated productivity spillovers to domestic firms and the magnitude of 
spillovers are similar. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) separate the presence 
of IJVs at the industry level. They find that the inter-industry presence of IJVs 
increases domestic firms’ productivity while the intra-industry presence of 
IJVs reduces domestic firms’ productivity. These studies advance the 
literature by examining the heterogeneous nature of the presence of IJVs. Our 
findings suggest that, by breaking down IJVs into IJVs with state-owned host-
country partners and those with privately-owned host-country partners, new 
insight has been provided on productivity spillovers from IJVs. Our 
methodological approach adds a crucial new dimension to FDI spillover study 
and may stimulate future research in this direction.    
Our findings on the contingent effect of state ownership of domestic firms 
also partly differ from but complement prior research in this area. Aware of 
the status of domestic firms as productivity receivers in the spillover 
relationship, existing studies have examined how state ownership of domestic 
firms can influence the extent to which they can capture FDI spillovers (Li et 
al., 2001; Lin, Liu, & Zhang, 2009). Nevertheless, foreign-invested firms, as 
the spillover source firms in the FDI spillover process, have largely been dealt 
with as “black boxes” (Spencer, 2008). Our findings suggest that state 
ownership of the host-country IJV partner influences the distribution of their 
productivity spillovers between SOEs and POEs. Contrasts with Xiao and 
Park (2017) who suggest that SOEs are inferior to POEs in absorbing FDI 
spillovers, our results are consistent with Buckley et al. (2007b) that SOEs 
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are superior to POEs in capturing FDI spillovers in certain contexts. Our 
research, together with other research in this field, illustrates that connecting 
state ownership of both IJV partners and domestic firms is in need to expand 
our understanding of how state ownership affect the spillovers from IJVs to 
domestic firms.  
There are limitations to our study, which may have implications for future 
research. First, we consider only intra-industry productivity spillovers from 
IJVs. Since inward FDI may also generate inter-industry productivity 
spillovers through transactional linkages (Liu et al., 2009), future research 
may examine our research questions in inter-industry productivity spillovers. 
Second, this study has its limitations regarding sampling. Firms in our sample 
are relatively large firms. Due to data availability in ARIES, we include only 
firms with annual sales of at least five million RMB in our sample. Since 
small and medium-sized firms may be subject to liability of smallness 
(Maekelburger et al., 2012), their responses to FDI productivity spillovers 
may differ from that of larger firms and thus the spillover effect. Future 
research may examine whether our findings are consistent with smaller firms. 
We also concentrate on productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms 
in China only. Although we believe that our theoretical arguments apply to a 
wider scope of transition countries, a single host-country sample may not 
fully reveal that potential. Compared to other transition economies, such as 
Vietnam, China has some unique attributes, including earlier start in SOE 
reform (Vu, 2009). Future research may examine whether our findings are 
consistent in other transition economies. Third, we consider only state-owned 
host-country IJV partners and privately-owned host-country IJV partners. 
Some existing FDI spillover literature suggests that collectively-owned 
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enterprises (COEs) may also play an important role in FDI spillovers 
(Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2004) and some foreign investors may also 
cooperate with COEs to form IJVs (Luo, 2002). However, for instance, in 
China some COEs are actually controlled by domestic governments 
(Jefferson et al., 2000). Empirically, it is difficult to distinguish those COEs 
controlled by their managers and employees from those controlled by 
domestic governments. Since the attitude of managers and employees towards 
FDI productivity spillovers is often inconsistent with that of domestic 
governments (Buckley et al., 2002), it becomes difficult to explain the 
empirical results pertaining to productivity spillovers from IJVs with 
collectively-owned host-country partners, which may impose limits on future 
research in this direction. Last but not least, we also do not have detailed 
information about IJV partners’ investment motivations. Therefore, we could 
not include investment motivations in either theoretical discussion or 
empirical test. Existing literature suggests that investment motivations may 
either directly (Driffield & Love, 2007) or interact with other factors to 
influence FDI spillovers (Girma, 2005). Future research may explore the 
interaction effect of state ownership of the host-country IJV partner and 
investment motivations on productivity spillovers from IJVs. Such research 
efforts cannot only advance our knowledge on productivity spillovers from 
IJVs but also offer practical implications on how transition economies can 
benefit from IJVs. 
This study also provides valuable managerial and policy implications. For IJV 
managers, they need to balance the costs and benefits of cooperating with 
state-owned host-country partners. Our findings confirm that SIJVs generate 
a significant amount of intra-industry productivity spillovers to Chinese 
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domestic firms, while PIJVs generate very limited productivity spillovers. 
Productivity spillovers will enhance the innovation of domestic firms and 
erode the technological advantages of foreign-invested firms (Perri & Peruffo, 
2016), and these are the costs of cooperating with state-owned host-country 
partners.  The benefits of cooperating with state-owned host-country 
partners can be market entry into state-controlled industries or favourable 
government policies (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997; Ma et al., 2006). For host-
country policymakers, the conventional belief that establishing IJVs will 
assist domestic firms’ absorption of foreign knowledge needs to be altered. 
Our findings suggest that the establishment of PIJVs can hardly generate 
intra-industry productivity spillovers to Chinese domestic firms. Instead, the 
establishment of SIJVs not only significantly increase Chinese domestic firms’ 
productivity but also benefit SOEs more than POEs, which is compatible with 
China’s political goal of SOE reform that SOEs’ performance needs to be 
improved (Park et al., 2006). Therefore, for transition or emerging countries 
aiming at improving domestic firms’ productivity, especially SOEs’ 
productivity, via inward FDI, their policies on inward FDI should give more 
weight and support to the establishment of SIJVs than PIJVs.   
In conclusion, to the limit of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study 
that explicitly compares productivity spillovers from SIJVs and productivity 
spillovers from PIJVs and the distribution of productivity spillovers from 
those IJVs between SOEs and POEs. Our findings deepen our knowledge of 
state ownership as a set of institutional constraints on firm behaviours across 
IJV life-cycle stages and should encourage further study on this interesting 
and promising topic.  
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Chapter 4. Conversion of an International Joint Venture into a Wholly 
Foreign-owned Enterprise under Host-Country Institutional 
constraints 
4.1 Abstract  
This chapter intends to explore new mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours at the stage of international joint 
venture (IJV) termination. Specifically, we explore whether host-country 
institutions constrain the conversion of an IJV into a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise (WFOE) through two informal mechanisms - rates of WFOEs/ 
successful WFOEs in a host industry and host-regional SOE dominance - and 
two formal mechanisms – host-regional centrally-planned allocation of 
economic resources (CAER) and FDI-restricted industry (excluding WFOE-
only industries). From an institutional view, the conversion of an IJV into a 
WFOE (CIW) is an IJV’s response to an increase in a WFOE’s legitimate 
status relative to an IJV. Hypotheses are tested on panel data from 16583 
manufacturing IJVs in China between 2005 and 2006. We find (1) positive 
relationships between rates of WFOEs/highly profitable WFOEs/high 
market-share WFOEs in a host industry and the CIW and (2) a negative 
relationship between host-regional SOE dominance and the CIW. We also 
find no significant impact of host-country institutions on the CIW through the 
two formal mechanisms. 
4.2 Introduction 
In this study, we examine the impact of host-country institutions on the 
conversion of an international joint venture (IJV) into a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise (WFOE). Previous research suggests that the conversion of an IJV 
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into a WFOE (CIW) has several important implications for a firm’s 
international operations. First, resource dependence-based literature suggests 
that the CIW results from the foreign partner’s acquisition of the key 
resources possessed or controlled by the local partner (Hennart, Roehl, & 
Zietlow, 1999). Second, organisational learning-based literature demonstrates 
that the CIW occurs when the foreign partner learns that the local partner is 
worthy of acquisition (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). Third, real option-based 
literature proposes that the CIW is how the foreign partner of an IJV can fully 
exploit the value of the firm, when the value of an IJV increases (Cuypers & 
Martin, 2007). Fourth, transaction cost-based literature advocates that the 
CIW is a foreign-invested firm’s organisational change towards a more 
efficient governance mode, when the foreign partner has gained independent 
access to local complementary inputs or an increase in asset specificity 
(Chang, 2019) or internal uncertainty leads to an increase in governance costs 
for the firm to combat opportunism. A foreign-invested firm organized as the 
high-control WFOE mode suffers a less increase in governance costs than one 
organized as the risk-sharing IJV mode (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Last 
but not least, institution-based literature argues that the CIW reflects a 
decrease in institutional pressures imposed on WFOEs relative to those 
imposed on IJVs (Deng, 2001).  
Compared with resource dependence-based-, organisational learning-based- 
and real option-based literature, transaction cost-based- and institution-based 
literature may provide more specific knowledge on the determinants of the 
CIW. Resource dependence-based literature considers the CIW as one 
outcome of the change of resource dependency between IJV partners and 
ignores differentiating the CIW from other outcomes of the change of 
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resource dependency between IJV partners, which include the redistribution 
of equity share between IJV partners (Steensma et al., 2008). Organisational 
learning-based literature considers the CIW as one outcome of the foreign 
partner’s learning of the local partner and ignores differentiating the CIW 
from other outcomes of the foreign partner’s learning of the local partner 
which include the termination of the IJV (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). 
Existing real option-based literature considers the CIW as one outcome of the 
foreign partner’s exercise of its call options in an IJV and therefore ignores 
differentiating the CIW from other outcomes of exercise of call options, 
which include the conversion of a foreign minority shareholder into a foreign 
majority shareholder (Folta & Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991). In contrast, 
transaction cost-based literature explores the mechanisms through which 
transaction cost-based factors such as access to local complementary inputs 
and asset specificity may influence a foreign-invested firm’s decision on the 
CIW (Puck et al., 2009). Institution-based literature explores host-country 
institutional determinants of the CIW, such as the reduction in host-country 
regulations on the WFOE mode (Deng, 2001). 
While existing transaction cost-based literature on the determinants of the 
CIW is relatively mature, existing institution-based literature on the 
determinants of the CIW is still adolescent. A transaction cost-based 
explanation of the CIW has been provided by Puck, Holtbrügge and Mohr 
(Puck et al., 2009) in terms of three transaction cost-based factors: access to 
local complementary inputs, asset specificity and uncertainty. Access to local 
complementary inputs (or assets) is the central explanatory factor in  
Hennart’s (2009) transaction cost-based framework, while asset specificity 
and uncertainty are two of the three principal explanatory factors (the other 
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one is frequency of transactions) in Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost-
based framework. In addition, frequency of transactions is widely considered 
unrelated to a firm’s choice between the IJV mode and the WFOE mode 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Institution-based literature has examined the 
impact of parent-firm isomorphism and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
regulations on the CIW (Deng, 2001; Puck et al., 2009). Although not only 
on the CIW, existing institution-based literature also suggests that host-
country institutional development (Chang, 2019; Driffield et al., 2016; 
Meschi et al., 2016), host-country national culture (Iriyama et al., 2014), IJV 
legitimacy (Lu & Xu, 2006) and cross-national institutional distance (Gaur & 
Lu, 2007; Sim & Ali, 2000) may also influence an IJV’s post-entry ownership 
change. When studying the impact of host-country institutions on the CIW, 
existing research focuses on the impact of formal institutions (Deng, 2001; 
Puck et al., 2009) or institutional barriers (Chang, 2019), but not that of 
informal institutions. This is the first research gap that we intend to fill in this 
study. The institutional view suggests that a foreign-invested firm’s strategies 
are subject to both formal- and informal institutional pressures (Peng et al., 
2008; Yiu & Makino, 2002). We propose that host-country institutions are 
likely to shape the institutional pressures imposed on IJVs relative to those 
imposed on WFOEs via two informal mechanisms: inter-organisational 
imitation and state ownership. Imitation is often a foreign-invested firm’s 
basic response to isomorphic pressures in the same organisational field 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Inter-organisational imitation may convince 
foreign-invested firms that strategies pervasively adopted by other foreign-
invested firms or successful strategies adopted by other foreign-invested 
firms are more likely to help them survive and prosper (Lu, 2002). While 
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commonly adopted practices reduce the risks that those firms are exposed to 
in an unfamiliar environment, successful examples direct those firms’ 
organisational learning by encouraging practices that produce positive 
outcomes and discouraging those that produce negative outcomes 
(Haunschild & Miner, 1997). State ownership is a key institutional 
arrangement in transition economies, and SOEs play an important role in 
shaping the local institutional environment (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). 
Regional SOE dominance often implies that the local environment is 
unfriendly to foreign-invested firms (Liao, 2015). Foreign-invested firms are 
expected to work harder on attaining local legitimacy in such subnational 
regions.  
When exploring how host-country formal institutions affect the CIW, prior 
studies concentrate on the impact of FDI regulations, especially the impact of 
the complexity of FDI regulations (Puck et al., 2009), but not other 
dimensions of host-country formal institutions and FDI regulations. This is 
the second research gap that we intend to close in this study. The institutional 
view also suggests that a foreign-invested firm’s strategies face pressures 
from different dimensions or sub-dimensions of formal institutions (Meyer et 
al., 2014). In particular, regarding other dimensions of host-country formal 
institutions, the government control of resource allocation is common across 
transition economies (Xu, 2011), because those economies are used to 
centrally-planned systems and market-based reforms are not finished yet. 
Foreign-invested firms are under pressures to meet the regional government’s 
expectations if they need access to some local resources. As for other 
dimensions of FDI regulations than the complexity of FDI regulations, host-
country governments will normally distinguish between FDI-restricted 
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industries and non-restricted industries (Lu & Ma, 2008), due to their 
concerns about domestic development or national security. In FDI-restricted 
industries, there are limits on the number or amount of investments that each 
foreign-invested firm can make. Inspections and government interferences 
are expected to be strong in those industries. Therefore, we propose that these 
formal institutional pressures may induce foreign-invested firms to show 
more local adaptations than those in other industries or regions, in terms of 
the CIW strategy.  
We apply these theoretical arguments in foreign-invested firms in China, 
which has been a major receiver of foreign direct investment for decades. As 
a transition economy, SOEs (Liao, 2015), FDI restrictions (Lu & Ma, 2008) 
and government control of economic resources (Xu, 2011) significantly affect 
the environment in which foreign-invested firms operate. We tested our 
hypotheses on an unbalanced panel dataset of 16583 manufacturing IJVs 
between 2005 and 2006. Our results show how different dimensions and/or 
sub-dimensions of host formal- or informal institutions shape the CIW 
strategy of IJVs. We contribute to the CIW literature in two important ways. 
First, we expand host-country institutional determinants of the CIW. Second, 
we expand the formal mechanisms through which host-country institutions 
may affect the CIW, from FDI regulations to other formal mechanisms such 
as resource allocation institutions.  
This study may also provide valuable managerial and policy implications. For 
IJV managers, this study may indicate whether the CIW is a legitimate 
response to host-country informal institutions such as inter-organisational 
imitation and state ownership or host-country formal institutions such as 
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resource allocation institutions and FDI regulations, since legitimate firm 
behaviours are more likely to sustain a firm’s survival and prosperity (Dacin 
et al., 2007). For host-country policymakers, this study may suggest whether 
those host-country institutions, as mentioned above, may create an unfriendly 
environment for WFOEs. To attract foreign investors which are unwilling to 
joint venturing with local firms, the host government should alter those host-
country institutions to provide WFOEs with a friendly environment. 
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
summarise existing institution-based CIW literature and address the research 
gap that we intend to fill in this study. This is followed by the development 
of hypotheses. Then we report our research methods and empirical results. 
Finally, we discuss the main contributions and implications of our study for 
both research and practice.  
4.3 Literature review  
Table 13 Important theoretical frameworks adopted in research on the conversion of an IJV’s ownership mode   
Author(s)  Focus  Theory/paradigm Main arguments 




The acquisition of better knowledge and 
understanding can improve an organisation’s actions.  
(Emerson, 1962; 




An organisation’s possession or control of key 
resources may make other organisations dependent on 
that organisation.  
(Myers, 1977) Antecedents  Real option The value of a firm is affected by the present value of 
options to make future investments on possibly 
favourable terms.  
(North, 1990; Scott, 
1995a) 
Antecedents  Institutions  Institutions (1) establish incentives and business 
practices that influence an organisation’s strategy 
making and (2) shape an organisation’s abilities to 
implement strategies.  
(Williamson, 1975, 
1985) 
Antecedents  Transaction cost The costs of searching for, negotiating, and securing 
an agreement determines the governance structure of 
the agreement. 
The CIW is part of a foreign-invested firm’s ownership mode strategy 
(Hennart & Slangen, 2014). Questions on the ownership mode are among the 
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most key questions in international business study (Shaver, 2013). A foreign-
invested firm’s ownership mode strategy determines whether it adopts the IJV 
mode or the WFOE mode (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). A foreign-invested 
firm’s timing of exercising of the strategy can be at the time of entry or post-
entry. The CIW belongs to a foreign-invested firm’s post-entry ownership 
mode strategy. The CIW is an IJV’s strategic response to (1) the termination 
of the foreign partner’s resource dependency on the local partner by resource 
dependence-based literature (Yan & Zeng, 1999); (2) the foreign partner’s 
acquisition of knowledge and understanding that there are potential benefits 
in acquiring the local partner; (3) an increase in its value proposed by real 
option-based literature (Cuypers & Martin, 2007); (4) an increase in asset 
specificity or internal uncertainty or a decrease in external uncertainty or local 
complementary inputs indicated by transaction cost-based literature (Puck et 
al., 2009); or (5) an increase in institutional pressures imposed on WFOEs 
relative to those imposed on IJVs (Deng, 2001). Important theoretical 
frameworks adopted in CIW-related research is listed below in Table 13. This 
study explores the CIW from an institutional view.  
Institution-based literature explores the interaction between institutions and 
organisations, and focuses on how institutions shape a firm’s behaviour 
through formal and/or informal mechanisms (Scott, 1995a). Formal 
institutions refer to laws, regulations and their supporting apparatuses (North, 
1990). Informal institutions refer to socially shared rules and norms, and 
understandings that are “created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Legitimacy 
comes from a firm’s conformity to institutional constraints and legitimate 
firm behaviours are more likely to sustain a firm’s survival and prosperity 
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(Dacin et al., 2007). According to the institutional view, institutional elements 
must be taken into account in determining an IJV’s post-entry ownership 
change. As for home-country institutions, increasing internal isomorphic 
pressures from the parent firm may lead to the conversion of its IJVs into 
WFOEs, since the local partner in the IJV may disagree with the parent firm’s 
objectives or practices (Puck et al., 2009). Regarding host-country institutions, 
reduced FDI regulations may make it more affordable for IJVs to convert into 
WFOEs, because many IJVs are initially formed due to host-country 
governments’ strong surveillance on WFOEs (Deng, 2001). FDI regulations 
refer to rules or laws made and maintained by the host-country government 
to protect local industries and national interests (Cui & Jiang, 2012). 
Compared with the WFOE mode, the IJV mode is subject to less regulative 
pressures from host-country governments, since local partners can leverage 
legitimacy for the IJV. Local partners are also more familiar with local rules 
and norms than foreign-invested firms and thus facilitate conformity. Chang 
(2019) also suggests that formal or informal regional institutional barriers 
may prevent the CIW in a host region. Although not only on the CIW, existing 
institution-based literature suggests that the foreign partner tend to reduce its 
equity share in an IJV in host countries characterised by corruption, because  
increase the share of the local partner may motivate the local partner to act in 
the best interest of the IJV, when faced with the opaqueness induced by 
corruption (Driffield et al., 2016). Driffield, Mickiewicz and Temouri (2016) 
also indicate that the development of the local equity market may facilitate 
the local partner’s acquisition of capital from the local market and therefore 
reduce its dependency on the foreign partner for capital, which may 
consequently reduce the foreign partner’s equity share in an IJV. Iriyama, Shi 
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and Prescott (2014) suggest that an IJV is more likely to experience 
ownership change if the local partner is from a collectivism (compared with 
individualism) country, because of difficulties in developing out-group trust 
with partners from collectivism countries. Sim and Ali (2000) suggest that the 
psychic distance between the host and home country positively affects 
likelihood of ownership change in an IJV, since the differences between the 
foreign partner and the local partners may lead to the instability of an IJV and 
consequently the change of ownership. In addition, the normative distance 
between the host and home country (Gaur & Lu, 2007), an IJV’s legitimacy 
status (Lu & Xu, 2006) and institutional alignments (Meschi et al., 2016) are 
also institutional factors which are found to influence the likelihood of IJV 
termination. Important empirical findings of institution-related research on 
IJV ownership change are listed below in Table 14. 



















Transaction cost Firm  France  Romania  The privatisation of the state-owned 
local partner may facilitate an MNE’s 
CIW strategy. 
(Chang, 2019) Institutional 
barrier 
Transaction cost Firm  Multiple  China  The CIW is more likely to happen in 
a host region with lower institutional 
barriers.  
(Deng, 2001) FDI 
regulations 
- Firm  Multiple  China  An IJV, which are initially formed 
due to host-country governments’ 
ownership control, may convert into 
a WFOE when such control is 
relaxed.  






Firm  Multiple  China  MNEs are more in need of local 
partners to deal with complex host-
country FDI regulations and 
therefore reluctant to implement the 
CIW strategy in such contexts.  
Home-country institutions and the CIW 






Firm  Multiple  China  High internal isomorphism is likely 
to increase conflicts between an 
MNE and its local partners, which 










Bargaining  Firm  Multiple  Multiple  A host-country government’s 
ownership control may give the local 
partner an advantage, which is 
termed “government suasion”, in 
expanding its ownership position in 






Bargaining  Firm  U. S.  Multiple  The foreign partner’s home- country 
FDI regulations negatively affect the 
likelihood of ownership change in an 
IJV.  






Firm  Multiple  China  The conversion of IJVs into wholly 
local-owned enterprises is more 
likely to happen in a host region with 










Firm  Multiple  Multiple  Shift from majority to minority 
foreign ownership is (1) more likely 
to happen in a host country with 
developed equity market and (2) less 
likely to happen in a host country 













ownership constraint may encourage 
US MNEs to increase their 
ownership share in IJVs in less-
developed countries.  







Firm  Japan  Multiple  There is a negative interaction effect 
of normative distance and the level of 
foreign ownership on the likelihood 










Firm  Japan  Multiple  An IJV is more likely to experience 
ownership change if the local partner 
is from a collectivism (compared 
with individualism) country. 




Institution  Firm  Japan  China  Chinese parent age, Chinese parent 
size, and IJV industry relatedness to 
either parent had a negative effect on 
IJV termination by enhancing an 
IJV’s external legitimacy. IJV 
industry relatedness to both parents 
led to higher rates of IJV termination 
by weakening an IJV’s internal 
legitimacy. 







Firm  Multiple  Vietnam  An IJV with high transactional and 
low institutional alignments is less 
likely to terminate than an IJV with 
low transactional and high 
institutional alignments in the 
transition economy context.  






Firm  Multiple  Bangladesh  Psychic distance between the host 
and home country positively affects 
the likelihood of ownership change 
in an IJV. 
Prior studies also suggest that, except for formal institutions such as FDI 
regulations, foreign-invested firms also have to respond to host-country 
informal institutional pressures. Foreign-invested firms are under isomorphic 
pressures to imitate the organisational practices and structures adopted by 
others in the same organisational field (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such 
imitative behaviours are commonly defined as inter-organisational imitation 
and divided into three types: frequency-based, trait-based and outcome-based 
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(Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Frequency-based imitation relies on a firm’s 
belief that structures and practices adopted by a large number of organisations 
gain strong legitimacy. Trait-based imitation refers to a firm’s following 
behaviours and strategies of other successful firms. Outcome-based imitation 
suggests that a firm imitates decisions that generate positive outcomes to 
other firms and avoid those that generate negative outcomes. A firm regards 
other firms in the same industry as their models to imitate, because firm 
managers tend to consider firms within the same industry as more critical 
competitors than firms outside the industry (Haveman, 1993). This tendency 
is partially decided by the managers’ cognitive categories (Porac & Thomas, 
1990), and the cognitive category refers to “mental processes and resulting 
ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, 
and beliefs” (Uphoff, 2000). Foreign-invested firms are also subject to 
adverse rules and norms shaped by state ownership of host-country 
competitors in a transition economy context (Liao, 2015). State ownership 
refers to the holding of firm shares by governments. SOE domination in a 
region legitimises government surveillance on and interventions in local 
business, which is opposite to most foreign-invested firms’ operational norms. 
SOEs also may build an old-fashioned network-based business environment, 
which is often unfamiliar to foreign-invested firms (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005).  
Existing research also suggests that, apart from FDI regulations, host-country 
institutions may also put pressure on foreign-invested firms through other 
formal mechanisms. Foreign-invested firms’ access to external resources is 
partly constrained by the local resource allocation institutions. We define 
resource allocation institutions as institutions which establish rules of the 
distribution of resources among firms. Foreign-invested firms commonly 
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have to rely on local resources such as land and infrastructure (Nguyen & 
Meyer, 2004). For small- and medium-sized firms, they may also partly 
depend on local finance in a foreign market, due to their liabilities of 
smallness (Laufs & Schwens, 2014). Also in some industries, foreign-
invested firms’ operations are restricted by host-country governments (Lu & 
Ma, 2008). Such restrictions normally set the maximum number and amount 
of investments that each foreign-invested firm can make.  
These beliefs, which may or may not be evidenced by empirical findings, may 
shape host-country rules and norms related to foreign-invested firms and 
therefore the institutional pressures faced by them. We hence argue that, via 
these mechanisms, host-country institutions influence the institutional 
pressures imposed on the IJV mode and the WFOE mode, respectively. In 
particular, host-country institutions are likely to shape the legitimate status of 
the IJV mode relative to that of the WFOE mode through two informal 
mechanisms-inter-organisational imitation and state ownership. In industries 
where one ownership mode is more pervasive or successful the other, foreign-
invested firms believe that this ownership mode is more legitimate and 
therefore works better than the other in the industry. In regions where SOEs 
dominate the local economy, those SOEs may build a business environment 
that is unfriendly to foreign-invested firms. Also, host-country institutions 
may affect the institutional pressures faced by IJVs relative to those faced by 
WFOEs via two formal mechanisms-resource allocation institutions and FDI 
regulations. In regions where government controls resource allocation, 
foreign-invested firms are under strong pressures to meet government 
expectations to access local resources. In industries where there is a limit on 
the number or amount of investments that each foreign-invested firm may 
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make, foreign-invested firms may find it difficult to thrive on their own. In 
these industries or regions, the institutional pressures faced by IJVs are likely 
to differ from those faced by WFOEs and hence an IJV’s strategy to enhance 
their local legitimacy. Existing literature contributes to our understandings of 
how host-country formal institutions affect the CIW, but not of how host-
country informal institutions influence the CIW, which is the first research 
gap that we intend to fill in this study. As for our understandings of how host-
country formal institutions affect the CIW, prior studies focus on the 
influence of FDI regulations but ignore that of other mechanisms, which is 
the second research gap that we may fill in this study. The research model is 
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Figure 8 Research model of Chapter 4 
4.4 Hypothesis development  
The impact of host-country informal institutions 
Informal institutions rely on cultural orthodoxy or social beliefs and norms 
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Host-country informal institutions may shape a 
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which host-country informal institutions influence a foreign-invested firm’s 
strategy include managerial norms (Meyer, 2001), acceptability of bribery 
(Peng, 2003), antiforeigner attitudes (Cui et al., 2011), network-based 
business norms (Peng & Heath, 1996) and inter-organisational imitation (Lu, 
2002). Informal institutions effect a change by defining the social 
acceptability of a foreign-invested firm or by shaping a foreign-invested 
firm’s internal representation of the external environment (Lu & Xu, 2006; 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
Inter-organisational imitation 
Frequency-based imitation is a standard and convenient response to external 
uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Frequency-based imitation suggests 
that structures and practices that have been adopted by a large number of 
organisations gain strong legitimacy (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Previous 
decisions or behaviours of other organisations can increase the legitimacy of 
similar decisions or behaviours (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). As for a foreign-
invested firm’s ownership mode, we expect that the ownership mode adopted 
by more foreign-invested firms will gain stronger legitimacy among foreign-
invested firms in an industry.  
China’s regulations on foreign investment have largely been uncertain. In the 
early years of FDI in China, the Chinese government put strict constraints on 
foreign investment and forced the establishment of IJVs (Teagarden, 1990). 
For those foreign-invested firms choosing to resist this institutional 
arrangement by adopting the WFOE mode, they were often sanctioned with 
more inspections and government interferences (Osland, Taylor, & Zou, 
2001). Later on, with the ‘Open Door’ policies of the late 1970s and accession 
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to the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the Chinese government gradually 
released its constraints on foreign investment and the WFOE mode became 
permitted and encouraged (Deng, 2001). However, the reduction in 
regulations on foreign investment moves back-and-forth. For instance, 
introducing a cyber security law in 2017 has closed or obstructed most virtual 
private network services, which foreign-invested firms have often used to 
access “business-critical information from abroad” (Yang, 2017). Faced with 
such regulative uncertainty, we argue that foreign-invested firms may adopt 
frequency-based imitation as a standard response. In a foreign manager’s 
cognitive category, a high rate of WFOEs (ROWs) in an industry implies that 
the CIW is a legitimate response to the host-country regulative uncertainty. 
Thus, we propose 
 Hypothesis 1. The rate of WFOEs in an industry is positively 
associated with the likelihood of the conversion of an IJV into a 
WFOE in this industry. 
Outcome-based imitation may be another mechanism through which host-
country informal institutions affect a foreign-invested firm’s ownership mode 
strategy (Lu, 2002). Outcome-based imitation suggests that firms may follow 
the successful practices of other organisations (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 
As for a foreign-invested firm’s ownership mode, we expect that the 
ownership mode adopted by successful foreign-invested firms in an industry 
will gain stronger legitimacy among foreign-invested firms in the industry 
(Cui et al., 2011). Existing studies suggest that two types of success are 
associated with a foreign-invested firm’s ownership mode strategy: financial 
success (Nitsch, Beamish, & Makino, 1996; Pan & Chi, 1999; Pan, Li, & 
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David, 1999; Shrader, 2001; Simmonds, 1990; Woodcock, Beamish, & 
Makino, 1994), and non-financial success (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 
1999; Brouthers et al., 2000). Financial success offers the insight of a 
manager’s cognition on attaining the firm’s economic purposes. Therefore, 
highly profitable firms can act as models for other firms in an industry (Burns 
& Wholey, 1993; Wholey & Burns, 1993). Non-financial success offers the 
insight of a manager’s cognition on realizing the firm’s strategic aims. China 
is a less-developed country, and “Market expansion is often the primary goal 
of FDI in less-developed countries” (Luo & Park, 2001). As a result, foreign-
invested firms that achieve a large market share in an industry may act as 
models for other foreign-invested firms in the industry. In a foreign manager’s 
cognitive category, a high rate of highly profitable or high market-share 
WFOEs in an industry implies that the CIW is a legitimate way of achieving 
success in the industry. Thus, we propose 
 Hypothesis 2a. The rate of highly profitable WFOEs (ROHPWs) in an 
industry is positively associated with the likelihood of conversion of 
an IJV into a WFOE in the industry. 
 Hypothesis 2b. The rate of high market-share WFOEs (ROHMWs) in 
an industry is positively associated with the likelihood of conversion 
of an IJV into a WFOE in the industry. 
We assume that a firm will regard other firms in the same industry as their 
models to imitate, because institutional perspectives on strategy propose that 
a firm’s mimetic strategies are decided partially by its managers’ cognitive 
categories (Daft & Weick, 1984; Porac & Thomas, 1990). Managers build 
their cognitive categories by their internal interpretations of the environment 
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(Yiu & Makino, 2002). Managers consider firms within their cognitive 
categories as more critical competitors than firms outside their cognitive 
categories (Porac & Thomas, 1990). Therefore, managers will focus their 
attention on firm behaviours in their population rather than on firm 
behaviours in other populations (Hannan & Freeman, 1993). When building 
their cognitive categories, managers may pay less attention to or even ignore 
the firm behaviours in other industries (Haveman, 1993).  
State ownership  
Another important channel through which host-country informal institutions 
can affect a foreign-invested firm’s ownership mode strategy is state 
ownership. In transition economies, SOEs are still key players and can affect 
the evolution of formal and informal institutions at the regional level (Meyer 
& Nguyen, 2005). A group of firms can shape local institutions by developing 
common understandings and practices in repeated interactions (Lawrence, 
Hardy, & Phillips, 2002). Those common understandings and practices 
include behaviour paradigms, ways of strategic thinking and collective sense-
making (Porac & Rosa, 1996). Those common understandings and practices 
may shape the cognitive identities of local managers, which establish the 
boundaries of legitimation (Liao, 2015). 
In China, government directions in economic activities shape part of the 
formal institutions, and government influences on managerial fashion and 
procedures shape part of the informal institutions (Ralston, Terpstra‐Tong, 
Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006). A key character of traditional Chinese SOEs 
is a lack of autonomy, and almost all their activities are subject to government 
approval (Lin et al., 1998). Where SOEs dominate the local economy, 
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government inspecting and interfering with local firms are more likely to be 
legitimised in this region. Compared to WFOEs, IJVs often suffer fewer 
government inspections and interference (Osland et al., 2001). In addition, 
SOEs in transition economies often adopt network-based growth strategies 
(Peng & Heath, 1996), and they control the access to old-fashioned business 
networks. Clusters of SOEs also build a business environment that favours 
the benefits of SOEs than foreign-invested firms. As a result, foreign-invested 
firms may experience difficulties in thriving all by themselves, where SOEs 
dominate the region (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). For foreign-invested firms, 
one commonly adopted solution to such institutional pressure is to ally with 
local firms. The host-country IJV partner can help the foreign-invested firm 
establish legitimacy (Peng, 2003), and gain access to local business networks. 
For instance, the host-country IJV partner has a better understanding of the 
local informal rules and norms shaped by SOEs. The choice of the CIW is to 
expose a foreign-invested firm to adverse rules and norms shaped by local 
SOEs. Thus, we propose 
 Hypothesis 3. SOE dominance in a region is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of conversion of an IJV into a WFOE in this region.  
The impact of host-country formal institutions 
Formal institutions depend on the setting, monitoring and enforcement of 
rules (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Host countries often use formal institutions to 
shape a foreign-invested firm’s strategy (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1990). The mechanisms through which formal institutions 
affect a foreign-invested firm’s strategy include ownership restriction, 
constraints on access to local resources, mandatory exporting, and 
131 
 
interference with other operational matters (Meyer et al., 2009). The purpose 
of using formal institutions to shape a foreign-invested firm’s strategy is to 
maximise local interests from inward FDI or to protect national interests (Cui 
& Jiang, 2012).  
Resource allocation institutions 
Institutional theory suggests that external legitimacy increases a firm’s 
chances of procuring external resources (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1993; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1994; Scott, 1995b; 
Zucker, 1987). In a transition economy, resource allocation institutions may 
determine whether a foreign-invested firm needs to gain external legitimacy 
for the purpose of acquiring local resources. In regions where the resource 
allocation institutions are more market-oriented, resource allocation is more 
determined by the market. If a subnational government’s control on resource 
allocation is high (Xu, 2011), a foreign-invested firm’s need to gain 
legitimacy from the subnational government for the purpose of acquiring 
external resources is high. In regions where resource allocation institutions 
are still largely centrally planned, the subnational governments maintain 
control of resource allocation (Rosser & Rosser, 2018). Therefore, a foreign-
invested firm that gains legitimacy from subnational governments is better 
positioned in the subnational resource allocation system. 
A common way for a foreign-invested firm to gain such legitimacy is to meet 
governmental expectations (Kostova & Roth, 2002). An important 
governmental expectation of emerging or transition countries is to nurture 
local firms via foreign investment (Buckley et al., 2007b). Compared to a 
WFOE, an IJV is more likely to provide local firms with access to foreign 
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technologies and management skills (Beamish, 2013; Blomström & Sjöholm, 
1999). Empirical findings also suggest that IJVs are more likely to induce 
positive spillovers to local firms than WFOEs are (Gorodnichenko et al., 2014; 
Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2008; Tian, 2010). Therefore, an IJV is more likely 
to meet governmental expectations and therefore gains legitimacy from the 
subnational government.  
Reforms from the centrally-planned- to market-oriented resource allocation 
institutions vary across regions in China (Fan & Wang, 2011). There are two 
major reasons for such cross-region variations: industrial structure and speed 
of ownership transformation. For instance, compared to inland provinces that 
are more dependent on heavy industry, coastal provinces are more dependent 
on light industry (Hao & Wei, 2010). In 1984, the Chinese government 
initiated the dual pricing system. This system allows the market to determine 
the prices of most small consumption commodities and light industrial 
products while maintaining centrally-planned allocation of resources (CAER) 
such as coal and steel, which are important for heavy industry (Wen, 2007; 
Wu & Chen, 2014). This offers the coastal area an earlier start on developing 
the product, factor, and intermediary markets and market-oriented legal 
systems. As a result, in a subnational region characterised by a high level of 
CAER, the subnational government’s control on local resource allocation is 
still tight and therefore there is a need for a foreign-invested firm to adopt the 
IJV mode to gain legitimacy from the subnational government, for the 
purpose of being better positioned in the subnational resource allocation 
system. In this context, the choice of the CIW is to move a foreign-invested 
firm into a worse position in the subnational resource allocation system and 
managers of the firm are unlikely to do so. Thus, we propose 
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 Hypothesis 4. The degree of centrally-planned allocation of economic 
resources in a subnational region is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of the conversion of an IJV into a WFOE in this region. 
FDI regulations A conventional mechanism through which host-country 
formal institutions affect a foreign-invested firm’s ownership mode strategy 
is FDI regulations (Lu & Ma, 2008). The Chinese Ministry of Commerce and 
National Development and Reform Commission issued the first version of 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries in 1995 and 
since then the catalogue has been revised every several years, classifying 
industries in which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted or prohibited. 
Those industries in which foreign investment is restricted are strategically 
important or politically sensitive or characterised by overcapacity or 
overinvestment (Reuters, 2017). Restrictions include the number and amount 
of investments that each foreign-invested firm can make, and limitations on 
the percentage of equity share that foreign-invested firms can hold in a firm. 
Foreign investments in non-restricted industries are not subject to those 
restrictions. Compared to foreign investment in non-restricted industries, 
foreign investment in restricted industries may face stronger local 
institutional pressures, because they either add to overcapacity or 
overinvestment or operate under close government scrutiny. For foreign 
investment of weak local legitimacy, Meyer et al. (2014) suggest that the IJV 
mode works better than the WFOE mode in coping with local institutional 
pressures. IJVs can enjoy legitimacy spillovers from local partners while 
WFOEs cannot (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Therefore, operating in an FDI-
restricted industry, IJVs may face weaker regulative pressures than WFOEs. 
In this context, the choice of the CIW is to increase the regulative pressures 
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that a foreign-invested firm faces and decision makers of the firm are often 
unwilling to confront evitable institutional pressures. Here, FDI-restricted 
industries do not include WFOE-only industries, since the CIW will never 
happen in WFOE-only industries.  
 Hypothesis 5. The conversion of an IJV into a WFOE is less likely to 
happen in an FDI-restricted industry.  
4.5 Data and Methodology  
Data and sample 
Given our research question, panel secondary data is more reliable for 
analysis, since survey data may entail a high risk of recall bias (Hennart & 
Slangen, 2014). Panel data refers to “the pooling of observations on a cross-
section of households, countries, firms, etc., over several time periods” 
(Baltagi, 2005). We have built a two-year panel data set of manufacturing 
IJVs in China. We have collected our data from the Annual Report of 
Industrial Enterprise Statistics (ARIES), published by the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It covers firm-level information of local and 
foreign-invested firms in mainland China with annual sales of at least five 
million RMB. Therefore, our empirical analyses may only explain the CIW 
behaviour of relatively large IJVs in China. Despite this limitation, this 
dataset has been previously used to study the conversion of an IJV’s 
ownership mode in China such as Chang (2019) and provide reliable 
empirical insights. A manufacturing firm is defined as the one which operates 
in a 2-digit industry of which China’s standard industrial classification (SIC) 
code varies between 13 and 43. An IJV is defined as a firm with over 0% but 
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less than 95% equity share held by foreign investors. A WFOE is defined as 
a firm with at least 95% equity share held by foreign investors.  
Table 15 Variable measurements of Chapter 4  
Variable  Description  Source  
CIW A dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if the IJV converts into a 
WFOE in year t, and 0 otherwise 
e.g. (Puck et al., 2009); Source: 
ARIES 
ROWs The number of WFOEs divided by the number of foreign-invested 
firms in a 3-digit host-country industry in year t-1 
e.g. (Lu, 2002); Source: ARIES  
 ROHPWs The number of WFOEs divided by the number of foreign-invested 
firms, in the top quartiles for return on assets in a 3-digit host-country 
industry in year t-1 
e.g. (Haveman, 1993); Source: 
ARIES 
ROHMWs The number of WFOEs divided by the number of foreign-invested 
firms, in the top quartiles for market share in a 3-digit host-country 
industry in year t-1 




1-an index assessing the extent to which non-state-owned firms 
contribute to the total cumulative income of firms in a province in 
2005 (2006) 
e.g. (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005); 
Source: NERI indices 
Regional 
CAER 
1-an index assessing the extent to which economic resources of a 
province are allocated by market in year t-1 
e.g. (Fan, Wang, & Zhang, 2001); 
Source: NERI indices 
FDI-restricted 
industry 
A dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if the IJV operates in an 
industry where foreign investment is restricted (except for ownership 
restriction) by the Chinese government in year t-1 and 0 otherwise, 
according to the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment 
Industries (Amended in 2004) 
 
e.g. (Chang, Kao, Kuo, & Chiu, 
2012); Source: Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment 
Industries (Amended in 20004) 
 




Marketing expenditure divided by total sales in year t-1 e.g. (Bradley & Gannon, 2000); 
Source: ARIES 
Firm age Logarithm of the difference between year t-1 and year of 
establishment 
e.g. (Chang, Chung, & Moon, 
2013); Source: ARIES 


















Whether or not the foreign investor is from non-HMT origin in year t-
1 
e.g. (Wang, Liu, Wei, & Wang, 
2014a); Source: ARIES 
Following Elango and Pattnaik (2007), we set a one-year lag for data to 
measure independent variables, to control for the potential endogeneity 
problem. We limit our observations between year 2005 and 2006, because the 
information on R&D and marketing expenditures, which is necessary to 
measure two of the important control variables, is only available between year 
2005 and 2007 in ARIES, and a lag of one year is set to measure independent 
variables. Since ARIES is an archival dataset, there may be unusable or 
unreliable observations. We have carefully checked the dataset and excluded 
observations with inaccurate data, e.g., negative R&D expenditures and 
negative marketing expenditures. Due to data limitations, we can only specify 
foreign IJV partners from two countries of origin: Hong Kong, Macau or 
Taiwan (HMT) origin and non-HMT origin. Overseas Chinese share the 
Confucian culture and the Chinese language with local Chinese, which may 
help develop more mutual trust and less uncertainty between local partners 
and HMT partners than between local partners and non-HMT partners (Wei, 
Liu, & Liu, 2005), which consequently may cause the differences between 
HMT partners and non-HMT partners on ownership restructuring. We 
exclude any IJVs whose equity share is held by the Chinese government. We 
also exclude foreign-invested firms that operate in any industry where only 
the IJV mode is allowed. We exclude any observation whose IJV partner’s 
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country of origin, industrial classification or geographical location changes 
over the sample period.  The final usable sample includes an unbalanced 
panel of 16583 firms with 25958 firm-year observations. Operationalisation 
of variables is listed in Table 15.  
4.6 Empirical results  
Table 16 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample and the correlation 
matrix for the variables. We observe that (1) ROWs and ROHPWs are 
correlated at 0.89, (2) ROWs and rate of ROHMWs are correlated at 0.89, (3) 
ROHPWs and ROHMWs are correlated at 0.80, and (4) regional SOE 
dominance and regional CAER are correlated at 0.76. To cope with the 
potential multicollinearity problem, we do not include them in the same 
regression analysis but enter them separately in different models.  
We employ panel logit regression (xtlogit in STATA) to estimate the model 
because the data is longitudinal panel data and the dependent variable is a 
binary variable. We adopt the random-effects model because it fits better than 
the fixed-effects model. In the fixed-effects model, the likelihood functions 
are not concave during the iterations of the maximum-likelihood algorithm, 
and no estimation result is generated. It suggests that the fixed-effects model 
does not fit and in this case the Hausman test is not workable, since the 
Hausman test is based on the comparison between the fixed-effects 
estimations and random-effects estimations (Benjamin, 1995). Table 17 
reports the results with positive coefficients indicating a preference of the 
CIW and negative coefficients indicating a resistance to the CIW. Model 1 is 
the base model which includes only control variables. As for the rates of 
WFOEs by industry, highly profitable WFOEs by industry and high market-
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share by industry, we introduce them one at a time in Models 2-4 and Models 
5-7. As for regional CAER and regional SOE dominance, we also introduce 
them separately into Models 2-4 and Models 5-7. Models 2-7 also include 
control variables. The average VIF value of the variables in each model of 
Table 17 is smaller than 2.00, below the threshold value of 10.00 for concerns 
of multicollinearity (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2015). 





  N Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 
ROWs 
25981 0.59 0.11              
2 
ROHPWs 
2,981 0.59 0.12 0.89*             
3 
ROHMWs 




25981 -8.00 2.10 -0.16* -0.13* -0.13*           
5 
Regional CAER 




25981 0.07 0.25 -0.18* -0.17* -0.11* -0.02* -0.01*         
7 
R&D intensity 
25977 0.00 0.02 -0.02* 0.00 -0.01 0.04* 0.05* -0.01        
8 
Marketing intensity 
25978 0.00 0.04 -0.03* -0.03* -0.02* 0.02* 0.01* 0.00 0.01       
9 
Firm age 
25977 1.92 0.68 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 0.05* 0.09* 0.00 0.03* 0.02*      
10 
Firm size 
25980 5.09 1.08 0.05* 0.02* 0.03* -0.06* -0.05* 0.04* 0.02* 0.02* 0.17*     
11 
Financial capability 
25970 2.58 43.92 0.02* 0.01 0.02* -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*    
12 
Export orientation 




25981 0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.02* -0.06* 0.05* 0.04* 0.02* 0.06* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.00 -0.10*  
14 
Country of origin 
25981 0.56 0.50 -0.03* -0.02* -0.03* 0.15* 0.08* -0.04* 0.01* 0.01 -0.07* -0.03* 0.00 0.04* 0.01 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Host-country informal institutions 
       
ROWs  2.76***   2.66+                  
 
 (0.63)    (1.38)                   
ROHPWs   2.38**   2.50***                 
 
  (0.78)    (0.50)                  
ROHMWs    1.50   1.564*** 
 
   (0.96)    (0.43)  
Regional SOE dominance  -0.053* -0.05* -0.05    
 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)     
Host-country formal institutions        
Regional CAER     -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
FDI-restricted industry  0.28 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.24 
  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.19)  
Controls         
R&D intensity -16.00* -14.32* -13.77+ -14.06 -13.86+ -14.34* -14.51*   
 
(7.49)  (6.84)  (7.13)  (9.74)  (8.31)  (6.73)  (6.75)  
Marketing intensity -11.76* -11.20* -10.46+ -10.49 -10.73 -10.97* -10.88*   
 
(5.86)  (5.33)  (5.69)  (8.23)  (7.02)  (5.14)  (5.09)  
Firm age -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Firm size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Financial capability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Export orientation 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.12)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) (0.11) 
Industry concentration 6.06 6.28 5.32 6.14 5.99 5.51 6.32 
 
(4.61)  (4.09)  (4.10 (5.06)  (4.54)  (4.10)  (3.95)  
Country of origin -0.26** -0.20* -0.19* -0.19 -0.21+ -0.22** -0.222**  
 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
Constant  -4.32*** -5.55*** -5.04** -4.65 -5.13 -5.29*** -4.788*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.44)  (1.62)  (3.37)  (2.76)  (0.48)  (0.46)  
N 
25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 
Log likelihood 
-6517.10 -6511.80 -6517.40 -6521.90 -6521.10 -6514.80 -6521.00 
χ2 
125.20*** 135.70*** 117.10*** 115.50*** 115.90*** 130.30*** 120.60*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. + if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05, ** if p < 0.01, *** if p < 0.001. The host-country 2-digit 
industry dummies and year dummy are included.  
In ownership mode analysis, there are two endogeneity (or self-selection) 
issues: the impact of establishment mode choice (greenfield or acquisition) 
on ownership mode choice (IJV or WFOE) at the time of foreign entry and 
the impact of ownership mode choice on post-entry performance. Regarding 
the first endogeneity issue, existing research suggests that foreign-invested 
firms may self-select their ownership modes to justify their establishment 
modes of foreign entry and some determinants of both mode choices may be 
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the same (Chen, 2008). In terms of the second endogeneity issue, existing 
studies also suggests that some determinants of both ownership mode choice 
and post-entry performance may be the same. As for this study, first, since 
the CIW is not an ownership strategy at the time of foreign entry but a post-
entry ownership strategy, when the establishment mode of a firm is already 
established and not subject to any change, self-selecting ownership mode to 
justify establishment mode may be not a concern for a firm in the post-entry 
stage. Therefore, the first endogeneity issue is often considered not a concern, 
which is suggested by research on post-entry ownership change such as Yan 
and Zeng (1999) and Cuypers and Martin (2007). Second, since the 
relationship between ownership mode choice and post-entry performance is 
beyond this study, the second endogeneity issue is also not a concern in this 
study.  
Hypothesis 1 states that an IJV operating in an industry characterised by a 
high rate of WFOEs is more likely to convert into a WFOE. The estimated 
coefficients for ROWs are positive and significant in Model 2 (p<0.001) and 
Model 5 (p<0.10) in Table 17, supporting Hypothesis 1. In the early years of 
FDI in China, the IJV mode of organisation was commonly required by the 
government (Beamish, 1993). Establishing a WFOE contradicted the 
expectation of the government, and the operation of a WFOE was expected 
to experience severe government pressures. Those government pressures 
include government inspections and interference in day-to-day operations 
(Osland et al., 2001). From the institutional view, it is expected that the IJV 
mode of organisation was legitimised during the early years of FDI in China. 
IJV managers may not convert their IJVs into WFOEs when explicit 
restrictions on foreign investment in the industry are removed, because 
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WFOEs are more likely to be treated unfavourably than IJVs in host countries 
with poor institutions such as China (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000). 
However, more establishments of WFOE in the industry may send the 
information that the discrimination against WFOE lessens or disappears, and 
the WFOE mode of organisation becomes more legitimated. Since the 
management of IJV is often problematic, more IJVs may prefer to convert to 
WFOEs. 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the rate of highly profitable WFOEs in an industry 
is positively associated with the likelihood of the CIW. In Model 3 and Model 
6 in Table 17, the estimated coefficients for ROHPWs are positive and 
significant in Model 3 (p<0.01) and Model 6 (p<0.001), supporting 
Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2b states that rate of high-market share WFOEs in 
an industry is positively associated with the likelihood of the CIW. The 
coefficient estimation for the rate of high market-share WFOEs is positive 
and significant (p<0.001 in Model 7 in Table 17). Hypothesis 2b is supported. 
Our results suggest that IJVs imitate structures or practices that have 
produced positive outcomes for other foreign-invested firms and avoid those 
that have produced negative outcomes (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). High 
profit or high market share are often considered as positive outcomes, and 
therefore the ownership mode which has produced positive outcomes for 
other foreign-invested firms is expected to be imitated. In this context, the 
CIW is considered a legitimate way of achieving success in the industry. 
Hypothesis 3 states that an IJV in provinces characterised by SOE dominance 
is less likely to convert into a WFOE. The estimated coefficients for this 
variable are positive and significant (p<0.05 in Models 2-3 in Table 17), 
supporting Hypothesis 3. In China, SOEs operate under a centrally planned 
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system. The input and output of SOEs are not determined by the market but 
by government authorities (Lin et al., 1998). Governmental interferences on 
firms are more likely to be legitimised in regions dominated by SOEs, and 
adopting the IJV mode is an efficient way to reduce government interferences 
on foreign-invested firms (Osland et al., 2001). In addition, regional SOE 
dominance indicates that local rules and norms are significantly influenced 
by centrally planned (SOE) logic. Foreign-invested firms from market 
economies may find it difficult to understand and then follow those rules and 
norms, which the local equity partner is more capable of dealing with. In this 
context, the choice of the CIW is to expose a foreign-invested firm to adverse 
rules and norms shaped by local SOEs. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that an IJV in provinces characterised by a high degree 
of regional CAER is less likely to convert into a WFOE. In contrast to our 
expectation, the estimated coefficients for this variable are negative but 
insignificant (p>0.10) in Models 5-7 in Table 17. Hypothesis 4 is not 
supported. The coefficient is negative, which suggests that in regions where 
the local resource allocation institution is more centrally planned, foreign-
invested firms have more need to adopt the IJV mode to gain legitimacy from 
the local government for the purpose of obtaining local resources. This is 
consistent with our arguments. However, this relationship is insignificant. 
One possible explanation for the insignificant relationship is that the local 
resource allocation institution has a considerably limited influence on a 
foreign-invested firm’s resource acquisition. First, foreign-invested firms 
may rely on internal rather than local resources. Transition economies are 
characterised by uncertainty, and firms tend to rely on internal- rather than 
external resources when faced with uncertainty (Kobrin, 1982). Second, 
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foreign-invested firms’ reliance on local resources may be limited. Foreign-
invested firms may not rely on local resources such as financial capital and 
therefore are not subject to local institutions constraining the allocation of 
financial capital. In the robustness check, we rerun the regression using 
another NERI marketisation index to measure centrally-planned allocation of 
bank loans, and the insignificant result confirms this explanation.   
Hypothesis 5 states that an IJV operating in an FDI-restricted industry is less 
likely to convert into a WFOE. In contrast to our expectation, the estimated 
coefficients for this variable are positive and insignificant (p>0.10) in Models 
2-7 in Table 17. Hypothesis 5 is not supported. This interesting result is 
inconsistent with findings of Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Brouthers 
(2002), Morschett et al. (2008) and Delios and Beamish (1999). Our 
explanation for this surprising effect is based on an institutional view (Peng 
et al., 2008). One possible explanation is that foreign-invested firms operating 
in FDI-restricted industries may use alternative measures to leverage their 
local legitimacy. For instance, they may prefer to adjust their business 
practices rather than adopt the IJV mode to gain local legitimacy (Kostova & 
Roth, 2002). Foreign-invested firms may also use local management teams or 
keep in contact with host-country stakeholders such as media and unions (Liu 
& Woywode, 2013). They may also support local communities (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). 
Turning attention to the control variables, we can see that R&D intensive IJVs 
are less likely to convert into WFOEs. One possible explanation is that R&D 
intensive IJVs focus on technology creation in need of complementary 
knowledge controlled by local firms (Liu, Vahtera, Wang, Wang, & Wei, 
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2017), rather than  technology transfer in need of avoiding technology 
dissemination by local equity partners (Brouthers, 2002). The marketing 
intensity variable is statistically significant with a negative sign, indicating 
that marketing intensive firms produce unsophisticated consumer goods and 
therefore are appropriate to adopt a low control mode such as the IJV mode 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Firm age is negative and statistically 
significant, revealing that older IJVs are more reluctant to ownership mode 
changes. Country of origin appears to be negative and significant. An IJV 
invested by HMT investors is more likely to convert into a WFOE, because 
culturally those investors are more proximal to China, which may help 
accelerate their speed of cross-border integration. 
Robustness checks 
First, we use alternative measures for our explanatory variables. Alternative 
measures for rates of WFOEs by industry, rates of highly profitable WFOEs 
by industry and rates of high market-share WFOEs by industry, are computed 
at the 4-digit SIC level rather than 3-digit SIC level. An alternative measure 
for Regional CAER is computed by 1- an index assessing the extent to which 
bank loans of a province are allocated by the market. The index is collected 
from the NERI indices (Fan et al., 2001). An alternative measure for regional 
SOE dominance is computed by cumulative annual sales of industrial SOEs 
divided by cumulative annual sales of industrial firms in a province. The sales 









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Host-country informal institutions 
       
ROWs  2.13*   2.28***                  
 
 (1.01)   (0.44)                   
ROHPWs   1.60***   1.56***                 
 
  (0.33)    (0.42)                  
ROHMWs    1.08*   1.15*** 
 
   (0.54)    (0.30)  
Regional SOE dominance  -0.05+ -0.05* -0.05+    
 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)     
Host-country formal institutions        
Regional CAER     -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
FDI-restricted industry  0.27 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.25 
 
 (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.20)  
Controls         
R&D intensity -16.00* -13.82+ -14.22* -13.98+ -14.59* -13.85* -14.71*   
 
(7.49)  (7.98)  (6.77)  (8.19)  (6.88)  (6.85)  (6.87)  
Marketing intensity -11.76* -10.13 -10.45* -10.01 -10.81* -10.05+ -10.63*   
 
(5.86)  (6.48)  (5.08)  (6.53)  (5.23)  (5.23)  (5.15)  
Firm age -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Firm size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Financial capability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Export orientation 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  
Industry concentration 6.06 5.95 5.70 5.66 6.28 5.47 5.94 
 
(4.61)  (4.45)  (4.22)  (4.39)  (4.16)  (4.09)  (4.10)  
Country of origin -0.257** -0.19+ -0.204* -0.19+ -0.223** -0.219* -0.23**  
 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  
Constant  -4.32*** -4.95* -4.92*** -4.44 -5.34*** -4.59*** -4.75*** 
 
(0.31)  (2.43)  (0.36)  (2.29)  (0.48)  (1.17)  (0.45)  
N 
25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 
Log likelihood 
-6517.10 -6514.50 -6512.20 -6521.30 -6510.00 -6522.70 -6517.90 
χ2 
125.20*** 123.80*** 134.60*** 115.50*** 137.90*** 86.50*** 126.20*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. + if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05, ** if p < 0.01, *** if p < 0.001. The host-country 2-digit 
industry dummies and year dummy are included.  
Second, we use alternative models for regression. We employ the population-
averaged model to run the regressions instead of the random effects model. 
Unlike the random effects model with individual-specific effects, the 
population-averaged model averages out any individual-specific effects 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2013).  
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Host-country informal institutions 
       
Rate of WFOEs by industry  2.55**   3.21***                  
 
 (0.80)    (0.75)                   
Rate of highly profitable WFOEs by industry   2.42***   2.48                 
 
  (0.50)    (30.75)                  
Rate of high market-share WFOEs by 
industry 
   1.70***   1.59*** 
 
   (0.51)    (0.43)  
Regional SOE dominance  -1.56** -1.62*** -1.89**    
 
 (0.58)  (0.49)  (0.58)     
Host-country formal institutions        
Regional CAER      -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
    (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.02)  
FDI-restricted industry  0.25 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.25 
 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (3.99)  (0.19)  
Controls         
R&D intensity -16.00* -14.02* -14.61* -16.52* -16.35* -14.43 -14.84*   
 
(7.49)  (6.87)  (6.76)  (7.83)  (7.93)  (162.10)  (6.81)  
Marketing intensity -11.76* -10.69* -11.06* -12.48* -12.97* -10.99 -11.12*   
 
(5.86)  (5.43)  (5.21)  (6.32)  (6.52)  (146.10)  (5.13)  
Firm age -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.29 -0.29*** 
 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (1.79)  (0.06)  
Firm size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Financial capability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Export orientation 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.12)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (1.00)  (0.11)  
Industry concentration 6.06 5.93 5.55 7.15 7.16 5.50 6.43 
 
(4.61)  (3.95)  (4.11)  (4.57)  (4.63)  (58.90)  (3.98)  
Country of origin -0.257** -0.176* -0.185* -0.210* -0.263** -0.23 -0.24**  
 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (2.83)  (0.08)  
Constant  -4.32*** -4.35*** -4.56*** -5.00*** -6.11*** -4.72 -4.37*** 
 
(0.31)  (1.15)  (0.38)  (0.42)  (0.55)  (72.70)  (0.41)  
N 
25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 
Log likelihood 
















Standard errors in parentheses. + if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05, ** if p < 0.01, *** if p < 0.001. The host-country 2-digit 
industry dummies and year dummy are included.     
We also use the panel Probit model to run the regressions instead of the panel 
Logit model. Probit regression is also commonly used in management 
research to estimate the model when the data is cross-sectional and the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. The main difference between Logit 
regression and Probit regression is the distribution function. The results of the 
population-averaged model and the panel Probit model are also consistent 
with our main results. We also use the pooled Logit model to run the 
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regression for robustness check. We find consistent results with those 
alternative measures in Tables 18-22. 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Host-country informal institutions 
       
ROWs  1.63***   1.65***   
 
 (0.37)   (0.37)   
ROHPWs   1.54***   1.56***  
 
  (0.31)   (0.31)  
ROHMWs    0.96***   0.98*** 
 
   (0.26)   (0.26) 
Regional SOE dominance  -0.03* -0.03* -0.03*    
 
 (0.01 (0.01) (0.01)    
Host-country formal institutions        
Regional CAER     -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
FDI-restricted industry  0.16 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.15 
 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Controls         
R&D intensity -11.12* -10.63* -10.70* -10.79* -10.71* -10.78* -10.87*   
 
(4.99) (4.97) (4.96) (5.00) (4.95) (4.94) (4.98) 
Marketing intensity -6.61* -6.76* -6.73* -6.63* -6.81* -6.78* -6.69*   
 
(3.01) (3.06) (3.07) (3.04) (3.04) (3.05) (3.03) 
Firm age -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Firm size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial capability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export orientation -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Industry concentration 3.63 3.64+ 3.41 3.73+ 3.65+ 3.42 3.75+ 
 
(2.39) (2.21) (2.33) (2.19) (2.20 (2.33) (2.19) 
Country of origin -0.15** -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* -0.14** -0.14** -0.14**  
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant  -1.90*** -2.90*** -2.89*** -2.59*** -2.91*** -2.90*** -2.59*** 
 
(0.17) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) 
N 
25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 
χ2 
112.20 141.50 143.60 136.60 136.10 138.30 130.90 
Standard errors in parentheses. + if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05, ** if p < 0.01, *** if p < 0.001. The host-country 2-digit 











Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Host-country informal institutions        
ROWs 
 1.69***   1.71***   
 
 (0.37)   (0.37)   
ROHPWs 
  1.51***   1.60***  
 
  (0.30)   (0.31)  
ROHMWs 
   1.03***   0.96*** 
 
   (0.29)   (0.26) 
Regional SOE dominance 
 -0.03** -0.03** -0.04**    
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Host-country formal institutions 
       
Regional CAER 
    -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
FDI-restricted industry 
 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.15 
 
 (0.12) (0.11)  (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Controls  
       
R&D intensity 
-8.75* -8.33* -8.35* -9.23* -8.37* -8.76* -8.47*    
(3.88) (3.84) (3.83) (4.20) (3.83) (3.99) (3.81) 
Marketing intensity 
-6.52* -6.67* -6.57* -7.12* -6.71* -6.90* -6.55*    
(3.11) (3.15) (3.12) (3.46) (3.12) (3.26) (3.05) 
Firm age 
-0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17***  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Firm size 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial capability 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export orientation 
0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01  
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Industry concentration 
3.44 3.79 3.35 4.20 3.79 3.48 3.84  
(2.58) (2.48) (2.53) (2.70) (2.47) (2.64) (2.42) 
Country of origin 
-0.15** -0.12* -0.12* -0.14* -0.14** -0.14** -0.14**  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant  
-2.35*** -3.40*** -3.32*** -3.38*** -3.36*** -3.47*** -2.97*** 
 (0.17) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) 
N 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 
Log likelihood -6533.20 -6518.20 -6516.10 -6517.00 -6520.90 -6516.70 -6525.40 
χ2 91.37 106.00 104.70 143.00 100.70 125.80 88.18 
Standard errors in parentheses. + if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05, ** if p < 0.01, *** if p < 0.001. The host-country 2-















Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Host-country informal institutions        
ROWs 
 1.62***   1.65***   
 
 (0.37)   (0.37)   
ROHPWs 
  1.53***   1.55***  
 
  (0.31)   (0.31)  
ROHMWs 
   0.96***   0.98*** 
 
   (0.26)   (0.26) 
Regional SOE dominance 
 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03*    
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Host-country formal institutions 
       
Regional CAER 
    -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
FDI-restricted industry 
 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.15 
 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Controls  
       
R&D intensity 
-11.15* -10.66* -10.74* -10.82* -10.74* -10.81* -10.90*    
(5.01) (4.99) (4.99) (5.03) (4.97) (4.96) (5.00) 
Marketing intensity 
-6.61* -6.76* -6.73* -6.63* -6.81* -6.78* -6.69*    
(3.01) (3.05) (3.06) (3.04) (3.04) (3.05) (3.02) 
Firm age 
-0.22*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22***  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Firm size 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial capability 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export orientation 
-0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Industry concentration 
3.62 3.63+ 3.41 3.73+ 3.64+ 3.42 3.74+  
(2.39) (2.21) (2.33) (2.19) (2.20) (2.33) (2.18) 
Country of origin 
-0.15** -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* -0.14** -0.14** -0.14**  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant  
-1.90*** -2.90*** -2.89*** -2.59*** -2.91*** -2.90*** -2.59*** 
 (0.17) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) 
N 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 25958 
Log likelihood -6567.90 -6553.60 -6551.00 -6556.70 -6555.80 -6553.10 -6559.00 
χ2 113.10 142.20 144.20 137.40 136.80 138.90 131.70 
Standard errors in parentheses. + if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05, ** if p < 0.01, *** if p < 0.001. The host-country 2-
digit industry dummies and year dummy are included.  
4.7 Discussions and conclusions  
Our study is motivated by the desire to better understand how institutions may 
affect an IJV’s CIW strategy in a transition economy context. It contributes 
to the literature by explicitly investigating the host-country institutional 
determinants of the CIW. As noted earlier, prior research has explored the 
impact of host-country formal institutions, specifically FDI regulations, on 
the CIW. While several studies have acknowledged that host-country 
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informal institution is a relevant dimension in shaping a foreign-invested 
firm’s ownership strategy (Davis, Desai, & Francis, 2000; Yiu & Makino, 
2002), ours is the first one that has directly examined the role of host-country 
informal institutions in CIW research.  
We drew upon the institutional view (North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008; Scott, 
1995a) to examine how host-country institutions affect an IJV’s CIW strategy. 
Using a comprehensive panel dataset of manufacturing IJVs in China in 2005-
2006, we find that the rates of WFOEs, highly profitable WFOEs and high 
market share WFOEs in an industry have a positive relationship with the 
likelihood of the CIW in the industry. This finding further emphasises a 
foreign-invested firm’s reliance on inter-organisational imitation in their 
ownership strategy (Lu, 2002). We also find that SOE dominance in a region 
is negatively related to the CIW in the region. This result suggests that a 
region dominated by SOEs often turns out unfriendly to foreign-invested 
firms (Liao, 2015). However, we found no significant impact of the regional 
resource allocation institution on the CIW in the region. One possible 
explanation is that in a transition economy context foreign-invested firms may 
rely more on their internal resources than local resources (Kobrin, 1982), or 
that foreign-invested firms’ reliance on local resources is limited. We also 
find no significant difference between the likelihood of the CIW in FDI-
restricted industries and that in non-restricted industries. One potential 
explanation is that in FDI-restricted industries foreign-invested firms prefer 
to use alternative measures such as supporting local communities (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999) rather than using the IJV mode to leverage their local 
legitimacy. These findings are consistent with our arguments that host-
country institutions may affect the CIW through not only formal mechanisms 
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but also informal mechanisms. Our results also indicate that there may be a 
limit on the extent to which host-country formal institutions influence the 
CIW, because adopting the IJV mode is sometimes an unfavourable strategy 
for foreign-invested firms to respond to formal institutional pressures.  
Our focus on the role of host-country institutions in CIW research differs from 
yet complements some existing understanding in this field. Deng (2001) 
focuses on the impact of host-country formal institutions and finds that many 
IJVs converted into WFOEs when the host government reduces FDI 
regulations. Deng’s (2001) study advanced the literature by examining how 
host-country institutions affect the CIW through formal mechanisms. Our 
findings suggest that, by taking into account informal mechanisms, new 
insight has been provided on how host-country institutions influence the CIW. 
Our theoretical approach adds a new crucial dimension to institution-based 
CIW study and may stimulate future research in this direction.  
Our concentration on the role of host-country formal institutions in CIW 
study also differs from but complements prior research in this area. Aware of 
the status of FDI regulations as formal constraints on the CIW, existing 
studies have examined how the complexity of FDI regulations can influence 
the CIW and found a significant relationship between them (Puck et al., 2009). 
FDI regulations can also put pressure on foreign-invested firms via other 
mechanisms such as FDI-restricted industry (Lu & Ma, 2008), although our 
findings suggest that the likelihood of the CIW is not significantly different 
between FDI-restricted industries and non-restricted industries. Host-country 
institutions may also constrain foreign-invested firms through other formal 
mechanisms such as resource allocation institutions, although we find no 
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significant relationship between the regional CAER and the likelihood of the 
CIW in the region. Despite those insignificant findings, our research together 
with other research in this field, illustrates that taking into account both 
formal mechanisms and informal mechanisms, is in need to expand our 
understanding of how host-country institutions influence an IJV’s CIW 
strategy.  
There are limitations to our study, which may have implications for future 
research. First, the foreign-invested firms in our sample are relatively large 
firms. We include only foreign-invested firms with annual sales of at least 
five million RMB in our sample because smaller foreign-invested firms are 
not available in ARIES. As institutional impacts may differ among firms of 
different size (Beck, Demirg üç‐ Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005), future 
research may test whether our results are consistent for small and medium-
sized foreign-invested firms. Second, our use of archival data is incapable of 
capturing perceptions of managers of the pivotal variables such as 
institutional pressures on their ownership mode decision making (Meyer et 
al., 2014). Future research may employ survey instruments to complement 
our documentary data. Third, future research could further observe the 
mechanisms underpinning why and how regional CAER may not be related 
to the CIW in the region. Could it result from foreign-invested firms’ choice 
to reliance on internal resources in response to the uncertainty in transition 
economies (Kobrin, 1982)? Fourth, future research could also observe the 
mechanisms underpinning why and how the likelihood of the CIW is not 
different between FDI-restricted industries and non-restricted industries. It 
may also be interesting to address when foreign-invested firms use the IJV 
mode and when foreign-invested firms use alternative measures to cope with 
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host-country regulative pressures. Fifth, we do not have information about the 
establishment mode (greenfield or acquisition) of foreign-invested firms. 
Foreign-invested firms may self-select their ownership modes (IJV or WFOE) 
to justify their establishment modes (greenfield or acquisition) at the time of 
foreign entry (Chen, 2008), and future research may explore whether the 
establishment mode of a foreign-invested firm may also influence its CIW 
strategy. Fifth, another limitation is that we also do not have detailed 
information about the autonomy status of foreign-invested firms. As a result, 
we could not assess whether a foreign-invested firm has to challenge host-
country institutions to better serve its parent firm’s global strategy. Future 
research may adopt an institutional duality view on this question (Kostova & 
Roth, 2002). Sixth, our attention has only been paid to a few mechanisms 
through which host-country institutions may affect the CIW. Future research 
may complement this study by exploring other mechanisms through which 
host-country institutions may influence the CIW. Last but not least, this study 
is limited to host-country institutional explanations of the CIW. Future 
research may pay more attention to the impact of home-country institutions 
and cross-national institutional distance on the CIW, thus forming a more 
fine-grained institutional view of the CIW.  
This study also provides valuable managerial and policy implications. For IJV 
managers, we show them how to respond to the uncertain regulative 
environment in the host country. Our findings confirm that a common strategy 
used by IJVs is to imitate the ownership mode adopted by many foreign-
invested firms within an industry. The underlying rationale is that structures 
and practices adopted by many foreign-invested firms become more socially 
or culturally accepted (Lu, 2002), and such social or cultural acceptability is 
154 
 
vital for a firm’s survival and prosperity (North, 1990). For host-country 
policymakers, they may be most interested in our findings in IJVs’ 
behavioural patterns. Subnational SOE dominance may render local informal 
institutions unfriendly for foreign-invested firms to operate on their own 
(Liao, 2015). Our findings confirm that an IJV is reluctant to convert into a 
WFOE in host-country subnational regions dominated by SOEs. SOE 
dominance may drive foreign-invested firms, which are unwilling to adopt 
the IJV mode, out of the region. A foreign-invested firm may be unwilling to 
adopt the IJV mode because it is unwilling to share its output with the local 
partner or to be exposed to management problems associated with the IJV 
mode (Hennart, 1991a; Yan & Zeng, 1999). Therefore, for a subnational 
region attempting to attract more foreign direct investment, the subnational 
government is suggested to reduce the influence of local SOEs.  
In conclusion, this chapter reveals (1) two informal mechanisms - rate of 
WFOEs/successful WFOEs in a host industry and host-regional SOE 
dominance - through which host-country institutions may constrain the CIW 
and (2) two formal mechanisms - host-regional CAER and FDI-restricted 
industry - through which host-country institutions may not constrain the CIW. 
Our findings enrich our knowledge of inter-organisational imitation, state 
ownership, resource allocation institutions, and FDI regulations as four sets 
of institutional constraints on firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages and 





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 A holistic description of research 
Research on firm behaviours across international joint venture (IJV) life-
cycle stages has become an important issue in international business study 
with the massive growth in the formation of IJVs over the past three decades 
(Steensma et al., 2008). Host-country institutional constraints are widely 
considered to have a substantial impact on those firm behaviours (Brouthers 
& Hennart, 2007; Farole & Winkler, 2012; Puck et al., 2009), because they 
define legitimate firm behaviours and thus affect firm performance (Scott, 
1995a). Despite the importance of institutional mechanisms in defining 
legitimacy, existing research on the mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages is still 
incomplete. This thesis has revealed several new mechanisms through which 
host-country institutions may constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-
cycle stages.  
First, this thesis has explored the mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours at the stage of IJV formation. 
Specifically, this thesis has explored whether host-country institutions 
constrain the foreign direct investment (FDI) ownership mode choice (OMC) 
of an IJV through the host-country national cultural dimension of indulgence-
restraint (IR). By integrating institutional theory and transaction cost 
economics (TCE) (Roberts & Greenwood, 1997), we have developed the 
following two mechanisms: (a) by determining the effects of opportunism on 
TCE’s predictions of FDI OMC, the host-country national cultural dimension 
of IR moderates the relationships between transaction-cost attributes of an 
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FDI project and the FDI OMC of an IJV. IR reflects a society’s belief that to 
what extent the gratification of human desires has to be restrained and ruled 
by stringent social norms and values such as moral disciplines (Hofstede et 
al., 2010), while opportunism is widely treated as an immoral or guileful 
behaviour (Matthews, 1990). Low level of national indulgence is associated 
with severe social sanctions for enforcing moral disciplines, which can drive 
up the costs of opportunistic behaviours. Therefore, opportunism is more 
likely to happen in indulgent countries than in restraint countries. Firstly, a 
parent firm’s R&D intensity reflects the extent to which the firm’s 
transaction-specific investment in an FDI project is subject to its potential IJV 
partner’s exploitation and exploitation is an opportunistic behaviour 
(Brouthers, 2002). Such exploitation is more likely to happen in indulgent 
host countries than in restraint host countries and therefore a parent firm with 
high R&D intensity are less likely to choose the FDI OMC of an IJV in 
indulgent host countries than in restraint host countries. Therefore, host-
country indulgence will enhance the TCE-predicted negative relationship 
between a parent firm’s R&D intensity and the FDI OMC of an IJV. Secondly, 
a parent firm’s international experience reflects the firm’s ability to ascertain 
the extent to which its employees have carried out contractual obligations or 
performed under pre-specified agreements (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
Local employees’ opportunism can cause their deviations from contractual 
obligations or pre-specified agreements and therefore inexperienced MNEs 
are more in need of a host-country IJV partner familiar with monitoring local 
employees in indulgent host countries than in restraint host countries. 
Therefore, host-country indulgence will enhance the TCE-predicted negative 
relationship between a parent firm’s international experience and the FDI 
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OMC of an IJV. (b) By determining the effects of bounded rationality on 
TCE’s predictions of FDI OMC, the host-country national cultural dimension 
of IR moderates the relationships between transaction-cost attributes of an 
FDI project and the FDI OMC of an IJV. Firstly, IR reflects a society’s belief 
that to what extent the gratification of human desires has to be restrained and 
ruled by stringent social norms and values such as thrift (Hofstede et al., 2010), 
while thrift is often considered a valuable trait in a restraint culture (Akdeniz 
& Talay, 2013). Low level of national indulgence is associated with social 
praises of hard working in fulfilling contractual obligations or pre-specified 
agreements. Therefore, local employees’ deviations from contractual 
obligations or pre-specified agreements are more likely to happen in indulgent 
countries than in restraint countries, and therefore bounded rationality makes 
it more difficult for inexperienced MNEs to monitor their local employees 
on their own in indulgent host countries. Therefore, host-country indulgence 
will enhance the TCE-predicted negative relationship between a parent 
firm’s international experience and the FDI OMC of an IJV. Secondly, IR 
reflects a society’s belief that to what extent the gratification of human desires 
has to be restrained and ruled by stringent social norms and values such as 
maintaining order in the nation (Hofstede et al., 2010). Host-country political 
risk reflects the “risk or probability of occurrence of some political events 
that will change the prospects” of an investment (Haendel et al., 1975). Low 
level of national indulgence is associated with giving high priority to 
maintaining order in the nation and restraint countries tend to spend more 
efforts on maintaining political order than indulgent countries. Therefore, 
political risk is more likely to run out of control in indulgent countries than 
in restraint countries, and therefore bounded rationality makes it more 
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difficult for an MNE to cope with the more unpredictable political risk in 
indulgent host countries on their own. Therefore, host-country indulgence 
will enhance the TCE-predicted positive relationship between host-country 
political risk and the FDI OMC of an IJV. In addition, on one hand, since the 
host-country IJV partner’s opportunism is more likely to happen in indulgent 
host countries than in restraint host countries, an MNE should avoid the FDI 
OMC of an IJV in indulgent host countries. On the other hand, since host-
country employees’ deviations from their contractual obligations are more 
likely to happen and political risk is more likely to run out of control in 
indulgent host countries than in restraint host countries, an MNE should 
cooperate with a host-country IJV partner in indulgent host countries. The 
direct effect of the host-country national cultural dimension of IR on the FDI 
OMC of an IJV is opposing. 
To search for empirical evidence of the above arguments, we have collected 
cross-sectional data from 431 outward FDI projects conducted by Chinese 
manufacturing firms between 2006 and 2008. By analysing the data with 
Logit regressions, we have found that the relationships between transaction-
cost attributes of an FDI project (a parent firm’s R&D intensity, a parent 
firm’s host-country experience and host-country political risk) and the FDI 
OMC of an IJV are stronger in indulgent host countries than in restraint host 
countries. We have also found no significant direct relationship between the 
host-country national cultural dimension of IR and the FDI OMC of an IJV. 
Therefore, at the stage of IJV formation, we have confirmed that host-country 
institutions constrain the FDI OMC of an IJV through the host-country 
national cultural dimension of IR. 
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Second, this thesis has explored new mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours at the stage of IJV operation. To be 
specific, this thesis has explored whether host-country institutions constrain 
intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms through 
state ownership of the host-country IJV partner. By integrating technology 
gap and absorptive capacity into an institutional framework, we develop the 
following four mechanisms: (a) state ownership of the host-country IJV 
partner affects the technology gap between IJVs and domestic firms. Hong 
Kong, Macau or Taiwan (HMT) firms prefer non-state-owned host-country 
partners while non-HMT firms prefer state-owned host-country partners 
when investing in mainland China (Huang Jr, 2004). State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) tend to be more technologically advanced than non-SOEs, while non-
HMT firms tend to be more technologically advanced than HMT firms (Wang 
et al., 2009). Therefore, IJVs with state-owned host-country IJV partners 
(SIJVs) tend to be more technologically advanced than IJVs with privately 
owned host-country partners (PIJVs) and therefore the technology gap 
between SIJVs and domestic firms should be greater than that between PIJVs 
and domestic firms. (b) State ownership of a domestic firm affects the 
technology gap between IJVs and the domestic firm. According to what we 
have discussed above in mechanism (a), SOEs tend to be more 
technologically advanced than non-SOEs in China and therefore the 
technology gap between SOEs and SIJVs (PIJVs) should be smaller than that 
between POEs and SIJVs (PIJVs). (c) State ownership of the host-country 
IJV partner affects the absorptive capacity of domestic firms to learn from 
IJVs. SOEs often bear government policy burdens on improving domestic 
firms’ productivity (Buckley et al., 2007b; Lin et al., 1998) while POEs do 
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not. State ownership of the host-country IJV partner can bring such policy 
burdens to an SIJV and therefore SIJVs are more likely to help domestic firms 
improve their productivity than PIJVs. Domestic firms’ capacity to learn from 
SIJVs is stronger than to learn from PIJVs. (d) State ownership of a domestic 
firm affects its absorptive capacity to learn from IJVs. As we have discussed 
before in mechanism (a), SOEs tend to be more technologically advanced 
than non-SOEs in China. This may contribute to SOEs’ advantages over 
POEs in absorbing productivity spillovers (Liu et al., 2009). However, SOEs’ 
incentives to learn is weaker than non-SOEs due to policy burdens or soft 
budget constraints (Buckley et al., 2002). This may contribute to SOEs’ 
disadvantages over POEs in absorbing productivity spillovers (Xiao & Park, 
2017). Based on the assumptions that technology gap determines the potential 
for domestic firms to learn from IJVs and absorptive capacity determines the 
extent to which domestic firms can take advantage of this potential (Perri & 
Peruffo, 2016), we argue that state ownership of the host-country IJV partner 
enhances intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms 
and that state ownership of a domestic firm enhances intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from SIJVs to the domestic firm, while the impact of 
state ownership of a domestic firm on intra-industry productivity spillovers 
from PIJVs to domestic firms is insignificant. 
To find empirical support of the above arguments, we have collected panel 
data from 256396 domestic firms and 68381 foreign-invested firms in 
Chinese manufacturing industry between 1998 and 2007. By analysing the 
data with panel OLS regressions, we have found that (1) SIJVs generate a 
greater magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers to domestic firms 
than PIJVs and that (2) SIJVs generate a greater magnitude of intra-industry 
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productivity spillovers to SOEs than to POEs. We also find very limited intra-
industry productivity spillovers from PIJVs to both SOEs and POEs. 
Therefore, at the stage of IJV operation, we have confirmed that host-country 
institutions constrain intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to 
domestic firms through state ownership of the host-country IJV partner. 
Third, this thesis has explored new mechanisms through which host-country 
institutions constrain firm behaviours at the stage of IJV termination. 
Specifically, this thesis has explored whether through two informal 
mechanisms - rate of wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs)/successful 
WFOEs in a host industry and host-regional SOE dominance - and two formal 
mechanisms - host-regional centrally-planned allocation of economic 
resources (CAER) and FDI-restricted industry (excluding WFOE-only 
industries) - host-country institutions constrain the conversion of an IJV into 
a WFOE (CIW). Based on the assumption that host-country institutions will 
affect the legitimate status of an IJV relative to that of a WFOE, we develop 
the following four mechanisms: (a) rates of WFOEs/successful WFOEs in a 
host industry affect the legitimate status of an IJV relative to that of a WFOE. 
A high rate of WFOEs suggests that the WFOE mode of organisation is 
adopted by a large number of other firms. Frequency-based imitation suggests 
that firms are under isomorphic pressures to imitate structures and practices 
adopted by a large number of other firms (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 
Therefore, faced with a high rate of WFOEs in a host industry, an IJV is under 
strong isomorphic pressures to adopt the WFOE mode of organisation and 
therefore the CIW is more likely to happen. A high rate of successful WFOEs 
suggests that the WFOE mode of organisation tend to generate positive 
outcomes to other firms. Outcome-based imitation suggests that firms are 
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under isomorphic pressures to imitate decisions that generate positive 
outcomes to other firms and avoid those that generate negative outcomes 
(Haveman, 1993). Therefore, faced with a high rate of successful WFOEs in 
a host industry, an IJV is under strong isomorphic pressures to adopt the 
WFOE mode of organisation and therefore the CIW is more likely to happen. 
(b) Host-regional SOE dominance affects the legitimate status of an IJV 
relative to that of a WFOE. SOE dominance in a host region tends to 
legitimise governments’ inspecting and interfering with local firms, because 
SOEs are used to such government behaviours (Lin et al., 1998). SOE 
dominance in a host region can also limit foreign investors’ access to local 
business networks, because in transition economies SOEs often adopt 
network-based growth strategies (Peng & Heath, 1996) and control the access 
to old-fashioned business networks (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). As a result, 
host-regional SOE dominance will create a business environment unfriendly 
for foreign investors to survive and succeed on their own (Liao, 2015). The 
CIW is less likely to happen in such a host region. (c) Host-regional CAER 
affects the legitimate status of an IJV relative to that of a WFOE. Host-
regional CAER determines the extent to which regional governments control 
a firm’s access to local economic resources (Fan & Wang, 2011). From a 
government’s perspective, the IJV mode of organisation may be more 
legitimate than the WFOE mode, since an IJV is more likely to provide 
domestic firms with access to foreign technologies and management skills 
than a WFOE (Beamish, 2013; Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999). Because 
governments control both definition of the legitimate FDI ownership mode 
and allocation of local economic resources, an IJV is better positioned in the 
regional resource allocation systems than a WFOE. Therefore, the level of 
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host-regional CAER negatively affects the CIW. (d) FDI-restricted industry 
affects the legitimate status of an IJV relative to that of a WFOE. An FDI-
restricted industry is strategically important or politically sensitive or 
characterised by overcapacity or overinvestment (Reuters, 2017). Foreign 
investors are faced with huge regulative pressures operating in an FDI-
restricted industry, and maintaining an IJV partnership with domestic firms 
can effectively reduce such regulative pressures (Meyer et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the CIW is less likely to happen in an FDI-restricted industry than 
in a non-restricted industry.  
To obtain empirical evidence of the above arguments, we have collected panel 
data from 16583 manufacturing IJVs in China between 2005 and 2006. By 
analysing the data with panel Logit regressions, we have found (1) positive 
relationships between rates of WFOEs/highly profitable WFOEs/high 
market-share WFOEs in a host industry and the CIW and (2) a negative 
relationship between the level of host-regional SOE dominance and the CIW. 
We have also found insignificant effects of host-regional CAER and FDI-
restricted industry on the CIW. Therefore, at the stage of IJV termination, we 
have confirmed that host-country institutions constrain the CIW through two 
informal mechanisms - rates of WFOEs/ successful WFOEs in a host industry 
and host-regional SOE dominance. We have found no evidence that host-
country institutions constrain the CIW through two formal mechanisms - 
host-regional CAER and FDI-restricted industry.  
5.2 Theoretical implications 
This thesis contributes to IJV literature in the following ways. In general, it 
reveals several new mechanisms through which host-country institutions 
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constrain firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages and may stimulate 
future research in those directions. In particular, first, it broadens our 
knowledge of culture as a set of institutional constraints on firm behaviours 
across IJV life-cycle stages. This thesis is the first to explore the impact of 
the national cultural dimension of IR on firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle 
stages, although existing research has examined the impact of national 
cultural dimensions of power distance (Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Morschett 
et al., 2010; Shane, 1993), individualism-collectivism (Jung & Suh, 2013), 
uncertainty avoidance (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli, 1996; 
Makino & Neupert, 2000) and long-term orientation (Peng & Beamish, 2014) 
on firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages. Second, it deepens our 
knowledge of state ownership as a set of institutional constraints on firm 
behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages. While existing research discloses the 
impact of state ownership of the host-country IJV partner on an IJV’s 
management challenges (Liu et al., 2014), social control (Chen et al., 2010) 
or probability of dissolution (Mohr et al., 2016), this thesis is the first to reveal 
its impact on productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms. This thesis 
is also the first to disclose the impact of host-regional SOE dominance on 
firm behaviours at the stage of IJV termination, while previous studies focus 
on its impact on firm behaviours at the stage of IJV formation (Liao, 2015; 
Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Third, it enriches our knowledge of inter-
organisational imitation as a set of institutional constraints on firm behaviours 
across IJV life-cycle stages. Existing studies also focus on the impact of inter-
organisational imitation on firm behaviours at the stage of IJV formation (Lu, 
2002; Xia et al., 2008), while this thesis is the first to reveal its impact on firm 
behaviours at the stage of IJV termination. Fourth, it expands our knowledge 
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of resource allocation institutions as a set of institutional constraints on firm 
behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages. We have found no significant impact 
of host-regional CAER on the CIW, while previous research has found 
significant effects of host-country allocation of land (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005), 
host government resource dependence (Wang et al., 2017) and host equity 
market (Driffield et al., 2016) on firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle 
stages. Fifth, it expands our knowledge of FDI regulations as a set of 
institutional constraints on firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages. We 
have also found no significant impact of FDI-restricted industry (excluding 
WFOE-only industries) on the CIW, while existing studies have found 
significant effects of FDI restrictions (Blodgett, 1991, 1992; Brouthers, 2002; 
Franko, 1989) and complexity of FDI regulations (Puck et al., 2009) on firm 
behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages.  
5.3 Managerial and policy implications 
This thesis has some important implications for both managers and 
policymakers. This thesis advises managers of how to organise efficiently and 
legitimately at different IJV life-cycle stages under host-country institutional 
constraints. First, at the stage of IJV formation, we advise managers to stick 
to conventional low transaction-cost mode of entry - the IJV mode when 
uncertainty of an FDI project is high and the WFOE mode when asset 
specificity of an FDI project is high (Zhao et al., 2004) - in indulgent host 
countries but not necessarily in restraint host countries, because the findings 
of Chapter 2 suggest that transaction costs have a greater impact on the 
organisational efficiency of an FDI project in indulgent host countries than in 
restraint host countries. Opportunism and/or bounded rationality will amplify 
the transaction costs associated with managing an FDI project in indulgent 
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host countries, because indulgent countries are characterised by a lower level 
of moral disciplines and a higher level of leisure and disorder than restraint 
countries (Hofstede, 2011).  
Second, at the stage of IJV operation, we advise managers to pay special 
attention to partner selection-related spillovers. It is widely accepted that one 
benefit of join-venturing with an SOE is that it can help an MNE to gain 
market entry into state-controlled industries or favourable government 
policies (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997; Ma et al., 2006). However, the findings 
of Chapter 3 suggest one cost of joint-venturing with an SOE - generating 
positive intra-industry productivity spillovers from the IJV to domestic firms, 
which can erode an IJV’s technological advantages against their local rivals. 
The findings of Chapter 3 also suggest one benefit of joint-venturing with a 
POE - preventing intra-industry productivity spillovers from the IJV to 
domestic firms, which can protect an IJV’s technological advantages against 
their local rivals.  
Third, at the stage of IJV termination, we advise managers to selectively 
imitate the ownership mode of other foreign-invested firms within the same 
host industry, since the findings of Chapter 4 suggest that the ownership mode 
adopted by large numbers of foreign-invested firms (frequency imitation) and 
that adopted by successful foreign-invested firms (outcome imitation) gains 
strong legitimacy, which is vital to the success of a firm (Scott, 1995a). 
Frequency imitation is an effective strategy for a firm to deal with uncertainty 
and outcome imitation is an effective way of producing positive outcomes 
and avoiding negative outcomes though vicarious learning (Haunschild & 
Miner, 1997). We also advise managers not to convert an IJV into a WFOE 
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in a host region dominated by SOEs, because the findings of Chapter 4 
suggest that the IJV mode is more legitimate than the WFOE mode in those 
regions. Regional SOE dominance may render local institutions unfriendly 
for MNEs to operate on their own (Liao, 2015), and keeping an IJV 
partnership with host-country firms may help cope with those institutions.  
This thesis also advises host-country policymakers of how to attract and 
utilise inward FDI effectively by shaping local institutions. To attract inward 
FDI effectively, we first advise policymakers of indulgent countries to 
enhance local rules and laws against business opportunism, because the 
findings of Chapter 2 suggest that the risk of opportunism is higher in 
indulgent host countries than in restraint ones, which could expose asset-
specific FDI projects to local exploitations (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
Asset-specific FDI projects may avoid those indulgent host countries where 
host-country formal institutions are insufficient to protect their transaction-
specific assets. Second, we advise policymakers of indulgent countries to give 
a higher priority to maintaining political order in the nation to provide 
foreign-invested firms with a relatively stable political environment, since the 
findings of Chapter 2 suggest that political risk is more likely to run out of 
control in indulgent host countries than in restraint host countries, which 
could expose an FDI project to frequent political changes in indulgent host 
countries. Without a stable political environment, high costs of responding to 
political changes can drive potential foreign investors away from indulgent 
host countries. Third, we advise host-country policymakers to reduce the 
influence of local SOEs on regional business, because Chapter 3 indicates that 
IJVs are reluctant to convert into WFOEs in host regions dominated by SOEs. 
Regional SOE dominance may create adverse institutions under which 
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foreign investors can hardly thrive on their own (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005) and 
those which are unwilling to form an IJV partnership with host-country firms 
may give up their plan to invest in those regions.  
To utilise inward FDI effectively, we first advise host-country policymakers 
to alter the conventional belief that establishing IJVs will assist domestic 
firms’ absorption of foreign knowledge (Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; Trade 
& Conference, 2003), because the findings of Chapter 4 suggest that intra-
industry productivity spillovers from PIJVs to domestic firms are very limited. 
This could result from PIJVs’ lack of motivations to share knowledge with 
domestic firms, since they are rivals in host markets. This could also result 
from small technology gaps between PIJVs and domestic firms, so that there 
is little potential for domestic firms to learn from PIJVs. Then, we advise 
host-country policymakers to give more weight and support to the 
establishment of SIJVs, because Chapter 4 also suggests that SIJVs can 
generate a greater magnitude of intra-industry productivity spillovers to 
domestic firms, especially to SOEs, than PIJVs. Since an SOE is a 
government agency, host-country policymakers can legitimately require an 
SIJV to share knowledge with domestic firms. 
5.4 Research limitations and further research recommendations 
The research limitations should be acknowledged, considering reliability and 
validity issues.  
First, our assumption of conformity to institutions is limited. We could not 
assess whether an MNE has to challenge host-country institutions to better 
serve its global strategy, because we do not have such detailed information. 
We assume that conformity is the principal response to host-country 
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institutional constraints. Although this assumption is subject to critics due to 
the possibility of nonconformity to institutions, it is widely adopted in 
existing international business research possibly due to the prevalence of 
conformity to institutions (Brandau, Endenich, Trapp, & Hoffjan, 2013). 
Future research may take into account home-country institutional constraints 
and adopt an institutional duality view on institutional constraints on firm 
behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages (Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
Second, our assumption of investment motivations is limited. We also could 
not include investment motivations in either theoretical discussions or 
empirical tests, because we do not have detailed information about investment 
motivations. We assume that the effects of host-country institutional 
constraints on firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages are 
independent of investment motivations. This assumption is subject to critics 
since existing literature suggests that investment motivations may interact 
with other factors to influence firm behaviours (Girma, 2005), but this 
assumption is widely adopted in existing international business research 
(Driffield & Love, 2007) possibly due to data availability. Future research 
may take into account investment motivations and study the potential 
interacting effects of investment motivations and host-country institutional 
constraints on firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages.  
Third, the scope of firm behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages is limited in 
our research. We only consider the FDI OMC of an IJV at the stage of IJV 
formation, intra-industry productivity spillovers from IJVs to domestic firms 
at the stage of IJV operation and the CIW at the stage of IJV termination. We 
fail to take into account other firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages 
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such as choosing between a greenfield IJV and an acquired IJV (Hennart & 
Slangen, 2014) at the stage of IJV formation or liquidating an IJV (Yan & 
Zeng, 1999) at the stage of IJV termination. Since host-country institutions 
may also influence an MNE’s choice between a greenfield subsidiary and an 
acquired subsidiary (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000) or to liquidate an IJV (Lu 
& Xu, 2006), future research may consider a wider scope of firm behaviours 
across IJV life-cycle stages. 
Fourth, the scope of host-country institutional constraints is limited in our 
research. We only take into account host-country national culture, state 
ownership, inter-organisational imitation, resource allocation institutions and 
FDI regulations. We pay little attention to other host-country institutional 
constraints such as the rule of law (Hearn, 2015; Ramachandran et al., 2011; 
Roy & Oliver, 2009) or shareholder protections (Devarakonda et al., 2020; 
Meyer et al., 2014; Talamo, 2009), although they may affect firm behaviours 
at different FDI life-cycle stages (Meyer et al., 2014). Future research may 
consider a wider scope of host-country institutional constraints on firm 
behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages. 
Fifth, the scope of our research contexts is limited. We only concentrate on 
behaviours of firms that have operations in China. Although we believe that 
our theoretical arguments may apply to a wider scope of transition countries, 
a single home-country or host-country sample may not fully reveal that 
potential. Compared to other transition economies such as Vietnam, China 
has some unique attributes including huge outward FDI in resource extraction 
activities dominated by SOEs (Gammeltoft, 2008) and an earlier start in SOE 
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reform (Vu, 2009). Future research may examine whether our findings are 
consistent with firm behaviours in other transition economies. 
Sixth, the consistency of our research contexts is limited. Resulting from data 
availability in measuring host-country institutions, especially the national 
cultural dimension of IR, we conduct the first empirical study in a multiple 
host-countries context while the second and third empirical studies in a single 
host-country context. This arrangement may bring inconsistency to the 
research settings of this thesis. Future research may collect data for the 
subnational cultural dimension of IR and examine its influence on firm 
behaviours across IJV life-cycle stages in a single host-country context.  
Seventh, the measurement validity of our research is limited. Our use of 
archival data is incapable of capturing the perceptions of managers of the 
pivotal variables such host-country institutional pressures (Meyer et al., 2014) 
on firm behaviours at different IJV life-cycle stages. Future research can use 
survey instruments to complement our documentary data.  
Eighth, the scope of industry is limited in our research. We consider only firm 
behaviours in the manufacturing industry. Some existing studies suggest that 
to some extent behaviours of manufacturing firms differ from those of service 
firms (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). Therefore, future research may also test 
whether our arguments are supported by behaviours of service firms.  
Last but not least, the firm size in our research is limited. We have used data 
from the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics (ARIES) data 
source for all empirical tests. Due to data availability in the ARIES, we can 
only examine the behaviours of relatively large firms with annual sales of at 
least five million RMB (Wang et al., 2014b). Since small and medium-sized 
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firms (SMEs) may be subject to liability of smallness (Maekelburger et al., 
2012), their responses to host-country institutional constraints may differ 
from larger firms (Beck et al., 2005). Future research may examine whether 
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